Qatar’s diplomatic incursions into the Horn of Africa
Summary
Although it is a small country in a dangerous neighbourhood, Qatar has regional ambitions. It punches above its weight diplomatically
by acting as a mediator in conflicts in the Horn of Africa. The results have been mixed, with negotiations hampered by the centralisation
of foreign policy in the person of the emir, who does not seek advice from his foreign affairs ministry. However, Qatar’s successes have been impressive and among the underpinnings of its efforts are wealth, shared with its citizens – from huge natural gas deposits, security guarantees from the United States and a strong alliance with Turkey – and Qatar’s position as the home of the media giant, Al Jazeera.
AT JUST UNDER 12 000 square kilometres, Qatar is the third smallest
country in the Middle East, after Kuwait and Bahrain. Only 250 000 of
its total population of two million are Qatari nationals. Thus
nationals, who live mostly in and around the capital, Doha, constitute a
minority, although a wealthy one – Qatar’s average GDP per capita
income is US$140 000.
Because it has too few recruitable nationals, Qatar’s small military force mainly consists of foreigners, including numerous Pakistanis and Yemenis.
The country, which attained its independence in 1971, operates in a geopolitically rough and economically competitive region. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of which are historically significant, more populous, geographically bigger, politically hostile, diplomatically influential and militarily stronger countries.
Nonetheless, Qatar possesses the third largest reserves of natural gas in the world, after Russia and Iran, and its reserves are projected to last for decades to come.
Because it has too few recruitable nationals, Qatar’s small military force mainly consists of foreigners, including numerous Pakistanis and Yemenis.
The country, which attained its independence in 1971, operates in a geopolitically rough and economically competitive region. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of which are historically significant, more populous, geographically bigger, politically hostile, diplomatically influential and militarily stronger countries.
Nonetheless, Qatar possesses the third largest reserves of natural gas in the world, after Russia and Iran, and its reserves are projected to last for decades to come.
Since 2006, it has emerged as the world’s largest exporter of
liquefied natural gas, which generates the bulk of its total export
revenues.
It is also endowed with a relatively young political leadership, which wants to ‘play a greater role and mould regional politics according to [Qatar’s best] interests’.
This leadership chose not to pursue the softer and passive foreign policy of Kuwait and Bahrain, the Middle East’s other small, wealthy countries. Instead, it purposefully took a different route and pursued a distinctively energetic and self-determined foreign policy. Consequently, Qatar has ended up, in less than two decades, attaining an international significance considerably at odds with its youthful statehood, small physical size, small population of Qatari citizens, limited military capability and unfavourable geopolitical situation.
It is also endowed with a relatively young political leadership, which wants to ‘play a greater role and mould regional politics according to [Qatar’s best] interests’.
This leadership chose not to pursue the softer and passive foreign policy of Kuwait and Bahrain, the Middle East’s other small, wealthy countries. Instead, it purposefully took a different route and pursued a distinctively energetic and self-determined foreign policy. Consequently, Qatar has ended up, in less than two decades, attaining an international significance considerably at odds with its youthful statehood, small physical size, small population of Qatari citizens, limited military capability and unfavourable geopolitical situation.
Qatar has ended up, in less than two decades, attaining an international significance considerably at odds with its youthful statehood
Qatar has begun to play an influential role in the Horn of Africa in
security and diplomacy. It previously established close relations with
Sudan and Eritrea, recently repaired its troubled bilateral relations
with Ethiopia and provides financial assistance to the current
government of Somalia. It successfully mediated conflicts between
Eritrea and Sudan and Eritrea and Djibouti. Additionally, Qatar rather
clumsily mediated Sudan’s Darfur conflict.
This case study of Qatari engagement in the Horn of Africa highlights the evolution of its international role, bearing in mind its diplomatic rivalry with Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the added value and limits of Qatar’s mediation in the Horn of Africa’s many intractable conflicts. And it underlines the gap between the decisions of a small country punching above its weight and the uninstitutionalised implementation of its broadest objectives.
The report is divided into three parts. The first part provides insights into the nature and operation of Qatar’s foreign policy decision-making. The second part explicates the two main objectives of the country’s foreign policy. It
also outlines the three preferred instruments used by Qatar to achieve these objectives. The third part examines the relations of Qatar with countries of the Horn of Africa.
This case study of Qatari engagement in the Horn of Africa highlights the evolution of its international role, bearing in mind its diplomatic rivalry with Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as the added value and limits of Qatar’s mediation in the Horn of Africa’s many intractable conflicts. And it underlines the gap between the decisions of a small country punching above its weight and the uninstitutionalised implementation of its broadest objectives.
The report is divided into three parts. The first part provides insights into the nature and operation of Qatar’s foreign policy decision-making. The second part explicates the two main objectives of the country’s foreign policy. It
also outlines the three preferred instruments used by Qatar to achieve these objectives. The third part examines the relations of Qatar with countries of the Horn of Africa.
A foreign policy centred on the emir
Qatar’s ruling Al Thani family, currently headed by Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, is one of the largest ruling families in the Middle East. This extended family has had a long history of intense infighting, mainly over foreign alliances and for top political positions. The family is the centre of the country’s politics and in a position of uncontested power, with absolute control over all existing institutions. Thus appointments to the highest government offices are usually based on personal loyalty to the incumbent emir, whose primary concern is the ongoing centralisation and retention of power. The ability of potential rivals in the Al Thani family to oppose both domestic and foreign policies and to compete for political power has been effectively curtailed.
Qatar’s ruling Al Thani family, currently headed by Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, is one of the largest ruling families in the Middle East. This extended family has had a long history of intense infighting, mainly over foreign alliances and for top political positions. The family is the centre of the country’s politics and in a position of uncontested power, with absolute control over all existing institutions. Thus appointments to the highest government offices are usually based on personal loyalty to the incumbent emir, whose primary concern is the ongoing centralisation and retention of power. The ability of potential rivals in the Al Thani family to oppose both domestic and foreign policies and to compete for political power has been effectively curtailed.
Hiba Khodr, assistant professor of public policy and public
management at the American University of Beirut, contends that, even if
it is tricky to discern how policies are exactly formulated in Qatar,
the political leadership, including the omnipresent emir and his
restricted inner circle, ‘has considerable autonomy and dominates the
policy-making process’.14 He argues that ‘this elite group attempts to
understand citizens’ needs, articulates a national vision, sets the
near-term political agenda and oversees policy implementation and
evaluation’.15 Yet,
he notes, there are ‘limited institutionalised channels of communication between citizens and the government, and, as a result, public officials do not appear to possess formal means of detecting the national mood or policy preferences of their citizens’.16
From 1995 when he captured power through a bloodless coup until 2013 when he unexpectedly abdicated, 64-year-old Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani had, without much political and bureaucratic turmoil, ‘centralised power in his own hands’.17 Indeed, ‘all domestic policies, like their foreign counterparts, are top-down decisions made primarily by the emir [Hamad] … [And, there was a visible] lack of public consultation on domestic and foreign policy [and a] lack of access to information on public affairs’.
During Hamad’s rule, four like-minded individuals played a vital role in Qatar’s decision-making.19 Apart from the emir himself, there was his second and favourite wife, Sheikha Mowza bint Nasser. She is portrayed by one interviewee as ‘having politics in her blood, [as] being often unofficially involved in policy deliberations and
key decisions and [as] the glue which holds the elite group together’.
There was also Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani, a distant cousin of Hamad, who served as prime minister between 2007 and 2013 and as minister of foreign affairs between 1992 and 2013. Jasim was a trusted aide whose opinions carried some weight. He was a forcefully supportive foreign policy second-in-command to
he notes, there are ‘limited institutionalised channels of communication between citizens and the government, and, as a result, public officials do not appear to possess formal means of detecting the national mood or policy preferences of their citizens’.16
From 1995 when he captured power through a bloodless coup until 2013 when he unexpectedly abdicated, 64-year-old Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani had, without much political and bureaucratic turmoil, ‘centralised power in his own hands’.17 Indeed, ‘all domestic policies, like their foreign counterparts, are top-down decisions made primarily by the emir [Hamad] … [And, there was a visible] lack of public consultation on domestic and foreign policy [and a] lack of access to information on public affairs’.
During Hamad’s rule, four like-minded individuals played a vital role in Qatar’s decision-making.19 Apart from the emir himself, there was his second and favourite wife, Sheikha Mowza bint Nasser. She is portrayed by one interviewee as ‘having politics in her blood, [as] being often unofficially involved in policy deliberations and
key decisions and [as] the glue which holds the elite group together’.
There was also Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani, a distant cousin of Hamad, who served as prime minister between 2007 and 2013 and as minister of foreign affairs between 1992 and 2013. Jasim was a trusted aide whose opinions carried some weight. He was a forcefully supportive foreign policy second-in-command to
Hamad,21 who greatly relied upon his hard work, tactical acumen and
extensive personal networks in power circles around the world.22 Sir
Graham Boyce, a former UK ambassador to Qatar, writes that Jasim had
‘remarkable access to the leaders in every Western capital’.
The current emir, the 36-year-old Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, is the son of previous emir Hamad and his second wife, Sheikha Mowza. Like his father, Tamim went to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. He was appointed crown prince in 2003, gradually promoted to a leadership position and gained experience in international dealings.
Tamim inherited and retained the weak and underutilised institutions that were characteristic of his father’s long rule.25 Foreign policy decision-making and diplomacy have remained the emir’s prerogative and institutions ‘hardly seem to matter’.
In a slight departure from previous practice, in 2013 Tamim appointed deputy minister of foreign affairs Khalid Al Attiya, who is not a member of the Al Thani family, as minister of foreign affairs, a post he held until 2016.27
An interviewee felt that Khalid ‘did not challenge the decisions of his political master and kept his personal opinions in check’.28 He was replaced by 36-year-old Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, another discreet loyalist but a distant cousin of the new emir. readmore
The current emir, the 36-year-old Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad, is the son of previous emir Hamad and his second wife, Sheikha Mowza. Like his father, Tamim went to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. He was appointed crown prince in 2003, gradually promoted to a leadership position and gained experience in international dealings.
Tamim inherited and retained the weak and underutilised institutions that were characteristic of his father’s long rule.25 Foreign policy decision-making and diplomacy have remained the emir’s prerogative and institutions ‘hardly seem to matter’.
In a slight departure from previous practice, in 2013 Tamim appointed deputy minister of foreign affairs Khalid Al Attiya, who is not a member of the Al Thani family, as minister of foreign affairs, a post he held until 2016.27
An interviewee felt that Khalid ‘did not challenge the decisions of his political master and kept his personal opinions in check’.28 He was replaced by 36-year-old Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, another discreet loyalist but a distant cousin of the new emir. readmore
![Image of Somali President, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on 8 February 2017 [AMISOM Public Information/Flickr]](https://i0.wp.com/www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017_2_8-Somali-President-Mohamed-Abdullahi-FarmajoMohamed_Abdullahi_Farmajo_landscape_crop.jpg?resize=1200%2C800&quality=75&strip=all&ssl=1)
