Qatar Crisis: Will Eritrea and Ethiopia take sides?

messengerafrica June 10, 2017 Analysis, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Interviews, Somalia, Sudan

Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud on a visit in April 2015 (Saudi Press Agency)

As battle lines are drawn in the diplomatic standoff between Qatar and Saudi Arabia that began last Monday, Horn of Africa nations including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan face pressures from the Saudi-led coalition to sever ties with Qatar.
Saudi Arabia has mustered a coalition with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Egypt and other powers, seeking to isolate Qatar diplomatically and economically over its support for Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and other militant groups. Qatar says the campaign aims to subvert its sovereign right to enact its own foreign policy.
Several Arab and Turkish news agencies on Friday cited a statement in Arabic by Asmara’s foreign ministry declining a request by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to cut diplomatic ties with Qatar. The purported statement said that Qatar “rejected” the demand to cut ties “with brother Doha,” adding, Eritrea has “strong ties with the brother people of Qatar,” and it was “impossible to cut ties.”
But the country’s information minister took to Twitter soon thereafter to disavow the statement and described it as “forged” on foreign ministry letterhead. But he did not elaborate further on the actual state of relations with Qatar or Saudi Arabia.
Eritrea hosts a military base belonging to Qatar’s Gulf rival UAE. But the country also has significant ties with Doha. Speaking with The Messenger on Wednesday, Professor Harry Verhoeven explained that Eritrea is a country with few international allies and that Qatar is one friend that has proven itself “reliable.”
Meanwhile, Eritrea’s neighbor and rival Ethiopia is likely to be cautious about getting drawn into the diplomatic row, even though its sympathies probably lie more with the other side, according to Professor Verhoeven, who has written extensively on international relations in the Horn of Africa.
Verhoeven points to ties between Ethiopia and Israel as a relevant factor, saying the Israelis are opposed to the Qatari position. He also cites ongoing talks between Ethiopia and the UAE over the refurbishment of the Red Sea port of Berbera. “It’s complex for Ethiopia because Ethiopia suffers from a lack fo deep ties to any of these players and in many ways actually a lack of understanding of how they operate. So I think it’s difficult for Ethiopia to decide in the near future on a particular course. But there’s no question Ethiopia will look for an opportunity,” he says.
“It’s interesting that at the very time this is happening (Prime Minister) Hailemariam has been visiting Israel. And Israel, of course, officially is not in the picture but is very closely aligned with the Emirati and Saudi position. Also if you look at some of the Saudi and Emirati demands of the Qataris — these could be Israel’s demands — demands about Hamas, about Hezbollah, about the Al Jazeera coverage, about potential ties with Iran.”
However, Verhoeven does not describe the relationship between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia and its ally UAE as unequivocally strong. He says the Ethiopians have been sceptical of Saudi and Emirati influence in the Horn of Africa even as they’ve seen their bilateral relationships grow. The Ethiopians are “trying to at least adjust themselves to the Emiratis and the Saudis on the one hand as a potentially credible partner, and on the other hand, trying to say, well, don’t pull too closely to Somaliland and particularly also to Eritrea.”

‘Ethiopia would probably calculate that it has more to lose from pulling closer to Qatar.’

Verhoeven sees Ethiopia as likely to ‘inch closer’ to the Saudi camp. “Ethiopia is largely in reactive mode. It’s difficult for them to shape these events. And so they’ll certainly look for an opportunity as everybody else does, but I would expect a relatively high degree of caution when it comes to this dispute, even though, as I said, most of their sympathies — I think their strategic instinct — will point in the direction of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi,” he says.
What’s unusual about this potential alignment is that it would put Ethiopia in the same camp as Egypt, which has sided strongly with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even though the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia is quite tense right now.
“Ethiopia would probably calculate that it has more to lose from, say, pulling closer to Qatar or the Iranians, which would also be compromising of the relationship with the United States, particularly under this administration, so that’s why I would think that they would inch closer to that camp rather than to the other side.” readmore
source https://messengerafrica.com/2017/06/10/qatar-crisis-eritrea-stands-with-brother-doha-but-whither-ethiopia/

The UAE expands military presence in the Horn of Africa

The United Arab Emirates is developing a strong military foothold in the Horn of Africa.
Recently, it secured a renewable 25-year contract to establish an air and naval base in Somaliland's coastal city of Berbera.
Last year - in 2015 - the UAE signed a 30-year lease agreement for military use of the port of Assab in Eritrea.
When it comes to security cooperation, the UAE train and equip counterterrorism and security unites in Somalia. And in Puntland, it paid to establish a maritime police force by providing training and equipment.
Alex Mello is the lead security analyst at Horizon Client Access, a security consultancy group based in New York. He says that the war in Yemen is the main reason why the UAE is fast expanding its military presence and influence in the Horn of Africa. The United Arab Emirates is fighting, since early 2015, alongside other Middle-Eastern nations against Houthi militias backed by Iran.
“The UAE has been building influence in the Horn since the mid-2000s," Mello said. "The military bases are just the latest phase. For years, the UAE has invested in the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the Indian Ocean islands supporting tourism, port infrastructure, natural gas, food security and development aid.”
The port and air base in Eritrea’s port city of Assab is their main logistics hub for all their operations in Yemen. “This year, they’ve also begun developing it into what’s going to be a long-term, permanent base that will allow them to monitor naval traffic”, adds Mello.
The UAE’s military investment in the Horn of Africa seems to pay off. Alex Mello says it graduated from a local power into regional force that has the capacity to do power projection far from the UAE homeland. A win-win situation
To what extent are states like Eritrea, Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia benefitting from an Emirati military presence and influence?
The UAE has been extensively funding the security services as well as intelligence and counter terrorism services in Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. An invaluable input for states with limited resources.
According to Alex Mello Somalia could seek Emirati assistance to be more effective in fighting the Al Shabab militia, a thorn in its side that just will not go away.
“The UAE has gained a lot of experience from operations in Afghanistan and Yemen in local level counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism work. In a sense, they have an advantage, over the United States for example, because they are more familiar with the terrain.”
Furthermore, Mello said, the military and security aid ties in with the economic aspect: “The air and naval base in Somaliland is being built now after the UAE won a very big contract in May to manage and expand the port of Berbera.”
The 30-year contract won by Dubai Ports World will help break up Djibouti’s monopoly on land-locked Ethiopia’s freight and, if it works out, will prove to be economically very lucrative for Somaliland.
Mello believes that the United Arab Emirates is beginning to emerge as a powerful actor in the Horn of Africa and beyond.
“It’s been really interesting to see how their presence there has evolved from the 2000s to where we are now. And I think it will definitely expand in the coming years. We’ll probably see the UAE develop more of a blue-water power projection capability. They are going to expand their navy in the next couple of years and that will allow them to really project power all along the East African seaboard, the Indian Ocean. That comes with increased economic influence in the area. source http://m.en.rfi.fr/africa/20161224-uae-discreet-yet-powerful-player-horn-africa

UAE Presence Expands in Africa

UAE Presence Expands in Africa

www.shephardmedia.com | December 20, 2016

The United Arab Emirates has signed an agreement to establish a second foreign military base in the Horn of Africa.

The new base, according to the source present at the negotiations, will be established at the coastal city of Berbera in Somaliland and will be an air and naval base. According to the government source the MoU was signed in the last week of September when a senior Somaliland delegation was in the UAE.

The self governing semi-autonomous Somaliland and the UAE enjoyed close political, economic and military ties since 2012.

The cooperation between the two countries intensified after the UAE’s involvement in the Yemen operations where the region’s strategic location south of the Bab al Mandeb strait proved crucial to their projection capabilities.

An area of 40km sq compromising of Berbera airport and sea front have been provided to the UAE for a period of 25 years and is renewable, the source added.

The base has been provided in exchange for security training, support and protection to the autonomous region, the source added, providing a much needed security blanket to Somaliland which borders Somalia to the south.

Just five kilometres away from the base UAE ports giant, Dubai Ports World, has signed earlier this year a $442 million deal to develop Berbera port. The 30 year deal will see the commercial port expanded and doubled in size next to a large free zone and other infrastructure projects to provide a new gate way to Ethiopia, Africa’s fastest growing economy.

According to Alexander Mello, security analyst at New York based Horizon Client Access the UAE’s plan to operate their Eritrean Assab base simultaneously with the Berbera base is quite plausible.

‘Assab is still a pretty austere base, the work the UAE is doing there – especially the the expansion of the hangars and apron and building a new docking facility for UAE vessels 10km north of of current Assab port – is consistent with a long-term UAE presence,’ Mello said.

The UAE has been putting up aircraft shelters and deployed half a squadron of Mirage 2000 fighters to the base in September, Mello added, which again is consistent with a long-term presence.

‘They might be speeding up development of Berbera now to have a base out of Houthi missile range. It’s possible Assab will be focused more on supporting ops in Yemen and Berbera will be primarily used for conducting naval and air ops in the Bab al-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden with the U.S. and Egypt,’ he said.

Shehab al Makahaleh, political analyst at consultancy group Geostrategic Media, said that despite the UAE previously adopting a cautious foreign policy the recent financial chaos, the Arab Spring and Islamic militancy has forced the UAE to safeguard their national security by securing major sea ports in Africa.

‘The UAE is increasingly focused on projecting military power, the unrest has prompted the UAE to have its own base in the Eritrean port of Assab. In 2015, this simple port was built up from empty desert into a modern airbase, deep-water port, and military training facility,’ he said.

Al Makahleh said that ‘the rapid militarization’ in the Horn of Africa by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, China, Russia, the UK, France – and the American presence on the west coast – under the aim to preserve the security and stability of the region has turned out to be a competition for its resources.

Source: https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/mil-log/uae-presence-expands-africa/

China Begins Construction Of Naval Base On The Horn Of Africa In Djibouti

China has started construction on a naval logistics base in Djibouti, Reuters reports, citing a spokesperson from the Chinese Ministry of Defense.

Some 4,800 miles away from Beijing, China’s new naval base in Djibouti, a tiny African nation of less than 1 million people, sits on a strategic position on the Horn of Africa along key global shipping routes where the mouth of the Red Sea meets the vast Indian Ocean.

This new base, which China describes as naval “support facilities”, will be China’s first overseas military outpost, giving Beijing access to the Arabian Peninsula and positioning its forces near its investments in sub-Saharan Africa.

China had conducted anti-piracy operations in the region in recent years and is seeking to expand its capacity to respond to growing threats to its interests abroad, Reuters reports.

China’s new base will be used “primarily for military rest and resupply in carrying out naval escort, peacekeeping, and humanitarian duties,” Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said.

“Currently, initial construction on the relevant facilities has already started and China has already dispatched some personnel to launch relevant work,” Wu said.

Establishing resupply and logistics points abroad is a vital component of China’s push to expand its global reach, as Stratfor Global Intelligence explains. readmore

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China’s Africa Pivot: A Cause for Alarm?

In late November, China announced its first-ever overseas military outpost in the strategic African state of Djibouti. Its purpose, according to the Chinese leadership, is to assist Chinese Navy ships on United Nations antipiracy missions. This comes on the heels of a security and defense agreement signed between Chinese Minister of Defense Chang Wanquan and Djibouti’s Minister of Defense in February 2014, which included the use of Djibouti as a port for the Chinese Navy as well as assistance in building up the operational capabilities of Djibouti’s military.
For some, this is a cause for alarm. China has until now refrained from emulating the United States’ longstanding policy of maintaining military bases in key geographic locations, condemning what it considers to be gestures of American imperialism and hegemony. Instead, Chinese foreign policy has centered on economic development. In March 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road initiative (also known as “One Belt One Road”), a $140 billion economic plan to consolidate and strengthen China’s geopolitical power. Similarly, on December 4, at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit in South Africa, President Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion in development assistance to Africa, including $5 billion in grants and interest-free loans.
What Beijing is slowly coming to realize, however, is that their economic interests are best served when developed hand-in-hand with military capabilities. The American practice of building bases where it serves national interests has allowed for continued US leverage and influence worldwide. If China hopes to continue its ascension into the upper echelons of international power, building up their military is not only a logical step; it’s a necessary one. Earlier this year and for the first time ever, China dispatched a combat battalion to take part in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in South Sudan, where Beijing has major oil interests. China’s 2015 military budget of about $145 billion was the second-largest in the world following the US, but many foreign analysts say China’s real military spending is significantly higher.
For China, focusing on Africa and Djibouti in particular is of critical importance. Strategically, Djibouti’s location on the Horn of Africa is ideally situated to protect oil imports from the Middle East that traverse the Indian Ocean on their way to China. From Djibouti, China gains greater access to the Arabian Peninsula. The United States recognizes Djibouti’s geographic importance and maintains a base there, as do France, Germany and Japan.
Currently, Beijing is funding 14 mega projects in Djibouti worth $9.8 billion, six times more than Djibouti’s GDP. China has invested heavily in infrastructure, including hundreds of millions of dollars spent upgrading the country’s undersized port. It has additionally financed a railroad extending from Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, to the Port of Djibouti—a project that cost billions of dollars. Beijing also cultivates its relationship with Djibouti by treating government officials to lavish ceremonies and summits more appropriate for leaders of greater global significance. Such political gestures, designed to stoke personal egos, can have a great effect in states where government officials wield significant power and wealth in their countries, such as Djibouti’s President Ismail Guelph and his top aides.
Africa presents a perfect opportunity for China as it begins flexing its foreign policy muscles. The continent, still reeling from the scars of its colonial past, lags behind all other continents in every human development metric possible. That’s why China, with its economics-based foreign policy, offers an attractive package for developing countries: a lack of stigma associated with former colonial powers, easy loan deals and a willingness to invest in projects Western institutions deem too risky. China has economic, political and military deals with numerous African states including Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria (three countries rich in energy resources). At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation on December 4th, following Xi Jinping’s announcement of $6 billion in development assistance, Zimbabwe President and current Chairman of the African Union Robert Mugabe said: “[Xi Jinping] is doing to us what we expected those who colonized us yesterday to do.”
China’s attractive economic deals aren’t just limited to infrastructure projects. It has a burgeoning arms and defense trade, and Chinese Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) are already incredibly popular, especially in the Gulf. The price tag can be as little as $1 million for a Chinese Wing Loong I compared to $30 million for a US Reaper. Furthermore, the US has prohibitive policies on who can purchase their weapons and defense systems, while China does not. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq are all confirmed operators of Chinese drones. China’s military continues to expand; on New Year’s Eve, the Chinese Defense Ministry announced that it was building its first indigenous aircraft carrier—the second one ever for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
These developments have not escaped the notice of Western military and intelligence officials. The US maintains Camp Lemonnier, its only base in Africa, in Djibouti. Lemonnier is home to 4,000 American troops who train and conduct counterterrorism operations, including fighter planes and Predator UAV drone operations in Yemen and Somalia. In 2013, Washington announced a $1.3 billion expansion plan for Lemonnier. In response to the February 2014 Chinese-Djiboutian security agreement, the US agreed to pay double its previous rent for Lemonnier in the hope of maintaining positive relations with President Guelleh. Overall, US investment in Djibouti amounts to $70 million annually.
A May 2015 Diplomat article likens the situation in Djibouti to a “zero-sum [game], where one power’s gain can only come at the other one’s loss.” Yet I would be cautious with this comparison.
For one, China’s base should be a welcome asset to counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf, which is a good opportunity for China to assume more responsibility on an important multilateral issue. Furthermore, China does have a legitimate stake in responding to domestic pressure to protect its citizens in the region. During the Libyan civil war in 2011, the Chinese government extracted nearly 36,000 workers. In 2012, militants captured 29 Chinese workers on a road project in Sudan. In November 2015, three Chinese executives were killed when Islamic militants stormed a hotel in Bamako, the capital of Mali. Just before, ISIS announced that it had killed a Chinese captive, Fan Jinghui. China’s interest in the Middle East is also fueled by the rise of the Islamic State, which has recruited hundreds of Uyghurs (a contentious Chinese Muslim ethnic group) into its foreign fighter ranks. In December 2015, ISIS released its first ever Chinese language recruiting video.

With the inevitability of Chinese military expansion looming on the horizon, the US and China must improve their bilateral relations and allow for Djibouti to serve as a productive analog in the future. Not only does the Sino international development plan have more financing available than Western ones, but is also more receptive in regions such as Africa and parts of the Middle East. Reports have leaked of Chinese plans to open at least a dozen new overseas military bases. China has also already sought to gain strategic military access through economic incentives in countries such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. readmore

The Chinese have struck a deal with the nation of Djibouti to build a military base in close proximity to a critical American military base on the Horn of Africa

According to PRI, “since 2014, this small chunk of the Horn of Africa, little bigger than the state of New Jersey, has been the only place in the world where the warships of the two countries’ navies are moored alongside each other.”
The Chinese are the second country to cut a deal with Djibouti this year to create a military presence, joining Saudi Arabia, which made a similar agreement early this year. China has invested heavily in the area by pumping billions into Djibouti and neighboring Ethiopia. The new base will both protect their investments and give them increased military presence in one of the world’s most important trading routes.
The Chinese government earlier this year began funding a natural gas pipeline to the main port in Djibouti that Beijing will then export. The major agreement has led some to caution that the government of Djibouti may depend too heavily on Chinese credit to function; estimates show a possible increase in the national debt of nearly 20 percent for the nation by 2017.
China has been increasing its investments worldwide, particularly focusing in Africa on Djibouti and neighboring Ethiopia. The new base will both protect its investments and give increased military presence in one of the world’s most important trading routes. Africa is uniquely situated at the opening of the major shipping lanes of the world. The Suez Canal and the Red Sea are among those major shipping routes, connecting Africa and Europe with Asia.
In an interview with Breitbart News, Captain Pete O’Brien, a military expert with the London Center, explained that China wants to be the dominate power in Asia. To achieve this goal, it must control passage through the South China Sea and the shipping lanes that lead to it.
Captain O’Brien went on to explain the Theory of Sea Power, written by A.T. Mahan in 1890. For China to become the dominate power in Asia and eventually the world, it would not necessarily have to control land, but control the approaches to the land. In the case of the South China Sea, this would mean Singapore in the east and the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the west. If it can control the flow of trade on both sides, it will hold quite a dominant position in not only Asia, but the world. A base in Djibouti would be pivotal to monitoring traffic in the sea.
The Chinese government is currently embroiled in an extensive territorial dispute in the South China Sea far west of Djibouti. China has declared everything within a self-proclaimed “nine-dash line” its exclusive territory, spanning waters within the borders of Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It has developed military facilities in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, on artificial islands built on reefs largely considered to be international territory. The Philippines has filed a case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague requesting a verdict that plainly notes where the borders of China end. China has vowed to disregard any such verdict.
A robust presence in Djibouti, then, could help secure China’s control around waters far to the west of the South China Sea, while the militarization plan underway in the Spratly and Paracel Islands would help cement its presence in the east. The small island nation is situated between the south opening of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, which in recent years has become the epicenter of regional and international conflict.

Secretary of State John Kerry visited Djibouti in mid-2015, highlighting for the Associated Press that “the mainly Sunni nation has become a critical part of U.S. foreign policy. With U.S. ground forces out of Yemen amid a civil war, Djibouti is a launching pad for drone attacks on al-Qaida and other extremist groups as well as a key transit point for Americans trying to get home.” readmore

Djibouti: Dangerous Game

DJIBOUTI (HAN) February 13, 2016 – Public Diplomacy and Regional Stability Initiatives News. The importance of Djibouti in modern international affairs is entirely tied to its location on the Horn of Africa, a hotbed of chaos where stability is the most important currency. Currently, a flurry of countries either maintain military bases or use the country’s ports as a logistics hub for their military operations. The 23,000 km2 mini-state acts as a safe harbor for the Japanese, the French, the Americans, the Europeans and, increasingly, for the Chinese. In a sharp reversal of stance, Beijing acknowledged last week that they would in fact be building their first African military base in Djibouti, a stone’s throw away from Camp Lemonnier, the American installation. A 10 year contract has been signed, worth according to previous estimates at $100 million per year.
As China looks for ways to expand its economic and military presence in Africa, Djibouti has become its forward base. Before last week’s announcement, the Chinese already leased space at the country’s deep water port for warships that take part in the counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden readmore

"Will China's Naval Base Cause Friction with the US?

Djibouti's recent decision to host a Chinese naval facility caught many Western analysts flat-footed, showing how difficult it can be to predict the behaviour of wily autocratic regimes like that of President Ismail Omar Guelleh—or, for that matter, the government in Beijing.  China chose this small country on the Horn of Africa as the location of its first overseas military base since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, raising the question of whether the Sino-American dynamic in Africa might be moving to a new, more competitive—perhaps even militarized—phase.  For a region which has suffered from being the focus of outside power struggles before, the question is pressing.
China, which claims that non-interference in the affairs of other states is a central plank of its foreign policy, has long disclaimed any intention to build military bases abroad.  Beijing has even criticized the United States for what it regards as its "militarized" approach to Africa.  Yet the only permanent U.S. military base on the continent is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, a country that also hosts French and Japanese facilities.  The new Chinese facility is a highly significant step away from the country's traditional approach to the continent, which has focused on diplomacy and trade much more than security.
In the early years of decolonization across Africa, China's relations with the newly-emergent states was based on their shared identity as developing countries who had been victimized by Western powers and China's desire for diplomatic recognition and support in bodies such as the UN General Assembly.  But since Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched Beijing's "Going Out" strategy of aggressive overseas commercial expansion in 1996, economic ties between China and many African countries have grown at an exponential pace and have come to define the relationship.
Protection of these commercial interests, and the many Chinese citizens who now live in Africa, is undoubtedly one reason for Chinese interest in a base in Djibouti.  Civil strife in Libya in 2011 and in Yemen last year stretched the capabilities of Chinese naval vessels dispatched to evacuate Chinese citizens.  Controversy over the Chinese presence in Africa is rising in many countries, and Djibouti represents an island of stability from which Beijing might be able to run future evacuation operations in a region undergoing many upheavals.  It is also conveniently located to provide logistical support for Chinese vessels involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.
But neither of these factors wholly explains Chinese interest in a Djiboutian base.  With incidents of piracy in 2015 having dwindled to just 1% of those recorded in 2011, the dimensions of the problem appear to be waning rather than growing.  This  begs the question of why China was interested in countering piracy in the Gulf of Aden to begin with despite its nominal policy of non-interference in regional affairs.  Trade doesn't appear to be the answer.  Africa as a whole accounts for only 5% of China's total overseas trade, and over half of that is with faraway Angola and South Africa.  China's commercial ties with countries in the Horn are a tiny part of its overall trade with Africa.
Instead, China's interest in a facility in Djibouti is much more about its global maritime strategy than it is specifically about the Horn of Africa.  It seems unlikely that China intends to use the new facility to project power across Africa and the Middle East, as the United States does from Camp Lemonnier.  Beijing's intentions are thoroughly aquatic: it is interested in power projection across water, not land.  The facility in Djibouti is likely to be the first such instalment around the Indian Ocean from which Beijing can in the future protect the maritime trade routes which are so crucial to its economy.  The fact that Djibouti is located at the crucial choke point through which vessels traversing the Suez Canal must pass only enhances its attractiveness as a base location.
China's goals for the new base means there is little reason to think it heralds the beginning of an era of Sino-American confrontation in the Horn of Africa—at least not yet.  During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in a zero-sum struggle in which the countries of the Horn of Africa were forced to take sides.  In the 1970s, warfare between Somalia and Ethiopia was fuelled by the superpower competition and the readiness of the superpowers to arm their client states.  The U.S. and China have both worked hard to avoid the appearance or reality of a Cold War–style competition in Africa, and Djibouti's ability to play both sides is a welcome sign that for now this dynamic continues.
But there is a risk that, as both China and the U.S. increase their involvement in a small and crowded country, tensions in the broader Sino-American relationship might eventually have negative implications for Djibouti.  At the moment, the two outside powers have different goals in the region, and there is little reason for them to come into conflict.  The U.S. uses Camp Lemonnier to prosecute the "war on terror" across Yemen and North Africa, an issue that interests China little because Al-Qaeda and related groups do not pose a threat to Beijing.  China's own interest in having a base from which it may be able to project maritime power across the Indian Ocean in the future need not conflict with America's goals either.  Although it remains to be seen how China will ultimately use its growing maritime influence, it would be unfortunate and disproportionate for Washington to react to developments such as this in a way that makes conflict more likely.
Yet President Guelleh needs to be careful.  It suits his purposes to develop a new strategic ally at a time when he is under pressure from Washington over democracy and human rights.  But he risks creating a situation in which, if Sino-American relations worsen or even break out into open warfare at some point in the future, Djibouti and the wider region could be forced to take sides or even become a theatre of hostilities.  Such a conflict would not be likely to have its origins in regional issues, but would affect the region nonetheless.  By being so promiscuous in his choice of international partners, Guelleh has hence made the future of his country dependent on decisions made in faraway places by much more powerful countries.  The great blessing that Djibouti has in its strategic location, which Guelleh has leveraged to garner many benefits from the country's partners, could then become a "location curse".  Wily as he may be, it is now no longer in Guelleh's power to ensure that such an eventuality doesn't come about. readmore

For more information about this publication please contact the Belfer Center Communications Office at 617-495-9858.

Full text of this publication is available at:
http://africatimes.com/2016/01/03/will-chinas-naval-base-cause-friction-with-the
-us/

http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/geopolitics-insecurity-horn-africa-and-arabian-peninsula?print

The Geopolitics of Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Summer 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 2

Accelerating processes of globalization and cross-border flows of information, communication, militants, money and matériel are reconfiguring the geopolitics of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Domestic and external drivers of conflict are increasingly intermeshed as problems transcend national boundaries and can no longer be contained within states. Issues have become transnationalized as supra- and sub-state networks of exchange bypass state controls and erode what little remains of Cold War-era distinctions between the internal and external domains. Previously localized conflicts have developed regional and transregional dimensions, knitting together the zones of instability, while the growth of powerful and violent non-state actors poses a profound challenge to existing security arrangements and the international order. In turn, new mechanisms of collaborative and multilateral approaches have emerged to tackle these issues. However, they have largely failed to address the underlying problems generated by the erosion of local carrying capacities, governing capabilities and a crisis of political legitimacy and authority in the two regions.
These subregional conflicts constitute an unstable zone of cross-border insecurity and informal networks that link the two largely distinct security complexes in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. The growth of multibillion-dollar shadow business networks spanning the Gulf of Aden complicates conventional counterterrorism and counterpiracy strategies and defies attempts to contain the threat of the spread of radicalization at its source. This has profound implications for the future stability of the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and for the security of the commercial shipping lanes that transit the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab. International actors' attention has, however, focused more narrowly on the threat posed by the reconstitution of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen in 2009 (and, to a lesser degree, Al-Shabaab in Somalia), and a succession of high-profile attempted attacks that have attracted global attention.
Following years of comparative neglect, the focus of the international community needs to shift to the interconnected sociopolitical, economic and transnational challenges confronting Yemen, Somalia and their regional environs. Yemen and Somalia face parallel challenges from insurgency, terrorism, economic hardship and ineffective governments that are perceived to lack legitimacy. Viewed through a narrow terror-centric prism, the region has become a dangerous node of international terrorism, as evinced in MI5 director-general Jonathan Evans' very public warning in September 2010 of the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from militants training in Yemen and Somalia. This, he said, "shows many of the characteristics that made Afghanistan so dangerous a seedbed for terrorism in the period before the fall of the Taliban."¹ Western engagement in each country has been based on a state-building framework involving diplomacy, development and defense; yet, the priority attached to secu rity-sector intervention has undermined the balance of political and economic action needed for this approach to succeed or be sustainable in the longer term.² Such an approach risks exacerbating a dangerous misalignment between the short-term security-centric priorities of the international community and the longer-term measures and comprehensive reforms necessary to recreate a base level of political legitimacy, social cohesion and economic sustainability.

The paper has five parts: (1) An exploration of the changing dynamics of regional security and the gradual convergence of the phenomenon of weak and failed states on each side of the Gulf of Aden. (2) An investigation of how the GCC states have responded to these new security problems astride a geostrategically critical trade route linking them to Western economies and markets. As the key regional stakeholder, the GCC states have a collective interest in addressing the root causes of human insecurity and minimizing their overspill to their own polities. Yet, Qatar apart, their record of engagement has hitherto been underwhelming, with a clear preference for a strategy of containment over serious consideration of the scale and complexity of the challenge posed by Yemen and Somalia. (3) A look at the recalibration of local and regional approaches to insecurity in the Horn of Africa that have achieved limited change in diplomatic mediation and conflict management. Much remains to be achieved, and at present the regional states remain divided; there is little prospect of an autonomous conflict-resolution capability developing. (4) An examination of the wider geopolitical implications for maritime and energy security and the internationalization of response measures. (5) A consideration of the extent to which security is being reconceptualized to encompass the emergence of increasingly non-military challenges to fragile polities in transition   readmore 

Military history of Cuba

The Military history of Cuba begins with the island's conquest by the Spanish and its battles afterward to gain its independence. Since the Communist takeover by Fidel Castro in 1959, Cuba has been involved with many major conflicts of the Cold War in Africa and Latin America where it had supported Marxist governments and rebels from liberation movements who were opposed to their colonial masters and/or allies of the United States. Readmore

Up to 50,000 flee South Sudan violence - U.N.

KHARTOUM (Reuters) - Up to 50,000 people have fled violence in a remote border area of South Sudan, the United Nations said on Monday, after days of clashes between two tribes. South Sudan became independent in July last year under a 2005 peace deal with Khartoum to end decades of civil war. But the new nation is struggling to build state institutions and stop rebel and tribal bloodshed that has killed thousands. On Monday, some 6,000 armed members of the Lou Nuer tribe attacked the remote town of Pibor in Jonglei state bordering north Sudan after days of clashes with the rival Murle tribe, U.N. sources said. Lise Grande, U.N. humanitarian coordinator for South Sudan, said tens of thousands of civilians had fled Pibor and nearby towns to escape the violence. "We are worried about their conditions. They are without water, shelter and food. They are hiding in the bush. I think it is between 20,000 and 50,000. This is an estimate only," she told Reuters. She had no information about casualties. South Sudan's armed forces are sending reinforcements to Pibor, army spokesman Philip Arguer said. "They attacked the town this morning. Civilians were evacuated from Pibor three days ago," he said, without giving further details. U.N. sources said around 3,000 soldiers and 800 policeman were on their way to Pibor. Cattle raids, they said, had sparked the latest violence. Doctor Without Borders (MSF) suspended operations in the area after two of its clinics were damaged by fighting, said MSF worker Jean-Marc Jacobs. "We evacuated our international staff," he said. "We have been unable to make contact with most of our local staff. We advised them to stay safe and they are hiding in the bush." (Reporting by Ulf Laessing; Writing by Tom Pfeiffer; Editing by Philippa Fletcher) Readmore

The Creation of South Sudan: Prospects and Challenges

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan achieved independence by separating from the northern state of Sudan to become the youngest nation in the world. The redoubtable challenge it faces is the continuance of the violent conflicts, mainly in the north, that is frustrating any attempt to bring about peace so necessary to get on with the first task of any new nation–socio-economic development. After nearly five decades of struggle, two civil wars and the deaths of nearly 2.5 million people, Sudan has reached a pivotal moment in its history. The dictates of its present circumstances emerge from its long history of oppression and the need now to find its own identity, as also the confidence of being an autonomous state. South Sudan's complex and interdependent relationship with Sudan will have a definitive impact in its trajectory as a nation, and on the prospects and challenges it currently encounters. This paper seeks to assess the present challenges that exist for South Sudan through an understanding of the historical narrative of the Sudanese state prior to the independence of the southern state. A crisis of national identity has been the key to the Sudanese state's history of violence and has manifested itself through recent ethnic conflicts such as in Darfur and in the Nuba Mountains. A history of interdependency and tensions over resource ownership has led to the heightened standoff in the oil-rich Abyei region, raising questions regarding the way ahead for the two warring regions. Sudan and South Sudan's dependency on oil, the strategic importance of countries (like India) investing in the region, and the longterm issues of sustenance will play a vital role in ensuring a future of peace, progress and prosperity for both the Republics. read more

Building Peace in the Space of Civil Society: The Case of Somali Women

Of all the Post-Cold War conflicts to arise in Africa, one of the most disastrous has been the collapse of the Somali state (legally and administratively) following a civil war in which Somalia degenerated into a collection of feudal enclaves, each controlled by a self-appointed ‘warlord’ and Islamic courts. The current Transitional Federal Government faces enormous challenges to assert its authority beyond Baidoa (is a tiny town). Somalia is a nation plagued by hunger, disease and poverty. It is a nation facing a very complex humanitarian crisis. The people of this nation have been experiencing economic, political and environmental insecurities. Women have been particularly affected as there are no publicly funded social services available (these include: employment, healthcare, education and protection). Even some of the gains which women made in education and politics were rolled back (the lost decade for Somali women). Read more

The Impediments to Building the Common Infrastructure in the Horn of Africa by Daniel Kendie

The infrastructure affects growth and development. It assists in coping with population growth, in improving environmental conditions, in raising output and in lowering production costs. It also helps to diversity production and to expand trade. Safe water is essential for everything. The provision of energy and hydro-electricity is a must for development. In effect, the infrastructure opens the path to sustained growth. If we relate all this to the Horn of Africa, we will discover that the countries of the sub-region have not made any appreciable headway in building the common infrastructure because of the legacy of unresolved conflicts. Since so many interest groups are also involved in their conflicts, no solution seems to be in sight. Among the conflicts are the territorial disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia, Eritrea and Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia, Kenya and Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea. In a situation where the governments of the sub-region do not therefore even have normal working relationships, to propose that the common infrastructure be built would be either outright disingenuous or naïve. One can write on each conflict. However, since time does not permit such a luxury, this paper will examine in some detail the conflicting stakes of Somalia and Ethiopia to show how irreconcilable their positions have been. It will then present a brief account of the serious internal and external problems which confront the sub-region, and which need to be addressed, and then conclude by making some observations regarding the infrastructure. Read more

Horn of Africa: Conflict and Consequences

Summary The Horn of Africa- Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti-, located in the strategic Northeastern part of the continent, has a combined area of more than 1.9 million square kilometers; a coastline of over 4000 kilometers, the longest in Africa; and a combined population of approximately 93 million. One of the primary obstacles to development in the region has been perennial conflict within and between countries. The consequences of these perennial conflicts have been very costly for the region in both human and economic terms. Even though endowed with great natural resources, the region is one of the poorest in the world. Where does the region go from here? The region needs a complete paradigm shift; for the people of the region to have a realistic shot at a prosperous future, the countries of the region must commit themselves to a few basic tenets in their relationship: mutual respect for one another; renunciation of war as a tool to resolve disputes; and acceptance of arbitration decisions on disputed boundaries as demarcated and/or recognized by the United Nations. This would create a stable environment that would open up opportunities for economic cooperation- and ultimately economic integration- that the region desperately needs. A Horn of Africa at Peace with itself and its neighbors will be able to exploit its rich natural and complimentary Read more

Famine and Politics in the Horn of Africa

Since the summer of 2011, there has been a crisis that the world’s media has not been reporting upon with the urgency that it deserves. The Horn of Africa, comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, is facing another famine that the constituent countries are unable to deal with. The online resource, Famine Early Warning System (www.fews.net) claims that at least two large areas of Southern Somalia are facing catastrophic conditions. Those fleeing the effects of the famine have made their way to the eastern part of Kenya, where according to conservative estimates, there are more than 3 million people living in makeshift relief camps. Geographers and social scientists are calling this the worst famine that has been visited upon the people of the Horn of Africa in over 60 years. The main causes for the famine are actually a combination of climatic and political factors. According to Swiss political scientist, Dr. Tobias Hagmann, who is based at the University of California at Berkeley, the price increase in staple crops like sorghum and rice, as well as debilitating droughts in the region, have merged to create famine conditions. What compounds matters, he says, is the erroneous media assumption that pastoralist depredations and the absence of a strong centralised state have added to the crisis. As a matter of fact, Hagmann and his clutch of colleagues who work on east Africa and Horn of Africa related conflicts, opine that the collapse of the state is only one aspect of the issue. They also feel that the anti-pastoral discourse is flawed, for it remains a major source of livelihood for many Somalis and to abandon it, as experts are wont to suggest would mean the end of their culture and economy Read more