China Begins Construction Of Naval Base On The Horn Of Africa In Djibouti

China has started construction on a naval logistics base in Djibouti, Reuters reports, citing a spokesperson from the Chinese Ministry of Defense.

Some 4,800 miles away from Beijing, China’s new naval base in Djibouti, a tiny African nation of less than 1 million people, sits on a strategic position on the Horn of Africa along key global shipping routes where the mouth of the Red Sea meets the vast Indian Ocean.

This new base, which China describes as naval “support facilities”, will be China’s first overseas military outpost, giving Beijing access to the Arabian Peninsula and positioning its forces near its investments in sub-Saharan Africa.

China had conducted anti-piracy operations in the region in recent years and is seeking to expand its capacity to respond to growing threats to its interests abroad, Reuters reports.

China’s new base will be used “primarily for military rest and resupply in carrying out naval escort, peacekeeping, and humanitarian duties,” Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said.

“Currently, initial construction on the relevant facilities has already started and China has already dispatched some personnel to launch relevant work,” Wu said.

Establishing resupply and logistics points abroad is a vital component of China’s push to expand its global reach, as Stratfor Global Intelligence explains. readmore

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Why China and Saudi Arabia Are Building Bases in Djibouti

China and Saudi Arabia are building military bases next door to US AFRICOM in Djibouti—and bringing the consequences of American withdrawal from the region into stark relief.

by Joseph Braude and Tyler Jiang

Djibouti, a resource-poor nation of 14,300 square miles and 875,000 people in the Horn of Africa, rarely makes international headlines. But between its relative stability and strategic location—20 miles across from war-consumed Yemen and in destroyer range of the pirate-infested western edge of the Indian Ocean—it is now one of the more important security beachheads in the develohttp://www.amazon.com/Joseph-Braude/e/B001KDV64Kping world. Its location also matters greatly to global commerce and energy, due to its vicinity to the Mandeb Strait and the Suez-Aden canal, which sees ten percent of the world’s oil exports and 20 percent of its commercial exports annually.[1] Since November 2002, the country has been home to Camp Lemonnier, a U.S. Expeditionary base—the only American base on the African continent—along with other bases belonging to its French, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese allies. (The United States maintains numerous small outposts and airfields in Africa, but officially regards Lemonnier as its only full-scale military base on the continent.)

But now there are two new kids on the block: On January 21st, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry announced an agreement with Djibouti to host its first-ever base beyond the South China Sea, and construction commenced days later.[2] Though Beijing called the installation a “logistics and fast evacuation base,” the Asian power’s “near-abroad” rivals, such as Taiwan, opined that it is more likely the beginning of a new, aggressive military buildup to rival the United States. Six weeks later, Saudi Arabia declared that it too would construct a base in Djibouti,[3] apparently as part of its newly assertive policy of countering Iranian proxies politically and militarily throughout the region.[4] read more

UN: 'Ethnic cleansing under way' in South Sudan

A UN commission on human rights in South Sudan has said a steady process of ethnic cleansing is underway in the country, involving massacres, starvation, gang rape and the destruction of villages.

On Wednesday, three commission members who had travelled around South Sudan for 10 days said they observed deepening divisions in a country with 64 ethnic groups.
"There is already a steady process of ethnic cleansing underway in several areas of South Sudan using starvation, gang rape and the burning of villages," commission chairwoman Yasmin Sooka told a news conference.
"The stage is being set for a repeat of what happened in Rwanda and the international community is under an obligation to prevent it."
The alleged ethnic cleansing comes after almost three years of fighting between government forces, rebel troops and allied militias. A political split between President Salva Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar escalated into a military conflict in December 2013.
The conflict - which has killed tens of thousands, caused widespread hunger and forced three million people from their homes - has pitted Kiir's Dinka ethnic group against Machar's Nuer ethnic group and other groups suspected of supporting the rebels.
"You have so many different groups of armed actors, including the military who are talking about dealing with a rebellion and putting it down," Sooka told Al Jazeera in a separate interview.
"You have ethnic tensions because people have been displaced from their land based on ethnicity. Everybody believes that a military conflict is almost inevitable in different parts of the country."

READ MORE: South Sudan's displaced face hunger

Adama Dieng, UN special adviser on the prevention of genocide, has called on the Security Council to impose an arms embargo to prevent the ethnic violence from escalating into full-on genocide.
In the Equatorias region, the commission "heard numerous accounts of corpses being found along the main roads," the UN's Godfrey Musila said.
The ethnic attacks have spread even to the southern Equatoria region, which had not experienced much violence until now, he said.
"The commissioner said that armed conflict could be averted if targeted sanctions, arms embargo and a hybrid court is set up to hold those accountable for crimes committed," Al Jazeera’s Hiba Morgan said, reporting from Juba.

"The UN Security Council is expected to vote on targeted sanctions and an arms embargo this week, but the hybrid court … seems far from becoming a reality." READMORE

What Is Behind the Oromo Rebellion in Ethiopia?

The Ethiopian government is now faced with unprecedented rebellion from the Oromo ethnic group, consisting 35% of the Ethiopia’s population, which it disingenuously claims is inspired by terrorism. The immediate pretext is the Addis Ababa Master Plan encroaching and displacing Oromo farmers, but this masks a deeper grievance which has been brewing for at least two decades under this regime, and for over a century under successive highland Ethiopian rulers. In the following, I will try to provide some context and offer some analysis of the danger Ethiopia and the region are facing READMORE 

Ethiopia arrests top Oromo opposition politician after Europe Parliament speech

ADDIS ABABA, Ethi­o­pia — A top opposition politician from Ethiopia’s Oromo ethnic group who criticized the country’s state of emergency at the European Parliament has been arrested, the government announced Thursday.

A colleague said police arrested Merera Gudina and three others from his home in Addis Ababa late Wednesday shortly after his return from Europe. The trip included a Nov. 9 speech to the European Parliament in which Gudina said tens of thousands have been arrested under the state of emergency in Ethiopia. read more

China’s Africa Pivot: A Cause for Alarm?

In late November, China announced its first-ever overseas military outpost in the strategic African state of Djibouti. Its purpose, according to the Chinese leadership, is to assist Chinese Navy ships on United Nations antipiracy missions. This comes on the heels of a security and defense agreement signed between Chinese Minister of Defense Chang Wanquan and Djibouti’s Minister of Defense in February 2014, which included the use of Djibouti as a port for the Chinese Navy as well as assistance in building up the operational capabilities of Djibouti’s military.
For some, this is a cause for alarm. China has until now refrained from emulating the United States’ longstanding policy of maintaining military bases in key geographic locations, condemning what it considers to be gestures of American imperialism and hegemony. Instead, Chinese foreign policy has centered on economic development. In March 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road initiative (also known as “One Belt One Road”), a $140 billion economic plan to consolidate and strengthen China’s geopolitical power. Similarly, on December 4, at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit in South Africa, President Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion in development assistance to Africa, including $5 billion in grants and interest-free loans.
What Beijing is slowly coming to realize, however, is that their economic interests are best served when developed hand-in-hand with military capabilities. The American practice of building bases where it serves national interests has allowed for continued US leverage and influence worldwide. If China hopes to continue its ascension into the upper echelons of international power, building up their military is not only a logical step; it’s a necessary one. Earlier this year and for the first time ever, China dispatched a combat battalion to take part in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in South Sudan, where Beijing has major oil interests. China’s 2015 military budget of about $145 billion was the second-largest in the world following the US, but many foreign analysts say China’s real military spending is significantly higher.
For China, focusing on Africa and Djibouti in particular is of critical importance. Strategically, Djibouti’s location on the Horn of Africa is ideally situated to protect oil imports from the Middle East that traverse the Indian Ocean on their way to China. From Djibouti, China gains greater access to the Arabian Peninsula. The United States recognizes Djibouti’s geographic importance and maintains a base there, as do France, Germany and Japan.
Currently, Beijing is funding 14 mega projects in Djibouti worth $9.8 billion, six times more than Djibouti’s GDP. China has invested heavily in infrastructure, including hundreds of millions of dollars spent upgrading the country’s undersized port. It has additionally financed a railroad extending from Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, to the Port of Djibouti—a project that cost billions of dollars. Beijing also cultivates its relationship with Djibouti by treating government officials to lavish ceremonies and summits more appropriate for leaders of greater global significance. Such political gestures, designed to stoke personal egos, can have a great effect in states where government officials wield significant power and wealth in their countries, such as Djibouti’s President Ismail Guelph and his top aides.
Africa presents a perfect opportunity for China as it begins flexing its foreign policy muscles. The continent, still reeling from the scars of its colonial past, lags behind all other continents in every human development metric possible. That’s why China, with its economics-based foreign policy, offers an attractive package for developing countries: a lack of stigma associated with former colonial powers, easy loan deals and a willingness to invest in projects Western institutions deem too risky. China has economic, political and military deals with numerous African states including Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria (three countries rich in energy resources). At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation on December 4th, following Xi Jinping’s announcement of $6 billion in development assistance, Zimbabwe President and current Chairman of the African Union Robert Mugabe said: “[Xi Jinping] is doing to us what we expected those who colonized us yesterday to do.”
China’s attractive economic deals aren’t just limited to infrastructure projects. It has a burgeoning arms and defense trade, and Chinese Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) are already incredibly popular, especially in the Gulf. The price tag can be as little as $1 million for a Chinese Wing Loong I compared to $30 million for a US Reaper. Furthermore, the US has prohibitive policies on who can purchase their weapons and defense systems, while China does not. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq are all confirmed operators of Chinese drones. China’s military continues to expand; on New Year’s Eve, the Chinese Defense Ministry announced that it was building its first indigenous aircraft carrier—the second one ever for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
These developments have not escaped the notice of Western military and intelligence officials. The US maintains Camp Lemonnier, its only base in Africa, in Djibouti. Lemonnier is home to 4,000 American troops who train and conduct counterterrorism operations, including fighter planes and Predator UAV drone operations in Yemen and Somalia. In 2013, Washington announced a $1.3 billion expansion plan for Lemonnier. In response to the February 2014 Chinese-Djiboutian security agreement, the US agreed to pay double its previous rent for Lemonnier in the hope of maintaining positive relations with President Guelleh. Overall, US investment in Djibouti amounts to $70 million annually.
A May 2015 Diplomat article likens the situation in Djibouti to a “zero-sum [game], where one power’s gain can only come at the other one’s loss.” Yet I would be cautious with this comparison.
For one, China’s base should be a welcome asset to counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf, which is a good opportunity for China to assume more responsibility on an important multilateral issue. Furthermore, China does have a legitimate stake in responding to domestic pressure to protect its citizens in the region. During the Libyan civil war in 2011, the Chinese government extracted nearly 36,000 workers. In 2012, militants captured 29 Chinese workers on a road project in Sudan. In November 2015, three Chinese executives were killed when Islamic militants stormed a hotel in Bamako, the capital of Mali. Just before, ISIS announced that it had killed a Chinese captive, Fan Jinghui. China’s interest in the Middle East is also fueled by the rise of the Islamic State, which has recruited hundreds of Uyghurs (a contentious Chinese Muslim ethnic group) into its foreign fighter ranks. In December 2015, ISIS released its first ever Chinese language recruiting video.

With the inevitability of Chinese military expansion looming on the horizon, the US and China must improve their bilateral relations and allow for Djibouti to serve as a productive analog in the future. Not only does the Sino international development plan have more financing available than Western ones, but is also more receptive in regions such as Africa and parts of the Middle East. Reports have leaked of Chinese plans to open at least a dozen new overseas military bases. China has also already sought to gain strategic military access through economic incentives in countries such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. readmore

The Chinese have struck a deal with the nation of Djibouti to build a military base in close proximity to a critical American military base on the Horn of Africa

According to PRI, “since 2014, this small chunk of the Horn of Africa, little bigger than the state of New Jersey, has been the only place in the world where the warships of the two countries’ navies are moored alongside each other.”
The Chinese are the second country to cut a deal with Djibouti this year to create a military presence, joining Saudi Arabia, which made a similar agreement early this year. China has invested heavily in the area by pumping billions into Djibouti and neighboring Ethiopia. The new base will both protect their investments and give them increased military presence in one of the world’s most important trading routes.
The Chinese government earlier this year began funding a natural gas pipeline to the main port in Djibouti that Beijing will then export. The major agreement has led some to caution that the government of Djibouti may depend too heavily on Chinese credit to function; estimates show a possible increase in the national debt of nearly 20 percent for the nation by 2017.
China has been increasing its investments worldwide, particularly focusing in Africa on Djibouti and neighboring Ethiopia. The new base will both protect its investments and give increased military presence in one of the world’s most important trading routes. Africa is uniquely situated at the opening of the major shipping lanes of the world. The Suez Canal and the Red Sea are among those major shipping routes, connecting Africa and Europe with Asia.
In an interview with Breitbart News, Captain Pete O’Brien, a military expert with the London Center, explained that China wants to be the dominate power in Asia. To achieve this goal, it must control passage through the South China Sea and the shipping lanes that lead to it.
Captain O’Brien went on to explain the Theory of Sea Power, written by A.T. Mahan in 1890. For China to become the dominate power in Asia and eventually the world, it would not necessarily have to control land, but control the approaches to the land. In the case of the South China Sea, this would mean Singapore in the east and the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the west. If it can control the flow of trade on both sides, it will hold quite a dominant position in not only Asia, but the world. A base in Djibouti would be pivotal to monitoring traffic in the sea.
The Chinese government is currently embroiled in an extensive territorial dispute in the South China Sea far west of Djibouti. China has declared everything within a self-proclaimed “nine-dash line” its exclusive territory, spanning waters within the borders of Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It has developed military facilities in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, on artificial islands built on reefs largely considered to be international territory. The Philippines has filed a case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague requesting a verdict that plainly notes where the borders of China end. China has vowed to disregard any such verdict.
A robust presence in Djibouti, then, could help secure China’s control around waters far to the west of the South China Sea, while the militarization plan underway in the Spratly and Paracel Islands would help cement its presence in the east. The small island nation is situated between the south opening of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, which in recent years has become the epicenter of regional and international conflict.

Secretary of State John Kerry visited Djibouti in mid-2015, highlighting for the Associated Press that “the mainly Sunni nation has become a critical part of U.S. foreign policy. With U.S. ground forces out of Yemen amid a civil war, Djibouti is a launching pad for drone attacks on al-Qaida and other extremist groups as well as a key transit point for Americans trying to get home.” readmore

Djibouti: Dangerous Game

DJIBOUTI (HAN) February 13, 2016 – Public Diplomacy and Regional Stability Initiatives News. The importance of Djibouti in modern international affairs is entirely tied to its location on the Horn of Africa, a hotbed of chaos where stability is the most important currency. Currently, a flurry of countries either maintain military bases or use the country’s ports as a logistics hub for their military operations. The 23,000 km2 mini-state acts as a safe harbor for the Japanese, the French, the Americans, the Europeans and, increasingly, for the Chinese. In a sharp reversal of stance, Beijing acknowledged last week that they would in fact be building their first African military base in Djibouti, a stone’s throw away from Camp Lemonnier, the American installation. A 10 year contract has been signed, worth according to previous estimates at $100 million per year.
As China looks for ways to expand its economic and military presence in Africa, Djibouti has become its forward base. Before last week’s announcement, the Chinese already leased space at the country’s deep water port for warships that take part in the counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden readmore

"Will China's Naval Base Cause Friction with the US?

Djibouti's recent decision to host a Chinese naval facility caught many Western analysts flat-footed, showing how difficult it can be to predict the behaviour of wily autocratic regimes like that of President Ismail Omar Guelleh—or, for that matter, the government in Beijing.  China chose this small country on the Horn of Africa as the location of its first overseas military base since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, raising the question of whether the Sino-American dynamic in Africa might be moving to a new, more competitive—perhaps even militarized—phase.  For a region which has suffered from being the focus of outside power struggles before, the question is pressing.
China, which claims that non-interference in the affairs of other states is a central plank of its foreign policy, has long disclaimed any intention to build military bases abroad.  Beijing has even criticized the United States for what it regards as its "militarized" approach to Africa.  Yet the only permanent U.S. military base on the continent is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, a country that also hosts French and Japanese facilities.  The new Chinese facility is a highly significant step away from the country's traditional approach to the continent, which has focused on diplomacy and trade much more than security.
In the early years of decolonization across Africa, China's relations with the newly-emergent states was based on their shared identity as developing countries who had been victimized by Western powers and China's desire for diplomatic recognition and support in bodies such as the UN General Assembly.  But since Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched Beijing's "Going Out" strategy of aggressive overseas commercial expansion in 1996, economic ties between China and many African countries have grown at an exponential pace and have come to define the relationship.
Protection of these commercial interests, and the many Chinese citizens who now live in Africa, is undoubtedly one reason for Chinese interest in a base in Djibouti.  Civil strife in Libya in 2011 and in Yemen last year stretched the capabilities of Chinese naval vessels dispatched to evacuate Chinese citizens.  Controversy over the Chinese presence in Africa is rising in many countries, and Djibouti represents an island of stability from which Beijing might be able to run future evacuation operations in a region undergoing many upheavals.  It is also conveniently located to provide logistical support for Chinese vessels involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.
But neither of these factors wholly explains Chinese interest in a Djiboutian base.  With incidents of piracy in 2015 having dwindled to just 1% of those recorded in 2011, the dimensions of the problem appear to be waning rather than growing.  This  begs the question of why China was interested in countering piracy in the Gulf of Aden to begin with despite its nominal policy of non-interference in regional affairs.  Trade doesn't appear to be the answer.  Africa as a whole accounts for only 5% of China's total overseas trade, and over half of that is with faraway Angola and South Africa.  China's commercial ties with countries in the Horn are a tiny part of its overall trade with Africa.
Instead, China's interest in a facility in Djibouti is much more about its global maritime strategy than it is specifically about the Horn of Africa.  It seems unlikely that China intends to use the new facility to project power across Africa and the Middle East, as the United States does from Camp Lemonnier.  Beijing's intentions are thoroughly aquatic: it is interested in power projection across water, not land.  The facility in Djibouti is likely to be the first such instalment around the Indian Ocean from which Beijing can in the future protect the maritime trade routes which are so crucial to its economy.  The fact that Djibouti is located at the crucial choke point through which vessels traversing the Suez Canal must pass only enhances its attractiveness as a base location.
China's goals for the new base means there is little reason to think it heralds the beginning of an era of Sino-American confrontation in the Horn of Africa—at least not yet.  During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in a zero-sum struggle in which the countries of the Horn of Africa were forced to take sides.  In the 1970s, warfare between Somalia and Ethiopia was fuelled by the superpower competition and the readiness of the superpowers to arm their client states.  The U.S. and China have both worked hard to avoid the appearance or reality of a Cold War–style competition in Africa, and Djibouti's ability to play both sides is a welcome sign that for now this dynamic continues.
But there is a risk that, as both China and the U.S. increase their involvement in a small and crowded country, tensions in the broader Sino-American relationship might eventually have negative implications for Djibouti.  At the moment, the two outside powers have different goals in the region, and there is little reason for them to come into conflict.  The U.S. uses Camp Lemonnier to prosecute the "war on terror" across Yemen and North Africa, an issue that interests China little because Al-Qaeda and related groups do not pose a threat to Beijing.  China's own interest in having a base from which it may be able to project maritime power across the Indian Ocean in the future need not conflict with America's goals either.  Although it remains to be seen how China will ultimately use its growing maritime influence, it would be unfortunate and disproportionate for Washington to react to developments such as this in a way that makes conflict more likely.
Yet President Guelleh needs to be careful.  It suits his purposes to develop a new strategic ally at a time when he is under pressure from Washington over democracy and human rights.  But he risks creating a situation in which, if Sino-American relations worsen or even break out into open warfare at some point in the future, Djibouti and the wider region could be forced to take sides or even become a theatre of hostilities.  Such a conflict would not be likely to have its origins in regional issues, but would affect the region nonetheless.  By being so promiscuous in his choice of international partners, Guelleh has hence made the future of his country dependent on decisions made in faraway places by much more powerful countries.  The great blessing that Djibouti has in its strategic location, which Guelleh has leveraged to garner many benefits from the country's partners, could then become a "location curse".  Wily as he may be, it is now no longer in Guelleh's power to ensure that such an eventuality doesn't come about. readmore

For more information about this publication please contact the Belfer Center Communications Office at 617-495-9858.

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The Geopolitics of Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Summer 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 2

Accelerating processes of globalization and cross-border flows of information, communication, militants, money and matériel are reconfiguring the geopolitics of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Domestic and external drivers of conflict are increasingly intermeshed as problems transcend national boundaries and can no longer be contained within states. Issues have become transnationalized as supra- and sub-state networks of exchange bypass state controls and erode what little remains of Cold War-era distinctions between the internal and external domains. Previously localized conflicts have developed regional and transregional dimensions, knitting together the zones of instability, while the growth of powerful and violent non-state actors poses a profound challenge to existing security arrangements and the international order. In turn, new mechanisms of collaborative and multilateral approaches have emerged to tackle these issues. However, they have largely failed to address the underlying problems generated by the erosion of local carrying capacities, governing capabilities and a crisis of political legitimacy and authority in the two regions.
These subregional conflicts constitute an unstable zone of cross-border insecurity and informal networks that link the two largely distinct security complexes in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. The growth of multibillion-dollar shadow business networks spanning the Gulf of Aden complicates conventional counterterrorism and counterpiracy strategies and defies attempts to contain the threat of the spread of radicalization at its source. This has profound implications for the future stability of the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and for the security of the commercial shipping lanes that transit the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab. International actors' attention has, however, focused more narrowly on the threat posed by the reconstitution of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen in 2009 (and, to a lesser degree, Al-Shabaab in Somalia), and a succession of high-profile attempted attacks that have attracted global attention.
Following years of comparative neglect, the focus of the international community needs to shift to the interconnected sociopolitical, economic and transnational challenges confronting Yemen, Somalia and their regional environs. Yemen and Somalia face parallel challenges from insurgency, terrorism, economic hardship and ineffective governments that are perceived to lack legitimacy. Viewed through a narrow terror-centric prism, the region has become a dangerous node of international terrorism, as evinced in MI5 director-general Jonathan Evans' very public warning in September 2010 of the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from militants training in Yemen and Somalia. This, he said, "shows many of the characteristics that made Afghanistan so dangerous a seedbed for terrorism in the period before the fall of the Taliban."¹ Western engagement in each country has been based on a state-building framework involving diplomacy, development and defense; yet, the priority attached to secu rity-sector intervention has undermined the balance of political and economic action needed for this approach to succeed or be sustainable in the longer term.² Such an approach risks exacerbating a dangerous misalignment between the short-term security-centric priorities of the international community and the longer-term measures and comprehensive reforms necessary to recreate a base level of political legitimacy, social cohesion and economic sustainability.

The paper has five parts: (1) An exploration of the changing dynamics of regional security and the gradual convergence of the phenomenon of weak and failed states on each side of the Gulf of Aden. (2) An investigation of how the GCC states have responded to these new security problems astride a geostrategically critical trade route linking them to Western economies and markets. As the key regional stakeholder, the GCC states have a collective interest in addressing the root causes of human insecurity and minimizing their overspill to their own polities. Yet, Qatar apart, their record of engagement has hitherto been underwhelming, with a clear preference for a strategy of containment over serious consideration of the scale and complexity of the challenge posed by Yemen and Somalia. (3) A look at the recalibration of local and regional approaches to insecurity in the Horn of Africa that have achieved limited change in diplomatic mediation and conflict management. Much remains to be achieved, and at present the regional states remain divided; there is little prospect of an autonomous conflict-resolution capability developing. (4) An examination of the wider geopolitical implications for maritime and energy security and the internationalization of response measures. (5) A consideration of the extent to which security is being reconceptualized to encompass the emergence of increasingly non-military challenges to fragile polities in transition   readmore 

Cuba and Eritrea: setting the record straight

here is an old Jewish proverb that says: “A half-truth is a whole lie.”
I recently came across an article written by Sam Farber entitled “Contradictions of Cuba’s foreign policy” that appears in the ISO newspaper. I found this article fascinating because it went on to claim how self-interested Castro is and, because of such, Cuba therefore has no real relationship to true revolution.
Farber declares that “while it is true that Cuba has followed a consistent policy of opposition to U.S.-sponsored imperialism, it has not followed that policy towards other imperialist aggressors. In fact, the Cuban government has taken the side of oppressor states on various occasions…. [and] also supported the suppression of the Eritrean national movement in the 1970’s.” Farber then asks: “How can we explain the contradictory policies of Cuba regarding the right of nations to self-determination?”

I was genuinely intrigued by Farber’s questions and comments because A) I love to learn about history and B) I visited Cuba and found myself inspired by its people and the Cuban nation – so much so that while in Cuba I better understood the meaning of Frederick Douglass’ quote “without struggle there is no progress”. So, naturally, I was inclined to question Farber’s article because I wanted to understand his point of view. readmore

U.S. Sets Stage for Libya-Like Regime Change in Eritrea, “Africa’s Cuba”

The U.S. is moving towards war against Eritrea, a fiercely independent African nation of only six million people. Washington has deployed its UN “human rights” proxies to justify another “humanitarian” military intervention, remarkably like the UN-sanctioned aggression against Libya, in 2011. The UN panel charges Eritrea with “enslaving” and murdering its own people – a pack of imperial lies. Obama is set to add another war to his bloody legacy. readmore

Eritrea Is Not for Cubans

By Karen De Young June 22, 1978

The Cuban government is determined, on both political and ideological grounds, to avoid direct military involvement in Ethiopia's war against Eritrean secessionists, authoritative sources here have indicated.
In a series of conversations, apparently seeking to convey in private what they have not said publicly, the high-level sources said that Cuba would resist Ethiopian pressure to commit its troops to Ethiopia's 17-year-old civil war, and would continue to push for a political solution to the conflict.
According to U.S. estimates, more than 15,000 Cuban soldiers remain stationed in Ethiopia after helping to win a border war against Somalia earlier this year.
Despite repeated objections from the United States and other Western nations to the continued Cuban presence, and strong expressions of concern that the troops would be deployed on Ethiopia's other, internal front, Cuba has refused to commit itself publicly either to withdrawal or to noninvolvement in Eritrea.
The possibility of Cuban troop deployment in Eritrea has also angered many of Cuba's Friends in the Third World, particularly militant Arab nations that support the Eritrean movement.
Just yesterday Iraq, the Soviet Union's closest ally in the Middle East, raised the stakes for Soviet-Cuban involvement in Eritrea. Iraqi Information Minister Saad Qasim Hammudi said in an interview that Baghdad, because of its support for the Eritrean cause, would not allow supply planes bound for Ethiopia to use Iraqi air space Readmore

Castro Seen Undecided On Cuban Role in Eritrea

By Murrey Marder April 28, 1978

Cuban President Fidel Castro and Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam engaged in an unusual public coloquy at a Havana rally Wednesday night over the Cuban military role in Afria.
Outwardly, Mengistu, a lieutenant colonel who is chairman of the Marxist Ethiopian Provisional Military Administrative Council, was paying tribute to Cuba's combat support in driving Somali invaders from Ethiopia's Ogaden region last month. Castro was basking in the praise.
But Cstro and Mengistu were also virtually debating, between the lines of their public remarks, whether Cuban troops should be drawn into the remaining and older war in Ethiopia against the secessionist province of Eritrea. This is one of the most difficult choices Cuba has faced in the projection of its military power into Africa, in coordination with the Soviet Union.
Diplomatic strategists in Washington and other capitals yesterday were amining monitored broadcasts of public remarks by Castro and Mengistu for clues to the private discussion underlying their speeches before an estimated million people in Havana's Plaza de la Revolucion.
A Carter administration official concluded yesterday, "Mengistu is trying to get his hooks in a little deeper. But Castro is standing pat."
Mengistu ended his week-long visit to Cuba yesterday without indicating whether he had obtained Cuba's agreement use its American estimated 17,000 military personnel in Ethiopia for the Eritrean conflict. As far as is known, Cuba until now has permitted only some military advisers, and reportedly a few of its pilots, to join in the gangled Eritrean conflict, State Department sources said yesterday.
State Department press spokesman Hodding Carter III said "we do not know" the extent of Cuban military involvement in Eritrea "beyond some indications that Cuban pilots have flown combat missions in Eritrea." On Wednesday an Eritrea "beyond some indications that Cuban pilots have flown combat missions in Eritrean Liberation Front broadcast claimed that Cubans were playing a "major role" in carrying out bombing sorties against "liberated" zones of Eritrea.
Ethiopia is believed to be attempting to mount its major seasonal offensive against the Eritrean secessionists. It would use greater power than in past failures, employing some of the estimated billion dollars of Soviet military equipment it has received in the past year, plus Soviet Cuban military advice and Cuban troops - if it can get them.
In the judgment of American analysts, Castro laid out at Wednesday night's Havana rally, a rationale "that could permit him to go either way - leaving his options open." Until recently, Cuba, which is in the awkward position of having trained some of the Eriteam liberation forces, described Eritrea as an internal Ethiopian problem.
Following the defeat of the agressors against the Ogaden," Castro said in introducing Mengistu, "imperialism and its reactionary allies madly demand the immediate withdrawal of Cuban combatants in Ethiopia."
"Anyone can understand," he said, "that this also means the immediate initiation of new acts of agression. We, as a matter of Principle, emphatically refuse to discuss with the United States this point or any other point concerning Cuba's solidarity with the just struggles of the peoples of Africa."readmore

Cuba in Africa: A Forgotten History

During the funeral of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, members of the United States press were surprised when President Obama was photographed shaking the hand of Cuba’s President Raul Castro. The handshake, which was purely formal and ceremonial, did not have any meaning beyond what the protocol for such occasions demands. In 2000 President Bill Clinton shook the hand of President Fidel Castro which also led to all sorts of idle speculation about the meaning of that gesture. Unfortunately, there is a blind spot in the U.S. media and a terrible lack of understanding of the context of the historical relationship between the United States and Cuba. Readmore

THE CONTESTED LEGITIMACY OF ERITREAN STATEHOOD:THE EFFECTS OF ARAB INTERVENTION, (1941-1993)

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Eritrea: The Effects of Arab Intervention, (1941

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1993)

Abstract

This report has embarked on to contribute to the understanding of the diplomatic history

of Eritrea‘s war of independence. Its primary p urpose is to assess critically the genesis

and effects of Arab interventionist policies in Eritrea. The underlying arguments are:Arab intervention was base on a flawed perception of Eritrea, as an Arab nation, whichcould rather be explained in light of their ̳national interests‘ across the spectrum of ideological, political and security concerns. Second, that intervention was not critical to

the victory of this largely self reliant struggle. This work has also probed into the core of

the matter in an endeavor to piece together a rough balance sheet of thee interventions to

show that they were even detrimental to the struggle. Though it has put much emphasis

on the diplomatic circumstance that surround the struggle, as the formative years of the

struggle had contributed to that end, as a way of introduction this academic inquiry has

started two decades before the start of the armed struggle, stretching the time frame from

1941 to 1993. The year 1941 marks the ending of Italian colonial rule and the start of

the British Military Administration, and 1993 signifies the rebirth of the country as a

legitimate sovereign by its admission to the United Nations readmore

Fidel Castro’s anti-colonialist legacy

Cuba in Africa
Castro’s (and Guevara’s) role in assisting the decolonisation process in Africa was second to none. From the early 1960s, Castro threw all his support behind the Algerian liberation struggle against France.
Cuban doctors and soldiers were some of the first to arrive in Algeria to offer a hand to the independence forces fighting to push French colonialism out of their country.
In the following years, that support increased in size and scope across the continent. Castro offered Cuban support to the liberation struggles in Mozambique, Namibia, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), Guinea-Bissau, and Angola, among many others.
In some cases, this support involved military interventions that did not always go according to plan. For example, in the mid-1970s after Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed by the Derg regime, Castro was forced to change sides – as the Soviets, East Germans, Czechs, and Americans also did – during a realignment of forces in the region provoked by ongoing disputes between Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Cuban personnel were required to abandon their former ally Mohammed Siad Barre, the Somali president, who now sided with the Americans, and take sides with their new ally Mengistu Haile Mariam. Cuban troops fought the Somalian invasion of the Ogaden alongside Ethiopian forces, and by remaining in Ethiopia gave at least tacit support to Ethiopian campaigns against Eritrean guerrillas fighting for independence.
This position almost certainly became a political dilemma for Castro, who until then had always supported anti-colonial movements of liberation across the world.
While Castro’s intervention in the Horn of Africa was characterised by dubious decisions and tainted by the purges that Mengistu’s regime would eventually carry out between 1977 and 1978, his involvement in the Angolan war is the outstanding episode in his career as a champion of decolonisation.

Not only did he demonstrate to the world that Cuba was far from being a pet project of the USSR – Cuba’s support for the socialist MPLA was done without the approval of the Kremlin and almost certainly against its wishes. It also helped raise his profile, and that of Cuba, to new levels of recognition and influence throughout the developing world. readmore 

Military history of Cuba

The Military history of Cuba begins with the island's conquest by the Spanish and its battles afterward to gain its independence. Since the Communist takeover by Fidel Castro in 1959, Cuba has been involved with many major conflicts of the Cold War in Africa and Latin America where it had supported Marxist governments and rebels from liberation movements who were opposed to their colonial masters and/or allies of the United States. Readmore