The current crisis in Mali was not unexpected, although most national
and international players were eager to maintain an unrealistic view of
political developments in this Sahelian country. This crisis reflects
the decay of state institutions and practices: the Malian army collapsed
and patronage does not mean democracy. Its crisis is built on four
dynamics that have their own effects: the debatable implementation of
previous peace settlements with the Tuareg insurgency; the growing
economic importance of AQIM activities in the Sahelian region; the
collapse of the Qaddafi regime in Libya; and the inability or
unwillingness of Algeria to play the role of regional hegemon now that
its rival (Libya) has stopped doing so.
While the Tuareg rebellion has been able to gain from the collapse of the Malian army in the north, it should be noted that the many armed groups have different agendas, and position themselves differently towards the local population and the Malian state. What is unclear is whether they will be able to co-exist on the same territory while trafficking and a protection economy are the only sustainable resources.
The jihadi aspect of some components of the insurgency has to be understood in context and should not be seen as erasing social and economic differences in a heterogeneous northern Mali. It proves the successful demonstration effect that small groups such as AQIM and Ansar ed-Din can have. It should also draw more attention to a regional context that could provide radicals with a wider audience and credibility by building opportunistic coalitions. Read more
While the Tuareg rebellion has been able to gain from the collapse of the Malian army in the north, it should be noted that the many armed groups have different agendas, and position themselves differently towards the local population and the Malian state. What is unclear is whether they will be able to co-exist on the same territory while trafficking and a protection economy are the only sustainable resources.
The jihadi aspect of some components of the insurgency has to be understood in context and should not be seen as erasing social and economic differences in a heterogeneous northern Mali. It proves the successful demonstration effect that small groups such as AQIM and Ansar ed-Din can have. It should also draw more attention to a regional context that could provide radicals with a wider audience and credibility by building opportunistic coalitions. Read more
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