frica and the Gulf crisis: the peril of picking sides

As the Gulf crisis enters its third week, the decision to cut or downgrade diplomatic ties with Qatar by eight African countries could have a long-term impact on the nationals of those countries, analysts warned.
"This is not good for Africa. This is rush decision-making and taking sides in a crisis that the leaders have no clear grasp of is dangerous and will scare investors away," Adama Gaye, a Senegalese foreign policy expert told Al Jazeera.
On June 5, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt announced that they were cutting ties with Qatar and imposing land, sea and air blockades.
The Arab countries accuse Doha of supporting "terrorism" and "extremist groups" - charges which Qatar strongly denies.

Soon after the announcement, some Gulf envoys and ministers started shuttle diplomacy, travelling between countries trying to convince allies to cut ties with Qatar. readmore

Africa: Qatar's Conflict With Its Neighbours Can Easily Set the Horn of Africa Alight

It began as a squabble between Arab allies, but the standoff between Qatar and its neighbours is threatening to engulf the Horn of Africa. When Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and the Maldives declared at the beginning of June that they were severing diplomatic relations with Qatar it appeared to be of interest mainly to the Arabian Peninsula - and the Gulf in particular.

The Saudis and their allies accused Qatar of backing international terrorism. The US, which has the Al Udeid air base in Qatar, looked askance, but did little more than use its good offices to try to ensure that the war of words did not flare into an open conflict.

But the countries just across the Red Sea have found themselves dragged into the dispute. After prevaricating for some time, Eritrea, which had hitherto good relations with Qatar, fell into line with the Saudis and broke ties with Qatar. readmore

What’s going on with Qatar?

By Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

June 1, 2017 at 5:00 AM

Watch more!

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain released separate statements on June 5 saying they would cut air, sea and land links with Qatar. (Reuters)

Tensions have resurfaced in a sustained media onslaught that has again cast Qatar as a threat to stability and security in the Persian Gulf. At the heart of the latest argument among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are incendiary comments attributed to Qatar’s Emir Tamim at a military graduation ceremony May 23.

A report published on the Qatar News Agency (QNA) website later that day alleged that the emir stated that Qatar had a tense relationship with President Trump’s administration, described Hamas as “the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” and called Iran “a big power in the stabilization of the region.” Qatar TV later reported the emir’s alleged speech on its evening news program before the government communications office claimed — belatedly, on May 24 — that the QNA website had been hacked and false statements posted on it.

Campaign to discredit Doha

Regardless of whether they were made or fabricated — and people present at the military graduation insist that the emir made no speech whatsoever — Tamim’s remarks caused immediate uproar in regional media, much of it based in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Both countries blocked Al Jazeera and other Qatar-based media outlets in the aftermath of the allegations, and new articles have been published daily in the week since. Almost without exception, each article has taken the emir’s speech as fact and proceeded, on that basis, to accuse Qatar of being the weak link in the threat to regional stability from Iran and terrorism — and to demand that Qatar choose sides between the GCC and Iran.

The ferocity and the sheer scale of the “Qatar-bashing” articles suggest that an orchestrated campaign is underway to discredit Doha regionally but also — crucially — in the eyes of the Trump administration.

This comes three years after a nine-month standoff between Qatar and three of its neighbors — Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain — rocked the six-member GCC. In the time since, Tamim and Abu Dhabi’s influential crown prince, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, exchanged frequent visits, and Qatar’s decision to deploy 1,000 soldiers to Yemen in September 2015 seemed to indicate that the 2014 upheaval was a thing of the past. What, then, has changed, and why has a seemingly dormant dispute suddenly flared up again and in such a visceral manner?

Arab leaders pose for a group photo during the 28th Ordinary Summit of the Arab League at the Dead Sea, Jordan, on March 29, 2017. (Mohammad Hamed/Reuters)

The Trump factor

A convergence of factors appears to have shifted the geopolitical landscape in the Persian Gulf. The Trump administration signaled that it intends to follow a set of regional policies that are aligned far closer to those of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh than Doha. Both Mohammed bin Zayed and Saudi Arabia’s Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman were high-profile visitors to Washington in the run-up to the Riyadh summit with Arab and Islamic leaders.

Further, the policy inexperience of many within Trump’s inner circle has presented an opportunity for both the Saudis and the Emiratis to shape the administration’s thinking on critical regional issues such as Iran and Islamism, both of which were evident during the Riyadh visit.

Whereas the Obama administration sought to enhance U.S. engagement with the GCC as a bloc, Trump focused instead on Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the twin pillars of its regional approach. Strong bonds reportedly have formed between Trump’s adviser and son-in-law Jared Kushner and Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia as well as Yusuf al-Otaiba, the influential UAE ambassador in Washington.

Key principals within the Trump administration, such as Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and CIA Director Mike Pompeo, hold views on Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood that are virtually indistinguishable from those in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are emerging as the two spearheads around which U.S. regional policies are realigning, including a set of hawkish defense and security interests; the joint raid conducted by U.S. and UAE Special Forces in Yemen in January may well be only the first of numerous joint initiatives across regional conflict zones in the months and years ahead. READMOREREADMORE

The Persian Gulf crisis over Qatar, explained

By Ishaan Tharoor June 6

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Four Arab nations lead diplomatic break with Qatar

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain said they would cut air, sea and land links with Qatar. (The Washington Post)

The Arab states of the Persian Gulf are in the grip of an unprecedented regional crisis. In Monday's early hours, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt released coordinated statements, announcing a diplomatic break with the tiny-yet-wealthy peninsular nation of Qatar. They cut air, sea and land links and ordered Qatari officials and nationals stationed in their countries to return home. read more

Qatar and Eritrea to strengthen ties

Admin year ago

H.E. President Isaias Afwerki with HE Minister of Environment Ahmed bin Amer Al Humaidi

By Eritrea Embassy Media

Steps taken by Qatar and Eritrea to strengthen their ties in every aspect serve as a solid example of this success. Doha has shown an interest in expanding cooperation, maintain relations in a number of fields, notably health care, education, construction, energy, tourism, exploring investment opportunities in Eritrea.

Qatar is a high income economy backed by the world's third largest natural gas reserves and oil reserves. The country has the highest per capita income in the world, and has the second highest standard of living in the Middle East and the seventh highest in Asia. 

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Home » Qatar’s diplomatic incursions into the Horn of Africa

Qatar’s diplomatic incursions into the Horn of Africa

• 3 March 2017
• Joburg Post
• Africa
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Summary
Although it is a small country in a dangerous neighbourhood, Qatar has regional ambitions. It punches above its weight diplomatically
by acting as a mediator in conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The results have been mixed, with negotiations hampered by the centralisation
of foreign policy in the person of the emir, who does not seek advice from his foreign affairs ministry. However, Qatar’s successes have been impressive and among the underpinnings of its efforts are wealth, shared with its citizens – from huge natural gas deposits, security guarantees from the United States and a strong alliance with Turkey – and Qatar’s position as the home of the media giant, Al Jazeera.

AT JUST UNDER 12 000 square kilometres, Qatar is the third smallest country in the Middle East, after Kuwait and Bahrain. Only 250 000 of its total population of two million are Qatari nationals.  Thus nationals, who live mostly in and around the capital, Doha, constitute a minority, although a wealthy one – Qatar’s average GDP per capita income is US$140 000.
Because it has too few recruitable nationals, Qatar’s small military force mainly consists of foreigners, including numerous Pakistanis and Yemenis.
The country, which attained its independence in 1971, operates in a geopolitically rough and economically competitive region. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of which are historically significant, more populous, geographically bigger, politically hostile, diplomatically influential and militarily stronger countries.
Nonetheless, Qatar possesses the third largest reserves of natural gas in the world, after Russia and Iran, and its reserves are projected to last for decades to come.

Since 2006, it has emerged as the world’s largest exporter of liquefied natural gas, which generates the bulk of its total export revenues.
It is also endowed with a relatively young political leadership, which wants to ‘play a greater role and mould regional politics according to [Qatar’s best] interests’.
This leadership chose not to pursue the softer and passive foreign policy of Kuwait and Bahrain, the Middle East’s other small, wealthy countries. Instead, it purposefully took a different route and pursued a distinctively energetic and self-determined foreign policy. Consequently, Qatar has ended up, in less than two decades, attaining an international significance considerably at odds with its youthful statehood, small physical size, small population of Qatari citizens, limited military capability and unfavourable geopolitical situation.

Qatar has ended up, in less than two decades, attaining an international significance considerably at odds with its youthful statehood

Qatar has begun to play an influential role in the Horn of Africa in security and diplomacy. It previously established close relations with Sudan and Eritrea, recently repaired its troubled bilateral relations with Ethiopia and provides financial assistance to the current government of Somalia. It successfully mediated conflicts between Eritrea and Sudan and Eritrea and Djibouti. Additionally, Qatar rather clumsily mediated Sudan’s Darfur conflict.
This case study of Qatari engagement in the Horn of Africa highlights the evolution of its international role, bearing in mind its diplomatic rivalry with Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the added value and limits of Qatar’s mediation in the Horn of Africa’s many intractable conflicts. And it underlines the gap between the decisions of a small country punching above its weight and the uninstitutionalised implementation of its broadest objectives.
The report is divided into three parts. The first part provides insights into the nature and operation of Qatar’s foreign policy decision-making. The second part explicates the two main objectives of the country’s foreign policy. It
also outlines the three preferred instruments used by Qatar to achieve these objectives. The third part examines the relations of Qatar with countries of the Horn of Africa.

A foreign policy centred on the emir
Qatar’s ruling Al Thani family, currently headed by Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, is one of the largest ruling families in the Middle East. This extended family has had a long history of intense infighting, mainly over foreign alliances and for top political positions. The family is the centre of the country’s politics and in a position of uncontested power, with absolute control over all existing institutions. Thus appointments to the highest government offices are usually based on personal loyalty to the incumbent emir, whose primary concern is the ongoing centralisation and retention of power. The ability of potential rivals in the Al Thani family to oppose both domestic and foreign policies and to compete for political power has been effectively curtailed.

Hiba Khodr, assistant professor of public policy and public management at the American University of Beirut, contends that, even if it is tricky to discern how policies are exactly formulated in Qatar, the political leadership, including the omnipresent emir and his restricted inner circle, ‘has considerable autonomy and dominates the policy-making process’.14 He argues that ‘this elite group attempts to understand citizens’ needs, articulates a national vision, sets the near-term political agenda and oversees policy implementation and evaluation’.15 Yet,
he notes, there are ‘limited institutionalised channels of communication between citizens and the government, and, as a result, public officials do not appear to possess formal means of detecting the national mood or policy preferences of their citizens’.16
From 1995 when he captured power through a bloodless coup until 2013 when he unexpectedly abdicated, 64-year-old Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani had, without much political and bureaucratic turmoil, ‘centralised power in his own hands’.17 Indeed, ‘all domestic policies, like their foreign counterparts, are top-down decisions made primarily by the emir [Hamad] … [And, there was a visible] lack of public consultation on domestic and foreign policy [and a] lack of access to information on public affairs’.
During Hamad’s rule, four like-minded individuals played a vital role in Qatar’s decision-making.19 Apart from the emir himself, there was his second and favourite wife, Sheikha Mowza bint Nasser. She is portrayed by one interviewee as ‘having politics in her blood, [as] being often unofficially involved in policy deliberations and
key decisions and [as] the glue which holds the elite group together’.
There was also Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani, a distant cousin of Hamad, who served as prime minister between 2007 and 2013 and as minister of foreign affairs between 1992 and 2013. Jasim was a trusted aide whose opinions carried some weight. He was a forcefully supportive foreign policy second-in-command to

Hamad,21 who greatly relied upon his hard work, tactical acumen and extensive personal networks in power circles around the world.22 Sir Graham Boyce, a former UK ambassador to Qatar, writes that Jasim had ‘remarkable access to the leaders in every Western capital’.
The current emir, the 36-year-old Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, is the son of previous emir Hamad and his second wife, Sheikha Mowza. Like his father, Tamim went to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. He was appointed crown prince in 2003, gradually promoted to a leadership position and gained experience in international dealings.
Tamim inherited and retained the weak and underutilised institutions that were characteristic of his father’s long rule.25 Foreign policy decision-making and diplomacy have remained the emir’s prerogative and institutions ‘hardly seem to matter’.
In a slight departure from previous practice, in 2013 Tamim appointed deputy minister of foreign affairs Khalid Al Attiya, who is not a member of the Al Thani family, as minister of foreign affairs, a post he held until 2016.27
An interviewee felt that Khalid ‘did not challenge the decisions of his political master and kept his personal opinions in check’.28 He was replaced by 36-year-old Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, another discreet loyalist but a distant cousin of the new emir. readmore

Qatar Crisis: Will Eritrea and Ethiopia take sides?

messengerafrica June 10, 2017 Analysis, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Interviews, Somalia, Sudan

Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud on a visit in April 2015 (Saudi Press Agency)

As battle lines are drawn in the diplomatic standoff between Qatar and Saudi Arabia that began last Monday, Horn of Africa nations including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan face pressures from the Saudi-led coalition to sever ties with Qatar.
Saudi Arabia has mustered a coalition with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt and other powers, seeking to isolate Qatar diplomatically and economically over its support for Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and other militant groups. Qatar says the campaign aims to subvert its sovereign right to enact its own foreign policy.
Several Arab and Turkish news agencies on Friday cited a statement in Arabic by Asmara’s foreign ministry declining a request by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to cut diplomatic ties with Qatar. The purported statement said that Qatar “rejected” the demand to cut ties “with brother Doha,” adding, Eritrea has “strong ties with the brother people of Qatar,” and it was “impossible to cut ties.”
But the country’s information minister took to Twitter soon thereafter to disavow the statement and described it as “forged” on foreign ministry letterhead. But he did not elaborate further on the actual state of relations with Qatar or Saudi Arabia.
Eritrea hosts a military base belonging to Qatar’s Gulf rival UAE. But the country also has significant ties with Doha. Speaking with The Messenger on Wednesday, Professor Harry Verhoeven explained that Eritrea is a country with few international allies and that Qatar is one friend that has proven itself “reliable.”
Meanwhile, Eritrea’s neighbor and rival Ethiopia is likely to be cautious about getting drawn into the diplomatic row, even though its sympathies probably lie more with the other side, according to Professor Verhoeven, who has written extensively on international relations in the Horn of Africa.
Verhoeven points to ties between Ethiopia and Israel as a relevant factor, saying the Israelis are opposed to the Qatari position. He also cites ongoing talks between Ethiopia and the UAE over the refurbishment of the Red Sea port of Berbera. “It’s complex for Ethiopia because Ethiopia suffers from a lack fo deep ties to any of these players and in many ways actually a lack of understanding of how they operate. So I think it’s difficult for Ethiopia to decide in the near future on a particular course. But there’s no question Ethiopia will look for an opportunity,” he says.
“It’s interesting that at the very time this is happening (Prime Minister) Hailemariam has been visiting Israel. And Israel, of course, officially is not in the picture but is very closely aligned with the Emirati and Saudi position. Also if you look at some of the Saudi and Emirati demands of the Qataris — these could be Israel’s demands — demands about Hamas, about Hezbollah, about the Al Jazeera coverage, about potential ties with Iran.”
However, Verhoeven does not describe the relationship between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia and its ally UAE as unequivocally strong. He says the Ethiopians have been sceptical of Saudi and Emirati influence in the Horn of Africa even as they’ve seen their bilateral relationships grow. The Ethiopians are “trying to at least adjust themselves to the Emiratis and the Saudis on the one hand as a potentially credible partner, and on the other hand, trying to say, well, don’t pull too closely to Somaliland and particularly also to Eritrea.”

‘Ethiopia would probably calculate that it has more to lose from pulling closer to Qatar.’

Verhoeven sees Ethiopia as likely to ‘inch closer’ to the Saudi camp. “Ethiopia is largely in reactive mode. It’s difficult for them to shape these events. And so they’ll certainly look for an opportunity as everybody else does, but I would expect a relatively high degree of caution when it comes to this dispute, even though, as I said, most of their sympathies — I think their strategic instinct — will point in the direction of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi,” he says.
What’s unusual about this potential alignment is that it would put Ethiopia in the same camp as Egypt, which has sided strongly with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even though the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia is quite tense right now.
“Ethiopia would probably calculate that it has more to lose from, say, pulling closer to Qatar or the Iranians, which would also be compromising of the relationship with the United States, particularly under this administration, so that’s why I would think that they would inch closer to that camp rather than to the other side.” readmore
source https://messengerafrica.com/2017/06/10/qatar-crisis-eritrea-stands-with-brother-doha-but-whither-ethiopia/

Somalia turns down $80m to cut ties with Qatar

     

June 12, 2017 at 2:35 pm | Published in: Africa, Middle East, News, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, UAE

Image of Somali President, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on 8 February 2017 [AMISOM Public Information/Flickr]

June 12, 2017 at 2:35 pm

Somali President, Mohammed Abdullah Farmajo, has been offered $80 million in exchange for his agreement to sever diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar, the New Khalij news outlet reported a prominent journalist has revealed.

“After two hours of enticement, Farmajo rejected the tempting offer,” journalist Jaber Al-Harimi said.

Yesterday, the newspaper Somalia Today quoted unnamed sources saying “there was pressure put on the Somali government by Saudi Arabia to reverse Somalia’s decision to stay neutral in the siege imposed by some Arab governments on the State of Qatar.”

Read: Trump chooses multibillion-dollar Saudi deal over security cooperation with Qatar

The sources confirmed that Saudi Arabia threatened to withdraw financial aid to the Somali government unless Somalia change its neutral stand in which it has called for an end to the political dispute between Qatar and the other Arab nations through dialogue via Islamic organisations like the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).

The sources added that “ministers of the Somali government returned from Saudi Arabia after meetings with their counterpart were unexpectedly postponed.” It is understood that the rulers of the UAE, with the knowledge of Saudi Arabia, have already sought to persuade Farmajo, who won the presidency despite opposition from the UAE, to change his position.

Sources close to Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi, who asked not to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue, explained to the New Khalij that the rulers of the UAE, in particular the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed Bin Zayed, would have preferred the former president, Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud, to remain in power, especially because of the concessions that the UAE were given by Mahmoud, including contracts for the unfettered access and management of a number of Somali ports that would have provided the UAE with an important strategic position in trading across the world. The new Somali President, Farmajo, has vowed to reverse a number of agreements, some of which have been described as “illegal”.

Read more: Qatar says no expulsions of nationals from countries that cut ties

Also arriving yesterday in the Somali capital were a Qatari delegation headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sultan Bin Saad Al-Muraikhi, to hold talks between the Gulf States and officials of the Somali Federal government. According to sources, the Qatari delegation met with the Somali Prime Minister, Hasan Ali Khairi, and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are also expected to meet Farmajo.

The Qatari delegation praised the non-aligned stance taken by government towards the Gulf countries and encouraged Somali leaders to maintain their stance against the embargo on Qatar at any cost.

Somalia allowed Qatar the use of its airspace to break the no fly restriction imposed by the Arab countries. “At least 15 Qatari planes flew through Somali Airspace on the first day of the blockade on Qatar,” the Associated Press quoted an official with the aviation authority as saying. source  https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170612-somalia-turns-down-80m-to-cut-ties-with-qatar/

Eritrea Sides with Gulf Nations Against Qatar Eritrea Sides with Gulf Nations Against Qatar

www.arabnews.com | June 12, 2017

DOHA, Qatar: Eritrea has expressed support for Saudi Arabia and its allies after they cut ties with Qatar.


The Eritrean Information Ministry’s statement of support on Monday came despite its previously close ties with energy-rich Qatar.


The statement said the initiative by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates “is not confined to Qatar alone as the potential of Qatar is very limited,” but is “one initiative among many in the right direction that envisages full realization of regional security and stability.”


The three countries along with Bahrain cut ties to Qatar last week over alleged Qatari support for Islamic extremists. Along with Bahrain, they have moved to block air, land and sea routes to the energy-rich Gulf nation.


Both Saudi and Qatari officials appear to be seeking support from Ethiopia.


Qatari officials met Monday with Ethiopia’s prime minister and Saudi officials visited the Ethiopian capital over the weekend.


Qatar has remained defiant as the dispute worsened, Its foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, is welcoming diplomatic efforts to calm the standoff, but insists that no one can dictate its foreign policy.


Al Thani said Monday that Qatar is in contact with international aviation authorities and legal organizations as it tries to fight back against moves by Saudi Arabia and its allies to cut off its land, air and sea access.


Speaking after diplomatic meetings in Paris, Al Thani said Qatar is ready to negotiate anything “related to the collective security of the Gulf countries” but insisted that Qatari foreign policy is not open to debate.


He also said “no one has the right” to pressure Qatar to silence TV network Al Jazeera, which is based in Doha.


Al Thani has visited multiple European countries in recent days seeking diplomatic support.


Source: http://www.arabnews.com/node/1113951/middle-east