The coup in Mali: the result of a long-term crisis or spillover from the Libyan civil war?

The current crisis in Mali was not unexpected, although most national and international players were eager to maintain an unrealistic view of political developments in this Sahelian country. This crisis reflects the decay of state institutions and practices: the Malian army collapsed and patronage does not mean democracy. Its crisis is built on four dynamics that have their own effects: the debatable implementation of previous peace settlements with the Tuareg insurgency; the growing economic importance of AQIM activities in the Sahelian region; the collapse of the Qaddafi regime in Libya; and the inability or unwillingness of Algeria to play the role of regional hegemon now that its rival (Libya) has stopped doing so.

While the Tuareg rebellion has been able to gain from the collapse of the Malian army in the north, it should be noted that the many armed groups have different agendas, and position themselves differently towards the local population and the Malian state. What is unclear is whether they will be able to co-exist on the same territory while trafficking and a protection economy are the only sustainable resources.

The jihadi aspect of some components of the insurgency has to be understood in context and should not be seen as erasing social and economic differences in a heterogeneous northern Mali. It proves the successful demonstration effect that small groups such as AQIM and Ansar ed-Din can have. It should also draw more attention to a regional context that could provide radicals with a wider audience and credibility by building opportunistic coalitions. Read more

Since December 2010, the speed, suddenness and scope of events in North Africa and the Middle East have taken everyone by surprise. They nevertheless had to happen. Given the universality of human nature – differences between a European and an Arab are ultimately of minor importance – the processes that began in Europe in the seventeenth century and spread throughout the world would have inevitably reached the Arab countries.

For the past four decades, depending on their level of advancement, the Arab countries have experienced cultural, ideational, demographic and anthropological transformation similar to what Europe had been through since the English (1640–1660) and French Revolutions (1789).

Fertility in some Arab countries is similar to or lower than in Norway, due to a rising age of marriage and the increasing use of contraception. At the same time, secularism is on the rise in society, if not in politics. There is no reason to believe the Arab world would have been an exception, because Arabs are not inherently averse to human progress. Read more

Gender, Conflict, and Development

This review addresses the gender dimensions of intrastate conflict. It is organized around eight areas or themes that are related to the World Bank’s agenda on gender, conflict, and development: (i) gender and warfare; (ii) gender and sexual violence; (iii) gender and formal peace processes; (iv) gender and informal peace processes; (v) gender and the post-conflict legal framework; (vi) gender and work; (vii) gender and rehabilitating social services; and (viii) gender and community- driven development. For each theme, the authors have analyzed the gender-specific roles of women and men before, during, and after conflict, the gender role changes throughout conflict, the development challenges in sustaining positive gender role changes and mitigating negative effects, and the policy options for addressing these gender roles, dynamics, and challenges. The suggested policy options are intended to be gender- as well as conflict-sensitive, and ideally should contribute to more equal gender relations. The relevance and applicability of the policy options are identified and key considerations outlined that the Bank would need to take into account in assessing policy options. Finally, further research areas are suggested on the gender, conflict, and development nexus. Read more

South Sudan Nhial Deng Nhial: We are on brink of war

South Sudan's foreign minister has warned his country is on the brink of war with Sudan following days of fierce fighting along the border. Nhial Deng Nhial told the BBC Sudanese forces had invaded the town of Jau, which was in the south. He urged the international community to intervene and said he hoped full-scale hostilities could still be avoided. South Sudan seceded from the north in July following years of civil war in which some 1.5m people died. The border between the north and south has not yet been officially designated. Since July Khartoum and Juba have accused each other of supporting rebels in the border areas. 'Tanks and aircraft' Mr Deng Nhial said the clashes in Jau, which he said was a town in Unity state, were the biggest threat to peace since South Sudan's independence. "Although there have been frequent aerial bombardments of different places in the Republic of South Sudan, we think that Khartoum has raised this offensive to an entirely new level by committing ground forces to cross into the Republic of South Sudan," he told the BBC's Focus on Africa programme. "We are still very much committed to the principle of dialogue with Khartoum - we are still hopeful that we can pull back from the brink of outright war." Earlier, Col Philip Aguer, spokesman for South Sudan's army - the South People's Liberation Army (SPLA) - told the BBC that Khartoum had used tanks and long-range artillery in the offensive on Jau, which started on Saturday. Read more

Building Peace in the Space of Civil Society: The Case of Somali Women

Of all the Post-Cold War conflicts to arise in Africa, one of the most disastrous has been the collapse of the Somali state (legally and administratively) following a civil war in which Somalia degenerated into a collection of feudal enclaves, each controlled by a self-appointed ‘warlord’ and Islamic courts. The current Transitional Federal Government faces enormous challenges to assert its authority beyond Baidoa (is a tiny town). Somalia is a nation plagued by hunger, disease and poverty. It is a nation facing a very complex humanitarian crisis. The people of this nation have been experiencing economic, political and environmental insecurities. Women have been particularly affected as there are no publicly funded social services available (these include: employment, healthcare, education and protection). Even some of the gains which women made in education and politics were rolled back (the lost decade for Somali women). Read more

The Impediments to Building the Common Infrastructure in the Horn of Africa by Daniel Kendie

The infrastructure affects growth and development. It assists in coping with population growth, in improving environmental conditions, in raising output and in lowering production costs. It also helps to diversity production and to expand trade. Safe water is essential for everything. The provision of energy and hydro-electricity is a must for development. In effect, the infrastructure opens the path to sustained growth. If we relate all this to the Horn of Africa, we will discover that the countries of the sub-region have not made any appreciable headway in building the common infrastructure because of the legacy of unresolved conflicts. Since so many interest groups are also involved in their conflicts, no solution seems to be in sight. Among the conflicts are the territorial disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia, Kenya and Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. In a situation where the governments of the sub-region do not therefore even have normal working relationships, to propose that the common infrastructure be built would be either outright disingenuous or naïve. One can write on each conflict. However, since time does not permit such a luxury, this paper will examine in some detail the conflicting stakes of Somalia and Ethiopia to show how irreconcilable their positions have been. It will then present a brief account of the serious internal and external problems which confront the sub-region, and which need to be addressed, and then conclude by making some observations regarding the infrastructure. Read more

Horn of Africa: Conflict and Consequences

Summary The Horn of Africa- Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti-, located in the strategic Northeastern part of the continent, has a combined area of more than 1.9 million square kilometers; a coastline of over 4000 kilometers, the longest in Africa; and a combined population of approximately 93 million. One of the primary obstacles to development in the region has been perennial conflict within and between countries. The consequences of these perennial conflicts have been very costly for the region in both human and economic terms. Even though endowed with great natural resources, the region is one of the poorest in the world. Where does the region go from here? The region needs a complete paradigm shift; for the people of the region to have a realistic shot at a prosperous future, the countries of the region must commit themselves to a few basic tenets in their relationship: mutual respect for one another; renunciation of war as a tool to resolve disputes; and acceptance of arbitration decisions on disputed boundaries as demarcated and/or recognized by the United Nations. This would create a stable environment that would open up opportunities for economic cooperation- and ultimately economic integration- that the region desperately needs. A Horn of Africa at Peace with itself and its neighbors will be able to exploit its rich natural and complimentary Read more

Famine and Politics in the Horn of Africa

Since the summer of 2011, there has been a crisis that the world’s media has not been reporting upon with the urgency that it deserves. The Horn of Africa, comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, is facing another famine that the constituent countries are unable to deal with. The online resource, Famine Early Warning System (www.fews.net) claims that at least two large areas of Southern Somalia are facing catastrophic conditions. Those fleeing the effects of the famine have made their way to the eastern part of Kenya, where according to conservative estimates, there are more than 3 million people living in makeshift relief camps. Geographers and social scientists are calling this the worst famine that has been visited upon the people of the Horn of Africa in over 60 years. The main causes for the famine are actually a combination of climatic and political factors. According to Swiss political scientist, Dr. Tobias Hagmann, who is based at the University of California at Berkeley, the price increase in staple crops like sorghum and rice, as well as debilitating droughts in the region, have merged to create famine conditions. What compounds matters, he says, is the erroneous media assumption that pastoralist depredations and the absence of a strong centralised state have added to the crisis. As a matter of fact, Hagmann and his clutch of colleagues who work on east Africa and Horn of Africa related conflicts, opine that the collapse of the state is only one aspect of the issue. They also feel that the anti-pastoral discourse is flawed, for it remains a major source of livelihood for many Somalis and to abandon it, as experts are wont to suggest would mean the end of their culture and economy Read more

Somalia-Ethiopia, Kenya Conflict

Despite the difficulties encountered in integrating north and south, the most important political issue in postindependence Somali politics was the unification of all areas populated by Somalis into one country--a concept identified as pan-Somalism, or Greater Somalia. Politicians assumed that this issue dominated popular opinion and that any government would fall if it did not demonstrate a militant attitude toward neighboring countries occupying Somali territory. Preoccupation with Greater Somalia shaped the character of the country's newly formed institutions and led to the build-up of the Somali military and ultimately to the war with Ethiopia and fighting in the NFD in Kenya. By law the exact size of the National Assembly was not established in order to facilitate the inclusion of representatives of the contested areas after unification. The national flag featured a five-pointed star whose points represented those areas claimed as part of the Somali nation--the former Italian and British territories, the Ogaden, Djibouti, and the NFD. Moreover, the preamble to the constitution approved in 1961 included the statement, "The Somali Republic promotes by legal and peaceful means, the union of the territories." The constitution also provided that all ethnic Somalis, no matter where they resided, were citizens of the republic. The Somalis did not claim sovereignty over adjacent territories, but rather demanded that Somalis living in them be granted the right to self-determination. Somali leaders asserted that they would be satisfied only when their fellow Somalis outside the republic had the opportunity to decide for themselves what their status would be. Read more

A Diplomatic Surge to Stop Somalia’s Famine

Somalia is dying. Three-quarters of a million people are at immediate risk of famine;
another 750,000 are refugees in neighboring countries, and 4 million – half the total
population – is in need of emergency aid. It is a calamity that could join the ranks of the
Rwanda genocide and the Darfur crisis in terms of scale and human suffering. And for
Somalia it is a terrible repeat of the 1991-92 famine that claimed 240,000 lives.
The international response to date has been shockingly inadequate – not just because
funds for humanitarian aid have fallen short, but because of the absence of political will
to take bold diplomatic action to remove impediments to the delivery of aid. Read more

Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting The Cost of Failure in Somalia

The disastrous famine in Somalia is the worst the world has seen in 20 years, and it again casts a harsh spotlight on the situation in that country. With millions of people now at risk of starvation, and appalling stories of human hardship dominating the evening news, the name “Somalia” once again conjures images of crisis and despair—a famished, suffering country peopled by pirates, terrorists, and warlords.

Somalia is best known for the civil war and famine of the early 1990s, which killed some 250,000 people and triggered a massive, U.S.-led humanitarian intervention that culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident of 1994. More recently, the rise of indigenous Islamist movements in southern Somalia has rekindled fears that the anarchic territory could—or has—become a safe haven for Al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist movements. Read more

Why Humanitarian Aid in Darfur is not a Practice of the "Responsibility to Protect"

The Discussion Paper provides a compelling critique of the ‘new humanitarianism, ’particularly the ways in which leading donor states seek to incorporate humanitarian assistance and protection into the toolbox of political intervention in other countries. Drawing upon the history of humanitarianism and its origins in an ethos of neutrality, impartiality and non-violence, the author shows how since the end of the Cold War, and increasingly since 9/11, the ‘new’ form of internationational humanitarianism has become deeply politicised and has taken on human rights, strategic-security, liberal and developmental agendas as defined by donor states. The paper frames the critique of linking R2P to humanitarian protection values in the context of the new humanitarianism and the pursuit of the foreign policies of hegemonic states. It therefore provides a critical perspective on the politics of humanitarian aid in Darfur, and opens up a new basis for an alternative discourse on international humanitarian intervention and its connection with the politics of global powers in African conflict arenas. This paper is an important resource for scholars, civil society activists and policy practitioners with a keen interest in international humanitarian aid, international humanitarian law, conflict, peace and security in Africa. Read more

PTSD, depression and anxiety among former abductees in Northern Uganda

PTSD, depression and anxiety among former abductees in Northern Uganda
Abstract
Background: The population in Northern Uganda has been exposed to extreme levels of
traumatic stress and thousands abducted forcibly became rebel combatants.

Methods: Using structured interviews, the prevalence and severity of posttraumatic stressdisorder (PTSD), depression and anxiety was assessed in 72 former abducted adults, 62 ofthem being former child soldiers.

Results: As retrospective reports of exposure to traumatic stress increased, anxiety and PTSD occurrence increased (r=.45). 49% of respondents were diagnosed with PTSD, 70%presented with symptoms of depression, and 59% with those of anxiety. In a multiple linear regression analysis four factors could best explain the development of PTSD

symptoms:male respondents (sex) living in an IDP-Camp (location) with a kinship murdered in the war (family members killed in the war) and having experienced a high number of traumatic events (number of traumatic events) were more likely to develop symptoms of PTSD than others. In disagreement to a simple dose-response-effect though, we also observed a negative correlation between the time spent with the rebels and the PTSD symptom level.

Conclusions: Former abductees continue to suffer from severe mental ill-health. Adaptation to the living condition of rebels, however, may lower trauma-related mental suffering
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Sudan: Southern Kordofan Civilians Tell of Air Strike Horror

The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) are indiscriminately bombing civilian areas in the Nuba Mountainsregion of Southern Kordofan and preventing aid from reaching desperate displaced people, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch said today.
Researchers from both groups, during a week-long mission to the area in late-August, investigated 13 air strikes in Kauda, Delami and Kurchi areas. Those air strikes killed at least 26 civilians and injured more than 45 others since mid-June. The researchers also witnessed government planes circling over civilian areas and dropping bombs, forcing civilians to seek shelter in mountains and caves. “The relentless bombing campaign is killing and maiming civilian men, women and children, displacing tens of thousands, putting them in desperate need of aid, and preventing entire communities from planting crops and feeding their children,” said Daniel Bekele, Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “The Sudanese government is
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Land, Power and Identity Roots of violent conflict in Eastern DRC Chris Huggins

This study examines access to, use of and management of land and its links with the root causes
of conflict in the two Kivu provinces and Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The
study’s aim is to identify key gaps in the international community’s understanding of land issues
in Eastern DRC, as well as gaps in the kinds of interventions that are being conducted at the
current time (2009-2010).
In the DRC, as in other countries, customary, informal and statutory land-tenure systems
“overlap” geographically, in the sense that a certain parcel of land might be claimed by different
actors under different systems. Individuals and sometimes communities may claim land through a
variety of systems simultaneously, resulting in confusion and dispute. Eastern DRC encompasses a
vast area and huge diversity in terms of geography, forms of local governance, ethnic composition,
and other aspects. However, while acknowledging this diversity, it is useful to identify two sets of
dichotomies, or “opposites”, which are of great significance across much of Eastern DRC: the dual
system of land access (customary and statutory) and the conceptual contrast between ethnic groups
which are “local” or “indigenous” to a particular area, and those which are seen as “migrants” or
“foreigners”. The weakness of the statutory land law, as well as widespread corruption, has led to
massive alienation of land held under custom. Customary leaders, who traditionally held the land
“in the name of their community”, have essentially privatised community properties, pocketing
the proceeds from alienated land which has been sold to wealthy and powerful individuals or
foreign and Congolese companies.
In the DRC, political representation at the local level is linked directly to “ethnic territories”. There
is therefore a structural link between claims to land ownership by ethnic communities, and claims to
political autonomy and power. Communities that have lacked local representation have long made
claims to land ownership in order to have their own chiefs, and these claims have often been resisted
by neighbouring communities. The result in many areas, particularly the east, has been violence.
Land is essential to most rural livelihoods, but it is also bound up very strongly with issues of “identity
and power”.1 While land scarcity and alienation of customary land has led to land disputes at the
micro-level, the tensions around such “local” and “intra-community” conflicts (or conflicts between
“ethnic citizens” and their chiefs who make decisions over community land) have generally been
transferred into the “inter-community” level. This has been achieved through discourses utilising
the concepts of “indigenous” and “immigrant” groups. For some communities, notably Hutu and
Tutsi, the issue of immigrant status is linked to an uncertain or contested right to citizenship. This
dynamic has led to widespread violence and the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and
refugees – particularly those of Tutsi ethnicity – to parts of North Kivu in recent months and years
risks renewed violence unless it is handled very carefully.
In addition, control over land is a “sustaining factor” in conflict. Those individuals and cliques
that have benefitted from changes in control over land during conflict do not necessarily require a
continuation of war to maintain de facto control over their spoils. Rather, they need to avoid having
wartime transactions and population movements scrutinised and potentially undone, for example
through the establishment of land commissions, mediation processes, the return of IDPs and refugees,
or other state or non-state interventions. In order to avoid the loss of wartime gains, such actors will
likely attempt to gain influence with politicians or maintain a certain level of “instability” in order
to prevent international and local NGOs and state services from gaining a foothold in areas under
their control, and to prevent the return of those claiming land ownership.
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Somalia: 20 years of anarchy

During the 1990s, the conflict in Somalia was between rival warlords and clan-based militia. This led to widespread hunger and the UN and US intervened before a humiliating pull-out.

Fighting continued but with less intensity until in 2006, the Union of Islamic Courts became the first group to exert control over the whole of the capital, Mogadishu, for 15 years.

Ethiopia then invaded to oust the Islamists, with US support. But the Ethiopians were unable to exert control and now the capital is the scene of regular battles between the UN-backed government and the al-Qaeda linked militants, al-Shabab.
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The comprehensive approach to Civil-Military crisis management

Facing recurrent complex crises requiring an improved coordination
of civilian and military, international and local actors, the comprehensive
approach concept has appeared both within international
organisations (Nato, EU etc) and within governments (the US,
France, the UK etc). The issue concerns restoring security, governance
and development through an inter-agency, inter-ministerial or
even an inter-organisational approach.
The present study identifies the dilemmas of the comprehensive
approach (the neutrality of humanitarian intervention versus the armed
commitment of states, the explicit cooperations between international
organisations versus implicit cooperation, etc). It anticipates
the consequences of the comprehensive approach, foremost a
strengthened position for the European Union and Nato, wielding
management capabilities for civil and military crisis management,
and the quest for legitimacy within Nato and the African Union. It
qualifies the French position towards the concept. It analyses the
operational impact of the comprehensive approach for the military.
Finally, it reinforces the academic thinking on the comprehensive
approach and presents new research topics in security studies.
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Landmines and Land Rights in Conflict Affected Contexts

This policy brief1 describes the important linkages
between land rights and landmines in conflict-affected
contexts. Its purpose is to deepen awareness within
the broader mine action and development communities
about these linkages, and provide guidance on
how to effectively mainstream land rights2 issues into
mine action operations.
Land rights in conflict-affected situations are a topic
of increasing concern for the humanitarian and
development community. The recovery of households,
communities and countries following war depend to
a large degree on re-establishing clear rights over
land resources which are the basis of livelihoods.
The land rights situation becomes particularly critical
in mine-affected countries, where land access can
be denied for years or decades. Mine action organisations
(i.e. National Mine Action Authorities, National
Mine Action Centres, mine/ERW operators
and mine action donors) typically avoid land rights
issues in their activities, due to considerations of
neutrality, mandate, complexity, awareness and
political sensitivity. However the decision to survey 3
and clear (or not) particular areas inevitably involves
land rights issues.
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A New Strategy for Darfur

The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not
necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House
is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not
take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if
any extract is used, the speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the
details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an
event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions, but
the ultimate responsibility for accuracy lies with this document’s author(s). The published text of
speeches and presentations may differ from delivery.
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The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur

For almost four years, the largest single cause of violent death in Darfur, Sudan’s western region, has not been the government–rebel war that erupted in 2003, but fighting among Arab tribes armed by the government to fight the insurgency. Although the inter-Arab conflict claimed about 1,000 lives in the first ten months of 2010, displaced thousands of civilians, and left tens of thousands unprotected, very little is understood about it, or its protagonists, despite a large international presence spearheaded by the 30,000-person African Union/ UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Like the insurgency in its early years, the killing of Arab by Arab is unfolding almost completely unremarked outside Sudan. Unlike the insurgency, the deaths are at least partially recorded, including by UNAMID, and well reported by some Sudanese journalists. This Working Paper examines the background to and the development of the fighting between camel-herding Abbala and cattle-herding Baggara, the main players, and some of the possible repercussions.
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