MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

Migration is clearly a major issue across Africa. Indeed, migration – both within countries and across borders – can be seen as an integral part of labour mar- kets and livelihoods across much of the continent for at least the last century. Over time, and in different places, migration has taken a number of different forms. It has cut across class and skill boundaries, and exists in widely differ- ent geographical and demographic contexts. Migration represents an important livelihood strategy for poor households seeking to diversify their sources of income, but is also characteristic of the better off, and indeed of many African elites. In practice, however, the link between migration and poverty is often viewed more negatively. It is assumed across much of the continent that it is poverty that forces poor people to migrate, rather than migration being a potential route out of poverty. The poor are also generally seen as those worst affected by conflict-induced migration, itself a prominent feature in Africa. The movement of skilled and/or wealthy Africans is also generally viewed negatively (e.g. there is long-standing concern on the African continent with the impact of the ‘brain drain’ of African professionals). Only slowly, and in relatively few quarters, is understanding emerging of the potentially positive role that migration itself can play in reducing poverty, or of the possibilities for ‘mobilisation’ of the African diaspora in the fight against poverty. Meanwhile, public policy remains a long way from building effectively on such understanding Read more

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE STATE OF ERITREA

During 2005 the political landscape in Eritrea continued to be dominated by the lack of progress towards a peaceful solution in Eritrea – Ethiopian relations. Structural economic imbalances continue to hamper economic development. Weather conditions have been favourable in the highlands comparative to other years, but food security remains a serious issue. In line with the Mid Term Review of the EU - Eritrea Cooperation, signed in 2004, projects, programmes and activities comprise interventions in three main sectors: 1) Infrastructure –including Transport and Energy 2) Rehabilitation and Recovery Programmes, covering reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure, resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, demobilization and de-mining and 3) Education. During 2005 progress was made towards the implementation of EU funded programs in most sectors. Problems were faced in the completion of certain tender procedures and in the implementation of the de-mining program. As shown in Annex I, in 2005 some €19M have been disbursed in Eritrea, of which €3.8M out of budget lines financed projects. The forecasts for 2006, provided in Annex VII, indicate that disbursements shall take place at a quicker pace: it is anticipated that some €29.9M will be paid out during this year, of which €6.8M from budget lines. For 2007, forecasted disbursement will further accelerate to €39.9M, of which some €4M from budget lines Readmore

PROFILE OF THE SOMALI REFUGEES IN EMKULU CAMP ERITREA

he Somali refugees in Emkulu Camp Eritrea are mainly of the Madiban tribe who immigrated to Djibouti region after the down fall of President Siad Barre in 1992. They crossed from Djibouti to Eritrea in 1993 in search of better protection and job opportunities and settled in Assab, the second largest port city of Eritrea. The influx of refugees from Djibouti towards Assab was never-ending and UNHCR established a refugee camp about 20 kms. South of Assab at Harsile Camp. The camp did not last long due to the war that took place between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998. Yet again the same refugees were relocated from Harsile Camp to Emkulu Camp. Currently Emkulu Camp hosts over 4000 Somali refugees and even now there are new arrivals each month. The first arrivals have resided in the camp for the last 8 years and have good relationship with the locals in Emkulu district and the vicinity Read more

Rape and the Arab Spring: The Dark Side of the Popular Uprisings in the Middle East

The Middle East is undergoing a profound and dramatic political transformation. But the analysis of the scope, pace, and quality of this change has focused largely on the quality and results of initial elections in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. Unfortunately, this sort of analysis overlooks how these transitions are affecting women and minorities— key indicators of the robustness of democracies around the world. Despite the prominent role played by women in organizing the popular movements that have overthrown and challenged authoritarian regimes across the region, the early results on the treatment of women in three key countries—Egypt, Yemen, and Libya— raise serious concerns about the future of democracy and human rights in the Middle East as the region experiences tectonic political change. As momentous as these changes are, they are occurring within a social context that has made sexual violence against women a powerful instrument of political repression. In many cases sexual violence against women is a desperate reaction of the powerful elite groups linked to authoritarian leaders and dictators who are rapidly losing power and relevance. Like other forms of violence and repression, sexual violence against women has been used as a tool to punish or intimidate those advocating for political change. The most horrific of these tools being used to control women is rape. Using rape as a weapon of war is not new, but in the context of patriarchal religious societies, it holds unique potential as a horrific tool of political repression. This issue brief outlines the role women have played in three countries that experienced changes in leadership—Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. It analyzes the use of sexual violence as a tool of continued repression and a means to hold back political change, and attempts to offer recommendations to U.S. policymakers and others in the international community to help protect women in the Middle East. At the same time, the limitations in influence foreign powers like the United States have in shaping the social and political realities of these countries must be acknowledged. Read more

SOUTH SUDAN: DISPLACEMENT PLAGUES WORLD’S NEWEST NATION

The Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) is going through a major displacement crisis. The country is playing host to tens of thousands of refugees who fled fighting in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. In addition to this, hundreds of thousands of people are displaced due to violence within South Sudan itself. The country also has to contend with a large influx of southerners returning from northern cities. This crisis could soon become overwhelming for the world’s newest country – a country already struggling to deliver security and basic services to its citizens. If this displacement crisis is not adequately addressed, all the positive efforts now being made to incorporate returnees into the social, political, and economic fabric of South Sudan will be short lived readmore

The Creation of South Sudan: Prospects and Challenges

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan achieved independence by separating from the northern state of Sudan to become the youngest nation in the world. The redoubtable challenge it faces is the continuance of the violent conflicts, mainly in the north, that is frustrating any attempt to bring about peace so necessary to get on with the first task of any new nation–socio-economic development. After nearly five decades of struggle, two civil wars and the deaths of nearly 2.5 million people, Sudan has reached a pivotal moment in its history. The dictates of its present circumstances emerge from its long history of oppression and the need now to find its own identity, as also the confidence of being an autonomous state. South Sudan's complex and interdependent relationship with Sudan will have a definitive impact in its trajectory as a nation, and on the prospects and challenges it currently encounters. This paper seeks to assess the present challenges that exist for South Sudan through an understanding of the historical narrative of the Sudanese state prior to the independence of the southern state. A crisis of national identity has been the key to the Sudanese state's history of violence and has manifested itself through recent ethnic conflicts such as in Darfur and in the Nuba Mountains. A history of interdependency and tensions over resource ownership has led to the heightened standoff in the oil-rich Abyei region, raising questions regarding the way ahead for the two warring regions. Sudan and South Sudan's dependency on oil, the strategic importance of countries (like India) investing in the region, and the longterm issues of sustenance will play a vital role in ensuring a future of peace, progress and prosperity for both the Republics. read more

South Sudan Nhial Deng Nhial: We are on brink of war

South Sudan's foreign minister has warned his country is on the brink of war with Sudan following days of fierce fighting along the border. Nhial Deng Nhial told the BBC Sudanese forces had invaded the town of Jau, which was in the south. He urged the international community to intervene and said he hoped full-scale hostilities could still be avoided. South Sudan seceded from the north in July following years of civil war in which some 1.5m people died. The border between the north and south has not yet been officially designated. Since July Khartoum and Juba have accused each other of supporting rebels in the border areas. 'Tanks and aircraft' Mr Deng Nhial said the clashes in Jau, which he said was a town in Unity state, were the biggest threat to peace since South Sudan's independence. "Although there have been frequent aerial bombardments of different places in the Republic of South Sudan, we think that Khartoum has raised this offensive to an entirely new level by committing ground forces to cross into the Republic of South Sudan," he told the BBC's Focus on Africa programme. "We are still very much committed to the principle of dialogue with Khartoum - we are still hopeful that we can pull back from the brink of outright war." Earlier, Col Philip Aguer, spokesman for South Sudan's army - the South People's Liberation Army (SPLA) - told the BBC that Khartoum had used tanks and long-range artillery in the offensive on Jau, which started on Saturday. Read more

"Turning Pebbles": Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya

This report examines the police and judicial response to the violence following the 2007 elections, which pitted ruling party supporters and the police against opposition-linked armed groups and civilians. Human Rights Watch found that of the 1,133 or more killings committed during the violence, only two have resulted in murder convictions. Victims of rape, assault, arson, and other crimes similarly await justice. Police officers, who killed at least 405 people during the violence, injured over 500 more, and raped dozens of women and girls, enjoy absolute impunity Read more

Recovery and Development Politics: Options for Sustainable Peacebuilding in Northern Uganda

This Discussion Paper addresses questions related to the causes, evolution and legacies of the prolonged war in Northern Uganda between the rebel LRA and government forces. It critically examines the Government of Uganda’s experience in drafting and implementing various plans for recovery and peacebuilding in Northern Uganda and proffers explanations for their limited success. It also analyses the threats posed by the continued marginalisation of Northern region and the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment relative to the more prosperous regions of the country. Of note is the concern about a possible regression into violent conflict and the breakdown of the fragile peace in Acholiland. The paper providesan alternative reading of the conflict and makes a compelling case for a radical paradigm of economic recovery, sustainable peace and development based on conflict-sensitive, inclusive, socially just and people-centred policies. It is essential reading for scholars, peace and security practitioners, activists and humanitarian and development workers with a keen interest in post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Africa. Read more

Stabilising the Congo

The brief considers the ‘stabilisation approach’ adopted by both the international community and national government to address the continued insecurity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Considering stabilisation also offers a way of conceptualising and engaging with the root causes of displacement. Political implications of the stabilisation agenda are brought into sharper relief by focusing on a single question: stabilisation by whom and for whom? Rather than continuing to support the State unconditionally, the brief calls on international actors to strengthen and exercise their combined leverage in critical priority areas that together form a comprehensive ‘road map’ to long-term peace and stability following the elections. Read more

Return to War in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains

This brief looks at what is driving the fighting in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains. With Sudan facing financial collapse, economic normalization must be part of negotiations with Khartoum to end the war in the Nuba Mountains and promote democratization throughout Sudan. Summary points: 1. The response to the renewed war in Sudan’s Nuba Mountains has been • driven largely by a human rights and humanitarian crisis. 2. The crisis will continue indefinitely without a political agreement that acknowledges the Nuba rebellion is self-sustaining and reflects a wider malaise within the new Republic of Sudan. 3. With Sudan facing financial collapse, economic normalization must be part of negotiations with Khartoum to end the war in the Nuba Mountains and promote democratization throughout Sudan. Readmore

Selective Outrage: The Dangers of Children's DDR in Eastern DRC

This article offers a critique of the dominant approach to children’s disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Drawing on narratives of young people who were formerly associated with armed groups, the article highlights some of the mistaken assumptions of the discourse and practice of children’s DDR, and shows how far removed they are from young people’s actual experience. I argue that the global outrage against the “child recruitment” phenomenon is dangerously selective, and that it obscures the entrenched structural violence, which deeply and negatively affects the lives of young people in eastern DRC today. Since the mid-1990s, the use and recruitment of children by armed groups is an issue that has dominated international discourse on children’s experience of violent conflict. From the 1996 report by Graça Machel on the impact of conflict on children,1 to the 1998 adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) codifying the use and recruitment of children under the age of 15 years as a war crime, to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC), adopted in 2000, global attention has mobilized forcefully behind the “child soldier” phenomenon Readmore

Gender-Based Insecurity and Opportunities for Peace: Supporting the Reintegration of Young War-Affected Mothers

In conflicts throughout the world, armed forces and groups recruit children to fight, maintain their camps, perform labor and be used for sexual purposes. The experiences of children associated with armed forces and groups (CAAFAG) are not uniform, nor can there be a uniform approach to helping them when the conflict is over. This article examines the gendered experiences of girls prior to recruitment, during their time with the fighting forces, through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes, and in their communities after formal DDR has ended. We also present some of the experiences of the Participatory Action Research (PAR) Study with Young Mothers in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Northern Uganda—a study conducted predominantly with former CAAFAG which used a highly participatory methodology to help participants attain community-based reintegration. In the PAR study young mother participants took a central role in the design and implementation of their reintegration process. A mixture of self-help style psychosocial support and livelihood support were critical to their success. As this population had exceptionally low social status, lacked confidence and self-respect, and did not have rudimentary economic skills at the start, social support and community mobilization were critical in laying the groundwork for livelihood activities and facilitating the sustainability of these activities. Readmore

The International Legal Framework for the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict

The protection of children in armed conflict has always been high on the international political agenda. The Security Council has a special working group which pays specific attention each year to the most serious violations of children’s rights in armed conflict: the recruitment and use of children by armed forces or armed groups, the killing and maiming of children, rape and sexual violence, abduction, attacks on schools and hospitals, and the denial of humanitarian access by parties to armed conflict. Read more

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State

Tens of thousands of ethnic Somali civilians living in eastern Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State are experiencing serious abuses and a looming humanitarian crisis in the context of a little-known conflict between the Ethiopian government and an Ethiopian Somali rebel movement. The situation is critical. Since mid-2007, thousands of people have fled, seeking refuge in neighboring Somalia and Kenya from widespread Ethiopian military attacks on civilians and villages that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. For those who remain in the war-affected area, continuing abuses by both rebels and Ethiopian troops pose a direct threat to their survival and create a pervasive culture of fear. The Ethiopian military campaign of forced relocations and destruction of villages reduced in early 2008 compared to its peak in mid-2007, but other abuses— including arbitrary detentions, torture, and mistreatment in detention—are continuing. These are combining with severe restrictions on movement and commercial trade, minimal access to independent relief assistance, a worsening drought, and rising food prices to create a highly vulnerable population at risk of humanitarian disaster. Although the conflict has been simmering for years with intermittent allegations of abuses, it took on dramatic new momentum after the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in Somali Region in April 2007, killing more than 70 Chinese and Ethiopian civilians. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government, led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, responded by launching a brutal counter-insurgency campaign in the five zones of Somali Region primarily affected by the conflict: Fiiq, Korahe, Gode, Wardheer, and Dhagahbur. In these zones the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) have deliberately and repeatedly attacked civilian populations in an effort to root out the insurgency. Read more

Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia Sarah Vaughan PhD

Abstract This thesis explores why ethnicity was introduced as the basis for the reconstitution of the Ethiopian state in 1991, examining the politicisation of ethnic identity before and after the federation of the country’s ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ was instituted. The establishment of the modern Ethiopian empire state in the nineteenth century, and the processes of centralisation and bureaucratisation which consolidated it in the mid twentieth, provide a backdrop to an emerging concern with ‘regionalism’ amongst political circles in the 1960s and 1970s. Ethnicity operated as both resource and product of the mobilisation by which the major movements of armed opposition to the military regime of the 1970s and 1980s, later the architects of ethnic federalism, sought control of the state. Under federalism through the 1990s, political representation and territorial administration were reorganised in terms of ethnicity. A stratum of the local elite of each ethnic group was encouraged to form an ethnic organisation as a platform for executive office. Meanwhile ethnic groups and their elites responded to these new circumstances in unanticipated but calculative ways, often radically reviewing and reconstructing not only their sense of collective interest, but also the very ethnic collectives that would best serve those newlyperceived interests. The architects of ethnic federalism are influenced by a Marxist formulation of the ‘National Question’ which incorporates contradictory elements inherent in the notion of ‘granting self-determination’: the conviction that self-selected communities respond better to mobilisation ‘from within’, in their own language, by their own people; and the notion that ethnic groups are susceptible to identification, definition, and prescription ‘from above’, by a vanguard party applying a checklist of externally verifiable criteria. These two sets of assumptions correlate with tenets of instrumentalism and primordialism respectively, which are, as they stand, equally irreconcilable. An investigation of theoretical approaches to ethnicity and collective action suggests that many conflate the ‘real world’ and ‘socially constructed’ referents of the ethnic profile of an individual (the constituents of the individual state of being an ethnic x), with the fully constructed collective accomplishment which creates members of an ethnic group (conferring the social status of being an ethnic x, of which those referents are markers). Differentiating the two, and exploring the recursive relationship between them, by means of a consideration of calculative action within the framework of actors’ categories (emerging from emic knowledge systems) and shared social institutions (premised, whether their referents are ‘natural’ ‘social’ or ‘artificial’, on collective processes of ‘knowledge construction’), may improve analysis of the causes and operation of collective action associated with ethnicity and ethno-nationalism. Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia offered the prospect of a shift away from the ‘high modernism’ of that state’s past projects to ‘develop’ its people, apparently in favour of the collective perspectives of groups of its citizens. The coercive and developmental imperatives of the state that guided its implementation, however, have militated against the substantive incorporation of locally determined social institutions and knowledge. read more

The Lord’s Resistance Army and the Responsibility to Protect

This brief seeks to clarify how the Responsibility to Protect [R2P] applies to the threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army [LRA] and examines the measures that should be taken by regional governments, the African Union [AU], donor governments and the UN Security Council in order to protect populations under threat.

Key Messages • The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has committed crimes against humanity across central Africa for more than two decades posing a grave threat to the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
• Regional governments, with the assistance of the international community, have a responsibility to protect populations from this threat and to take action to prevent and halt the crimes committed by the LRA
• Recent international efforts to confront the threat posed by the LRA, including African Union and UN Security Council engagement as well as the deployment of military advisors by the United States, are a positive development.
• Engagement must be sustained until the threat is removed. This requires improved efforts to protect civilians, capture senior LRA commanders, and entice low and mid-level fighters to leave the group through disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programs (DDRRR).
Readmore

Building Peace in the Space of Civil Society: The Case of Somali Women

Of all the Post-Cold War conflicts to arise in Africa, one of the most disastrous has been the collapse of the Somali state (legally and administratively) following a civil war in which Somalia degenerated into a collection of feudal enclaves, each controlled by a self-appointed ‘warlord’ and Islamic courts. The current Transitional Federal Government faces enormous challenges to assert its authority beyond Baidoa (is a tiny town). Somalia is a nation plagued by hunger, disease and poverty. It is a nation facing a very complex humanitarian crisis. The people of this nation have been experiencing economic, political and environmental insecurities. Women have been particularly affected as there are no publicly funded social services available (these include: employment, healthcare, education and protection). Even some of the gains which women made in education and politics were rolled back (the lost decade for Somali women). Read more

The Impediments to Building the Common Infrastructure in the Horn of Africa by Daniel Kendie

The infrastructure affects growth and development. It assists in coping with population growth, in improving environmental conditions, in raising output and in lowering production costs. It also helps to diversity production and to expand trade. Safe water is essential for everything. The provision of energy and hydro-electricity is a must for development. In effect, the infrastructure opens the path to sustained growth. If we relate all this to the Horn of Africa, we will discover that the countries of the sub-region have not made any appreciable headway in building the common infrastructure because of the legacy of unresolved conflicts. Since so many interest groups are also involved in their conflicts, no solution seems to be in sight. Among the conflicts are the territorial disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia, Kenya and Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. In a situation where the governments of the sub-region do not therefore even have normal working relationships, to propose that the common infrastructure be built would be either outright disingenuous or naïve. One can write on each conflict. However, since time does not permit such a luxury, this paper will examine in some detail the conflicting stakes of Somalia and Ethiopia to show how irreconcilable their positions have been. It will then present a brief account of the serious internal and external problems which confront the sub-region, and which need to be addressed, and then conclude by making some observations regarding the infrastructure. Read more

Horn of Africa: Conflict and Consequences

Summary The Horn of Africa- Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti-, located in the strategic Northeastern part of the continent, has a combined area of more than 1.9 million square kilometers; a coastline of over 4000 kilometers, the longest in Africa; and a combined population of approximately 93 million. One of the primary obstacles to development in the region has been perennial conflict within and between countries. The consequences of these perennial conflicts have been very costly for the region in both human and economic terms. Even though endowed with great natural resources, the region is one of the poorest in the world. Where does the region go from here? The region needs a complete paradigm shift; for the people of the region to have a realistic shot at a prosperous future, the countries of the region must commit themselves to a few basic tenets in their relationship: mutual respect for one another; renunciation of war as a tool to resolve disputes; and acceptance of arbitration decisions on disputed boundaries as demarcated and/or recognized by the United Nations. This would create a stable environment that would open up opportunities for economic cooperation- and ultimately economic integration- that the region desperately needs. A Horn of Africa at Peace with itself and its neighbors will be able to exploit its rich natural and complimentary Read more

Authorities urged to free two journalists and reopen their newspaper

Reporters Without Borders condemns the illegal detention of two journalists and calls for their immediate release and the reopening of their newspaper, the Juba-based daily Destiny, which has been closed by the government. They are Ngor Aguot Garang, its editor, who was arrested on 2 November, and Dengdit Ayok, its deputy editor, who was arrested on 5 November. “These arrests highlight the difficulties of working as a journalist in South Sudan and the risks that media personnel run in this young country, in which no law protects them,” Reporters Without Borders said. “We call on the authorities to free Garang and Ayok without delay and to quickly pass laws that regulate the work of the media and protect journalists from arbitrary imprisonment of this kind.” The two journalists are reportedly being held in a prison near Jebel Marra. No formal charge has been brought against them. Under South Sudan’s laws, this makes their detention illegal. Garang, who is also a reporter for Sudan Tribune, was arrested one day after being summoned for questioning by the national security department in Juba on 1 November. As Destiny is the English-language version of Al-Misier, an Arabic-language also based in Juba, Al-Misier editor Atem Simon and chairman of the newspaper’s board, Dhieu Mathok, also responded to the summons. The summons was prompted by an article by Ayok in Destiny’s 26 October issue criticizing President Salva Kiir Mayardit, to which the information ministry had reacted by suspending the newspaper. The suspension has remained in place, although Destiny issued an apology. The ministry also suspended Ayok from working as a journalist. The incident has revived the debate about media freedom in South Sudan, Africa’s youngest country since obtaining its independence on 9 July. In an earlier incident, Mohammed Arkou of Sudan Radio Service was arrested on 11 May for taking photos without government permission, although he was not in a military area, and was held for three weeks. The South Sudan Media Development Association has expressed its concern about this latest case, while the Sudan Tribune has launched an online petition for Garang’s release. Reporters Without Borders urges you to sign it source http://en.rsf.org/south-sudan-authorities-urged-to-free-two-08-11-2011,41361.html

Famine and Politics in the Horn of Africa

Since the summer of 2011, there has been a crisis that the world’s media has not been reporting upon with the urgency that it deserves. The Horn of Africa, comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, is facing another famine that the constituent countries are unable to deal with. The online resource, Famine Early Warning System (www.fews.net) claims that at least two large areas of Southern Somalia are facing catastrophic conditions. Those fleeing the effects of the famine have made their way to the eastern part of Kenya, where according to conservative estimates, there are more than 3 million people living in makeshift relief camps. Geographers and social scientists are calling this the worst famine that has been visited upon the people of the Horn of Africa in over 60 years. The main causes for the famine are actually a combination of climatic and political factors. According to Swiss political scientist, Dr. Tobias Hagmann, who is based at the University of California at Berkeley, the price increase in staple crops like sorghum and rice, as well as debilitating droughts in the region, have merged to create famine conditions. What compounds matters, he says, is the erroneous media assumption that pastoralist depredations and the absence of a strong centralised state have added to the crisis. As a matter of fact, Hagmann and his clutch of colleagues who work on east Africa and Horn of Africa related conflicts, opine that the collapse of the state is only one aspect of the issue. They also feel that the anti-pastoral discourse is flawed, for it remains a major source of livelihood for many Somalis and to abandon it, as experts are wont to suggest would mean the end of their culture and economy Read more

Kenya sends troops to attack al-Shabab

Somali opposition fighters driven out from two bases near the border in joint Kenyan-Somali military offensive. Kenya sends troops to attack al-Shabab[ Kenyan troops have crossed into Somalia and have driven out al-Shabab fighters from two bases near the border in a joint operation with Somali soldiers, according to a Somali military commander. Kenya has said it will hunt the fighters they accuse of being behind several recent kidnappings of foreigners. Abdi Yusuf, a senior Somali military commander, said on Sunday that fighter jets struck two al-Shabab bases in southern Somalia, but could not confirm if the aircraft belonged to Kenya. "There have been air strikes in ... al-Shabab bases near Afmadow late yesterday and today. We are heading towards Afmadow now. Al-Shabab have already vacated the town," he said. Alfred Mutua, the Kenyan government spokesman, said that its troops had entered southern Somalia to fight the al-Shabab, who it says are responsible for attacks on its territory. Read more

Somalia-Ethiopia, Kenya Conflict

Despite the difficulties encountered in integrating north and south, the most important political issue in postindependence Somali politics was the unification of all areas populated by Somalis into one country--a concept identified as pan-Somalism, or Greater Somalia. Politicians assumed that this issue dominated popular opinion and that any government would fall if it did not demonstrate a militant attitude toward neighboring countries occupying Somali territory. Preoccupation with Greater Somalia shaped the character of the country's newly formed institutions and led to the build-up of the Somali military and ultimately to the war with Ethiopia and fighting in the NFD in Kenya. By law the exact size of the National Assembly was not established in order to facilitate the inclusion of representatives of the contested areas after unification. The national flag featured a five-pointed star whose points represented those areas claimed as part of the Somali nation--the former Italian and British territories, the Ogaden, Djibouti, and the NFD. Moreover, the preamble to the constitution approved in 1961 included the statement, "The Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means, the union of the territories." The constitution also provided that all ethnic Somalis, no matter where they resided, were citizens of the republic. The Somalis did not claim sovereignty over adjacent territories, but rather demanded that Somalis living in them be granted the right to self-determination. Somali leaders asserted that they would be satisfied only when their fellow Somalis outside the republic had the opportunity to decide for themselves what their status would be. Read more

The Relationship between Aid, Insurgency & Security [Part Two]

This report is the second in a series addressing the relationship between foreign aid and security in Afghanistan. The first report in this series focused primarily upon the statistical correlation between development assistance and levels of insurgent violence. While its findings were nuanced, the research outlined in the first report suggested that reconstruction and development assistance – while commonly viewed as a means of countering insurgency – may actually be correlated with greater numbers of insurgent attacks. Case study evidence from the Feinstein International Center [FIC] at Tufts University cited in the first report also suggested that, in Afghanistan, aid had a negligible or perhaps negative impact upon levels of insurgent violence.

This second report focuses more upon Afghanistan than the first report in this series and moves away from statistical correlations. Rather, it presents various explanations that have been developed by leading analysts and researchers for why security in Afghanistan has decreased sharply while development assistance increased markedly. The goal of this report is primarily to identify ways in which the reconstruction and development strategy relates to the intensity and scale of the conflict. The following issues are examined: [i] the congruence between Afghans' priorities and the allocation of development assistance, [ii] the relationship between aid and governance, including corruption, and [iii] the potential for aid funding to have inadvertently financed insurgent groups. Read more

The Relationship between Aid, Insurgency & Security [Part One]

This report covers a variety of publications addressing the impact of international development assistance on insurgent violence. A recent historical review of mid-conflict stabilisation missions published in the journal Disasters noted that civilian and military actors have provided aid to locations in the midst of conflict for well over a century. Examining counter-insurgency [COIN] missions in the Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam and El Salvador from as early as 1898 to as recently as 1992, the authors suggested that stabilisation operations such as the one currently taking place in Afghanistan have been based on the belief that reconstruction and development projects as well as financial assistance – hereafter termed “foreign aid” or “aid” – have a beneficial impact upon security [i.e., reducing violence]. This “security-development nexus” involved, in each of the historical cases as well as contemporary ones such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the logic of intervention outlined below [see Figure 1]. In short, by promoting the well-being of the local population – in addition to territorial security and sufficiently legitimate state institutions – stabilisation actors can win the favour of the host nation citizenry and erode insurgents' ability to operate effectively. The result may either be a military victory for counter-insurgent forces, the flight and temporary withdrawal of the insurgents or the attainment of a negotiations-inducing stalemate. Read more

Africa and the Arab Spring: A New Era of Democratic Expectations

A question often asked since the launch of the Arab Spring in January 2011 is what effect will these popular protests have on democracy in the rest of Africa. Frequently overlooked in this discussion is that Sub-Saharan Africa has been experiencing its own democratic surge during this time with important advances in Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Nigeria, and Zambia, among other countries. This progress builds on nearly two decades of democratic institution building on the continent. Even so, the legacy of “big-man” politics continues to cast a long shadow over Africa’s governance norms. Regime models on the continent, moreover, remain highly varied, ranging from hard core autocrats, to semiauthoritarians, democratizers, and a select number of democracies.

Recognizing these complex and still fluid crosscurrents, this Working Group embarked on an analysis of the linkages between the Arab Spring and African democracy — with an eye on the implications for governance norms on the continent over the next several years. Read more

Experiences of Female Survivors of Sexual Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo: A Mixed-Methods Study

Background: The conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC] is the deadliest since World War II. Over a decade of fighting amongst an array of armed groups has resulted in extensive human rights abuses, particularly the widespread use of sexual violence against women.

Interpretation: Rape results not only in physical and psychological trauma, but can destroy family and community structures. Women face significant obstacles in seeking services after rape. Interventions offering long-term solutions for hyper-vulnerable women are vital, but lacking; reintegration programs on SGBV for women, men, and communities are also needed. Read more

Libyan Oil: Before and After Moammar Gaddafi

While National Transitional Council [NTC] forces, with the help of NATO, were successful in toppling the regime of Moammar Gaddafi, future Libyan oil production remains uncertain. Current production is at very low levels as a result of the tenuous security conditions created by the eight month conflict, which began in February 2011. Uncertainty surrounds the NTC’s ability to create a secure environment, in which foreign oil companies are willing to return to the oil fields of Libya. This report provides a chronological overview with a discussion of the role and significance of Libyan oil both domestically and internationally. The document then explores the economic implications of the Libyan conflict on oil markets. It examines the challenges to be met in resuming oil production in post-conflict Libya and the rising concerns over oil prices and future oil production. Read more

Court drops one of three charges against Swedish journalists

Reporters Without Borders is relieved to learn that an Addis Ababa court today dropped a charge of participating in terrorist activity against Swedish journalists Johan Persson and Martin Schibbye of the Kontinent news agency, who nonetheless continue to be tried on charges of supporting a terrorist group and entering Ethiopia illegally.

At the end of today’s hearing, the trial was adjourned until 6 December. The two journalists will meanwhile remain in detention.

“We hope that the court will also drop the charge of supporting a terrorist group,” Reporters Without Borders said. “Persson and Schibbye are recognized journalists and have nothing in common with terrorists. All they did was enter the Ogaden without proper documents because that region is closed to the media. Their goal was just to report on what is going on there.” Read more

U.S. Expands Drone Flights to Take Aim at East Africa

he military has reopened a base for the unmanned aircraft on the island nation of Seychelles to intensify attacks on al Qaeda affiliates, particularly in Somalia, defense officials told The Wall Street Journal.

The U.S. has used the Seychelles base for flying surveillance drones, and for the first time will fly armed MQ-9 Reapers from the Indian Ocean site, supplementing strikes from a U.S. drone base in Djibouti.



The MQ-9 Reaper drone

The move comes as Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and other officials have stressed a need to urgently follow up on the killing of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in May with operations to destroy his terrorist organization.

U.S. officials say they are concerned that al Qaeda—under pressure from U.S. operations in Pakistan—is moving to expand operations through its affiliates in East Africa, and that a new charismatic militant leader could emerge there.

Stepped-up surveillance on the militant groups is needed to help keep al Qaeda affiliates in check, officials said.

"We do not know enough about the leaders of the al Qaeda affiliates in Africa," said a senior U.S. official. "Is there a guy out there saying, 'I am the future of al Qaeda'? Who is the next Osama bin Laden?"

The U.S. military has long operated a base in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, and has already used drones against militants in Somalia.



The new Seychelles base, with the Reaper deployment, will allow for more flights and improved operational security, giving the military a better chance at uncovering and destroying al Qaeda training camps in East Africa, officials said. Militants can sometimes spot and track drones that fly over land from the base at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti—something that will be more difficult at an island base. Read more

East Africa: Why Capturing Kismayu Could Trigger Proxy Wars for Kenya

In conversations with diplomats, government officials, and intelligence sources in the region, a clear picture has started emerging of a war that has been in the making over the past five years and one that could dramatically reorder the Somali state, and just possibly bring about the peace that has proved so elusive over the past two decades.

According to these sources, Kenya's military offensive was timely, coming as it did when the Al Shabaab militants are at their weakest and at a time when there is convergence of opinion in the wider East African region about what to do about the crisis in Somalia.

However, a clearer strategy crafted by Somali leaders and regional players in the conflict is also emerging. The first step, the sources say, is to create three new "areas of influence" in the rest of Somalia, beside Somaliland and Puntland, which now function as independent territories.

These territories would provide a buffer zone for Kenya and Ethiopia. Already, Ethiopia has created a buffer zone spanning Galgadud, Hiraan, Bay, Bakool and Gedo.

Kenya's military ambition is to create a buffer zone spanning Gedo El Wak, Middle and Lower Juba regions.

Ultimately, these regions will be governed as semi-automous states at first that could one day form part of a strong united federal government of Somalia.

The second step after the fall of Kismayu would to be to hand over all "liberated" areas to Amisom. Read More

Shock and awe in Somalia? Sorry, it isn’t a board game

enyans are justifiably worried too — artists, journalists and writers associated with Concerned Kenyans Writers have already issued a statement essentially saying that this is not being done in our name.

Diplomatic missions have issued upgraded security advisories to their citizens resident in Kenya. And, publicly, are taking a naive sort of wait-and-see position, professing lack of prior knowledge as to what Kenya had clearly been planning for a while.

The recent kidnappings attributed to Al Shabaab, based on changing official statements, were clearly just an excuse to legitimise the offensive.

Al Shabaab has itself denied responsibility for the kidnappings — somewhat curiously, given its propensity for publicity. And it has, naturally, promised retaliation.

Kenya’s security apparatus seems determined to trudge on. Its attitude is that all “irrelevant” security issues — the minor matter of human-rights violations committed by Kenyan security services in an almost routine manner, for example — can be disregarded as so much buzzing around of flies to be swatted away. Read more

Kenyan Motives in Somalia Predate Recent Abductions

NAIROBI, Kenya — The Kenyan government revealed on Wednesday that its extensive military foray into Somalia this month to battle Islamist militants was not simply a response to a wave of recent kidnappings, as previously claimed, but was actually planned far in advance, part of a covert strategy to penetrate Somalia and keep the violence in one of Africa’s most anarchic countries from spilling into one of Africa’s most stable. Read more

Kenya: Kibaki Gambles On Regional War With Al Shabaab

As the Kenyan army ventured deeper into Somalia, in its first cross-border campaign in 44 years, a regional grand strategy to deal with Al Haraka al Shabaab al Mujahideen is beginning to emerge.

Kenya's intervention was under detailed consideration several weeks before Nairobi's official declaration of war against Al Shabaab on 15 October. There is little substance to media claims that United States diplomats based in Nairobi were surprised by Kenya's operation. Both the USA and Britain run substantive regional counter-terrorism operations from Nairobi.

Although the mobilisation was initially announced as a 'hot pursuit' operation against Somali-based groups who had kidnapped tourists in north-eastern Kenya, President Mwai Kibaki's government and Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) quickly characterised the military campaign as a coordinated effort, even if Kenya appeared to be acting unilaterally. Read more

Somalia • Famine & Drought

Just over 100 days have passed since famine was declared in southern Somalia on 20 July. Since July,
there has been a significant scale-up in response activities. At least 2.2 million people have benefited from
enhanced access to food, up from 770,000 before July. Nearly 1.2 million people now have sustained access
to safe drinking water compared to 850,000 by
the end of June, with an additional 1.8 million
people receiving temporary water provision.
Partners have established at least 217 new
nutrition treatment centres since July, with 1,142
static and mobile centres able to treat children by
the end of September. Some 1.16 million
children have been immunized against measles
since July. Partners significantly increased food
voucher, cash-for-work and cash relief
programmes since the declaration of famine, with
1,177,229 people benefiting from these
programmes since July, compared to 100,201
from January to June. Read more

A Diplomatic Surge to Stop Somalia’s Famine

Somalia is dying. Three-quarters of a million people are at immediate risk of famine;
another 750,000 are refugees in neighboring countries, and 4 million – half the total
population – is in need of emergency aid. It is a calamity that could join the ranks of the
Rwanda genocide and the Darfur crisis in terms of scale and human suffering. And for
Somalia it is a terrible repeat of the 1991-92 famine that claimed 240,000 lives.
The international response to date has been shockingly inadequate – not just because
funds for humanitarian aid have fallen short, but because of the absence of political will
to take bold diplomatic action to remove impediments to the delivery of aid. Read more

Somalia and 6 others Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010) (S/2011/433)

The UN panel is tasked with monitoring compliance with embargoes on the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Somalia and Eritrea, as well as probing activities – financial, maritime or in another field – which generate revenue used to violate those embargoes.

The report states that the Eritrean Government “conceived, planned, organized and directed a failed plot to disrupt the African Union summit in Addis Ababa by bombing a variety of civilian and governmental targets.”

It adds that “since the Eritrean intelligence apparatus responsible for the African Union summit plot is also active in Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan and Uganda, the level of threat it poses to these other countries must be re-evaluated.”

The report, which is over 400 pages, also points to Eritrea’s continuing relationship with Al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group that controls some parts of Somalia’s territory and has been waging a fierce battle against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) there.

While the Eritrean Government acknowledges that it maintains relationships with Somali armed opposition groups, including Al-Shabaab, it denies that it provides any military, material or financial support and says its links are limited to a political, and even humanitarian, nature.

However, evidence and testimony obtained by the Monitoring Group, including records of financial payments, interviews with eyewitnesses and data relating to maritime and aviation movements, all indicate that Eritrean support for Somali armed opposition groups is not limited to the political or humanitarian dimensions.

The Group says that Eritrea’s continuing relationship with Al-Shabaab appears designed to “legitimize and embolden the group rather than to curb its extremist orientation or encourage its participation in a political process.”

Moreover, Eritrean involvement in Somalia reflects a broader pattern of intelligence and special operations activity, including training, financial and logistical support to armed opposition groups in Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Sudan and possibly Uganda in violation of the Security Council’s embargoes. Read more

Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting The Cost of Failure in Somalia

The disastrous famine in Somalia is the worst the world has seen in 20 years, and it again casts a harsh spotlight on the situation in that country. With millions of people now at risk of starvation, and appalling stories of human hardship dominating the evening news, the name “Somalia” once again conjures images of crisis and despair—a famished, suffering country peopled by pirates, terrorists, and warlords.

Somalia is best known for the civil war and famine of the early 1990s, which killed some 250,000 people and triggered a massive, U.S.-led humanitarian intervention that culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident of 1994. More recently, the rise of indigenous Islamist movements in southern Somalia has rekindled fears that the anarchic territory could—or has—become a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist movements. Read more

The miniAtlas of Human Security

This at-a-glance guide to global security issues provides a wealth of information on armed conflicts since 1946. It maps political violence, the links between poverty and conflict, assaults on human rights - including the use of child soldiers - and the causes of war and peace. Extraordinary changes have taken place since the end of the Cold War. Despite the escalating violence in Iraq, and the widening war in Darfur, there has been a decline in armed conflict worldwide. The number of battle-deaths, genocides and refugees has also decreased. Many of these changes can be attributed to international activism - spearheaded by the UN - that seeks to stop ongoing wars, help negotiate peace settlements, support post-conflict reconstruction, and prevent old wars from flaring up again. Specially designed to show detailed information on a small scale, the miniAtlas of Human Security is a succinct introduction to today's most pressing security challenges. Read more

Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War

The new Human Security Report from the Human Security Research Project at Simon Fraser University argues that long-term trends are reducing the risks of both international and civil wars. The Report, which is funded by the governments of Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom and will be published by Oxford University Press, also examines recent developments that suggest the world is becoming a more dangerous place.

Part I of the new Report examines the forces and political developments that have driven down the number of international conflicts and war deaths since the 1950s, and the number of civil wars since the early 1990s. It argues that the fact that these forces persist, or have strengthened, provides grounds for cautious optimism about the future of global security.

Part II examines the paradox of mortality rates that decline during the overwhelming majority of today’s wars, as well as the challenges and controversies involved in measuring indirect war deaths—those caused by war-exacerbated disease and malnutrition.

Part III, “Trends in Human Insecurity,” reviews recent trends in conflict numbers and death tolls around the world, and updates the conflict and other trend data in previous HSRP publications. Read more

Violence as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Youths in the 2007 Kenyan Elections

The role played by youths in 2007–2008 electoral violence in Kenya was in reaction to four decades of political and social deprivation set within a culture of structural violence established and upheld by successive national governments. This environment, constructed for the benefit of a relatively few individuals and groups, fueled simmering animosities and desire for the economic spoils of political control. Solutions to youth violence can be sought in changes aimed at improving long-term relationships, altering attitudes among conflicting parties, and developing socio-economic and political systems that promote inclusivity, equity, recognition, and reconciliation. Read more

Gaps in the Eastern Congo Peacebuilding Process: The Role of Peace Education and Local Tensions

The prevailing explanations of peacebuilding failures tend to emphasize economic interests and cultural and political aspects. Peace education and recognition of local tensions and understandings of conflict and peace are, however, necessary components for building an enduring peace. The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s transition from war towards peace and democracy demonstrates the need to address micro problems in extending local, regional, and national security. Involvement by local peoples in peace work and peace education are an appropriate methodology of peacebuilding in war-torn societies to bring about the personal and systemic changes necessary for securing sustainable peace. Read more

Why Humanitarian Aid in Darfur is not a Practice of the "Responsibility to Protect"

The Discussion Paper provides a compelling critique of the ‘new humanitarianism, ’particularly the ways in which leading donor states seek to incorporate humanitarian assistance and protection into the toolbox of political intervention in other countries. Drawing upon the history of humanitarianism and its origins in an ethos of neutrality, impartiality and non-violence, the author shows how since the end of the Cold War, and increasingly since 9/11, the ‘new’ form of internationational humanitarianism has become deeply politicised and has taken on human rights, strategic-security, liberal and developmental agendas as defined by donor states. The paper frames the critique of linking R2P to humanitarian protection values in the context of the new humanitarianism and the pursuit of the foreign policies of hegemonic states. It therefore provides a critical perspective on the politics of humanitarian aid in Darfur, and opens up a new basis for an alternative discourse on international humanitarian intervention and its connection with the politics of global powers in African conflict arenas. This paper is an important resource for scholars, civil society activists and policy practitioners with a keen interest in international humanitarian aid, international humanitarian law, conflict, peace and security in Africa. Read more

PTSD, depression and anxiety among former abductees in Northern Uganda

PTSD, depression and anxiety among former abductees in Northern Uganda
Abstract
Background: The population in Northern Uganda has been exposed to extreme levels of
traumatic stress and thousands abducted forcibly became rebel combatants.

Methods: Using structured interviews, the prevalence and severity of posttraumatic stressdisorder (PTSD), depression and anxiety was assessed in 72 former abducted adults, 62 ofthem being former child soldiers.

Results: As retrospective reports of exposure to traumatic stress increased, anxiety and PTSD occurrence increased (r=.45). 49% of respondents were diagnosed with PTSD, 70%presented with symptoms of depression, and 59% with those of anxiety. In a multiple linear regression analysis four factors could best explain the development of PTSD

symptoms:male respondents (sex) living in an IDP-Camp (location) with a kinship murdered in the war (family members killed in the war) and having experienced a high number of traumatic events (number of traumatic events) were more likely to develop symptoms of PTSD than others. In disagreement to a simple dose-response-effect though, we also observed a negative correlation between the time spent with the rebels and the PTSD symptom level.

Conclusions: Former abductees continue to suffer from severe mental ill-health. Adaptation to the living condition of rebels, however, may lower trauma-related mental suffering
Readmore

Sudan: Southern Kordofan Civilians Tell of Air Strike Horror

The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are indiscriminately bombing civilian areas in the Nuba Mountainsregion of Southern Kordofan and preventing aid from reaching desperate displaced people, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said today.
Researchers from both groups, during a week-long mission to the area in late-August, investigated 13 air strikes in Kauda, Delami and Kurchi areas. Those air strikes killed at least 26 civilians and injured more than 45 others since mid-June. The researchers also witnessed government planes circling over civilian areas and dropping bombs, forcing civilians to seek shelter in mountains and caves. “The relentless bombing campaign is killing and maiming civilian men, women and children, displacing tens of thousands, putting them in desperate need of aid, and preventing entire communities from planting crops and feeding their children,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “The Sudanese government is
Read more

Two journalists freed on bail, two others in separate case remain in detention

Reporters Without Borders notes that Haileyesus Worku, the editor of the state-owned Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency (ERTA), and one of his reporters, Abdulsemed Mohammed, were finally released on bail of 5,000 birr (205 euros) on 22 July after being held for 15 months on charges of illegally selling state-owned news content for personal gain.

The court has scheduled a hearing for 12 November to hear defence arguments. The two journalists are meanwhile banned from leaving the country.

They were arrested on 26 April 2010 on charges of illegally obtaining TV news content and passing it to a foreign TV company for personal profit, causing considerable losses for ERTA and violating copyright. They could be fined and jailed if convicted. More information

Reporters Without Borders has also learned that Woubeshet Taye, the deputy editor of the Amharic-language weekly Awramba Times, who was arrested on 19 June, and Reyot Alemu, a woman reporter for the Amharic-language weekly Fitih, who was arrested on 21 June, appeared last week before judges, who ordered that they remain in detention.

Alemu was brought before a federal court in the utmost secrecy on 20 July without her family or her colleagues being notified of the hearing. Taye was also brought before a federal court. In both cases, a 28-day extension of their detention was ordered to allow for further police investigation.

Both are accused of complicity with Ginbot 7, a US-based opposition group which parliament recently declared to be a “terrorist” organization. They are due to appear in court next on 19 August. Reporters Without Borders has been told that they have not been allowed visits by family members or their lawyers.
read more

ERITREA-SUDAN: Refugees battling for a better life

KHARTOUM/KASSALA, 1 July 2011 (IRIN) - The first official Eritrean refugees arrived in Sudan in 1968; today, an estimated 1,600 cross the border every month to seek refuge in Shagarab, a large camp in the east of Sudan.

The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that northern Sudan has more than 100,000 Eritrean refugees but in 43 years, the profile of the refugees has changed.

"The new arrivals are generally young and well educated; they come from the highlands and have no cultural or ethnic ties with local populations," said Mohamed Ahmed Elaghbash, Sudan's Commissioner for Refugees. "Most of them take Sudan as a transit country. They stay here for some time until they get the opportunity to move northwards. Sometimes, they try to cross the Mediterranean from North Africa in order to reach Europe."
read more

Southern Sudan

During the interviews, all government officials were asked to name the one issue that must be
addressed to ensure the success of the Government of Southern Sudan. On the whole, officials focus
on five areas: state economic viability, economic diversification, corruption, civil service competency
and security. Weak inter-governmental communication, including confusion about powers and
competencies, and tribalism are also mentioned as obstacles that can thwart the GOSS’s progress.
Officials’ thoughts on stumbling blocks and opportunities for GOSS success are summarized below,
followed by a set of recommendations suggested by the officials themselves or drawn from the
findings. More information about each key finding can be found in the corresponding section in the
main text.
KEY FINDINGS
Read more

referendum

In the last quarter of 2010, the focus in Sudan was primarily
on preparations for the historic referendum on the status of
southern Sudan, with voting scheduled to take place from 9 to
15 January 2011.
While every effort is being made to ensure that the referendum
takes places peacefully and that the outcome is respected, it
is widely acknowledged that the referendum could contribute
to inter-communal tensions in Sudan, with potentially serious
consequences for the humanitarian situation. As a result,
humanitarian partners have dedicated significant efforts to
contingency planning (see “Emergency Preparedness” below
Read more

DARFUR PEACE PROCESS CHRONOLOGY

2006
5 May: The predominantly Zaghawa Sudan Liberation Army–Minni Minawi (SLA–
MM) and the Sudanese government sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in
Abuja; SLA–Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur (SLA–AW) and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) do not. Limited support for the agreement and a failure to sell (or
even explain) it to civil society, Darfur’s Arabs, and the masses in the displaced
camps, plus scant attention to implementation as insecurity deepens, condemn it to
irrelevance. A decision to seek wider support by allowing splinter groups to sign
Declarations of Commitment backfires, encouraging factional splits and divide-andrule
tactics. In September United Nations (UN) Special Envoy Jan Pronk will tell the
UN Security Council: ‘In hindsight, maybe we should have taken more time. Not to
get a better agreement, but in order to bring on board all parties
Read more

Land, Power and Identity Roots of violent conflict in Eastern DRC Chris Huggins

This study examines access to, use of and management of land and its links with the root causes
of conflict in the two Kivu provinces and Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The
study’s aim is to identify key gaps in the international community’s understanding of land issues
in Eastern DRC, as well as gaps in the kinds of interventions that are being conducted at the
current time (2009-2010).
In the DRC, as in other countries, customary, informal and statutory land-tenure systems
“overlap” geographically, in the sense that a certain parcel of land might be claimed by different
actors under different systems. Individuals and sometimes communities may claim land through a
variety of systems simultaneously, resulting in confusion and dispute. Eastern DRC encompasses a
vast area and huge diversity in terms of geography, forms of local governance, ethnic composition,
and other aspects. However, while acknowledging this diversity, it is useful to identify two sets of
dichotomies, or “opposites”, which are of great significance across much of Eastern DRC: the dual
system of land access (customary and statutory) and the conceptual contrast between ethnic groups
which are “local” or “indigenous” to a particular area, and those which are seen as “migrants” or
“foreigners”. The weakness of the statutory land law, as well as widespread corruption, has led to
massive alienation of land held under custom. Customary leaders, who traditionally held the land
“in the name of their community”, have essentially privatised community properties, pocketing
the proceeds from alienated land which has been sold to wealthy and powerful individuals or
foreign and Congolese companies.
In the DRC, political representation at the local level is linked directly to “ethnic territories”. There
is therefore a structural link between claims to land ownership by ethnic communities, and claims to
political autonomy and power. Communities that have lacked local representation have long made
claims to land ownership in order to have their own chiefs, and these claims have often been resisted
by neighbouring communities. The result in many areas, particularly the east, has been violence.
Land is essential to most rural livelihoods, but it is also bound up very strongly with issues of “identity
and power”.1 While land scarcity and alienation of customary land has led to land disputes at the
micro-level, the tensions around such “local” and “intra-community” conflicts (or conflicts between
“ethnic citizens” and their chiefs who make decisions over community land) have generally been
transferred into the “inter-community” level. This has been achieved through discourses utilising
the concepts of “indigenous” and “immigrant” groups. For some communities, notably Hutu and
Tutsi, the issue of immigrant status is linked to an uncertain or contested right to citizenship. This
dynamic has led to widespread violence and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and
refugees – particularly those of Tutsi ethnicity – to parts of North Kivu in recent months and years
risks renewed violence unless it is handled very carefully.
In addition, control over land is a “sustaining factor” in conflict. Those individuals and cliques
that have benefitted from changes in control over land during conflict do not necessarily require a
continuation of war to maintain de facto control over their spoils. Rather, they need to avoid having
wartime transactions and population movements scrutinised and potentially undone, for example
through the establishment of land commissions, mediation processes, the return of IDPs and refugees,
or other state or non-state interventions. In order to avoid the loss of wartime gains, such actors will
likely attempt to gain influence with politicians or maintain a certain level of “instability” in order
to prevent international and local NGOs and state services from gaining a foothold in areas under
their control, and to prevent the return of those claiming land ownership.
Read more

Somalia: 20 years of anarchy

During the 1990s, the conflict in Somalia was between rival warlords and clan-based militia. This led to widespread hunger and the UN and US intervened before a humiliating pull-out.

Fighting continued but with less intensity until in 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts became the first group to exert control over the whole of the capital, Mogadishu, for 15 years.

Ethiopia then invaded to oust the Islamists, with US support. But the Ethiopians were unable to exert control and now the capital is the scene of regular battles between the UN-backed government and the al-Qaeda linked militants, al-Shabab.
read more

The comprehensive approach to Civil-Military crisis management

Facing recurrent complex crises requiring an improved coordination
of civilian and military, international and local actors, the comprehensive
approach concept has appeared both within international
organisations (Nato, EU etc) and within governments (the US,
France, the UK etc). The issue concerns restoring security, governance
and development through an inter-agency, inter-ministerial or
even an inter-organisational approach.
The present study identifies the dilemmas of the comprehensive
approach (the neutrality of humanitarian intervention versus the armed
commitment of states, the explicit cooperations between international
organisations versus implicit cooperation, etc). It anticipates
the consequences of the comprehensive approach, foremost a
strengthened position for the European Union and Nato, wielding
management capabilities for civil and military crisis management,
and the quest for legitimacy within Nato and the African Union. It
qualifies the French position towards the concept. It analyses the
operational impact of the comprehensive approach for the military.
Finally, it reinforces the academic thinking on the comprehensive
approach and presents new research topics in security studies.
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Landmines and Land Rights in Conflict Affected Contexts

This policy brief1 describes the important linkages
between land rights and landmines in conflict-affected
contexts. Its purpose is to deepen awareness within
the broader mine action and development communities
about these linkages, and provide guidance on
how to effectively mainstream land rights2 issues into
mine action operations.
Land rights in conflict-affected situations are a topic
of increasing concern for the humanitarian and
development community. The recovery of households,
communities and countries following war depend to
a large degree on re-establishing clear rights over
land resources which are the basis of livelihoods.
The land rights situation becomes particularly critical
in mine-affected countries, where land access can
be denied for years or decades. Mine action organisations
(i.e. National Mine Action Authorities, National
Mine Action Centres, mine/ERW operators
and mine action donors) typically avoid land rights
issues in their activities, due to considerations of
neutrality, mandate, complexity, awareness and
political sensitivity. However the decision to survey 3
and clear (or not) particular areas inevitably involves
land rights issues.
Read more

A New Strategy for Darfur

The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House
is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not
take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if
any extract is used, the speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the
details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an
event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but
the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document’s author(s). The published text of
speeches and presentations may differ from delivery.
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Beyond Southern Sudan

JANUARY’S REFERENDA ON SOUTHERN SUDAN’S SELFdetermination
and the status of Abyei are two of
the most important events to occur within the
region in years, if not decades. Media and
diplomatic attention on the potential local and
national fallout is as inevitable as it is
understandable. However, the referenda and
subsequent negotiations are not the only coming
events within the unstable triangle of Sudan, Chad and the
Central African Republic (CAR). Ignoring Sudan’s two
western neighbours – the CAR and Chad – risks overlooking
the fragile balance of stability within, as well as between, the
three countries.
Despite numerous postponements, presidential elections are
now due to be held in the CAR on January 23 and in Chad on
May 8, with the latter’s parliamentary and local elections in
February and March respectively. The two former French
colonies have historically been beset by conflict, including
involvement by the military in political affairs, and are
consistently two of the ten most vulnerable states worldwide
according to the Fund for Peace/Foreign Policy Failed State
Index. Furthermore, they continue to be entangled with events
beyond their borders.
Chad and the CAR are ranked low on the 2010 Ibrahim
Index on African Governance, and elections in either country
do not necessarily indicate good governance or guaranteed
future stability. The CAR’s incumbent leader, President
François Bozizé, came to power in a military coup in 2003
Read more