‘Africans will be biggest losers after letting foreign military into their continent’

          Africa has become a staging ground where foreign countries can show off their military capabilities against one another away from their country of origin at the expense of Africans, says African affairs expert Ayo Johnson.

Turkey is gearing to open its largest overseas military base in Somalia.
The United Arab Emirates are building a military base at the port of Berbera, in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland.
Africa is an attraction to foreign militaries: China opened its first overseas military base on August,1 in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. Djibouti is also currently housing Americans, Japanese and French troops. readmore

Inside Story - Is China exploiting Africa?

youtube    Inside Story - Is China exploiting Africa?

China Begins Construction Of Naval Base On The Horn Of Africa In Djibouti

China has started construction on a naval logistics base in Djibouti, Reuters reports, citing a spokesperson from the Chinese Ministry of Defense.

Some 4,800 miles away from Beijing, China’s new naval base in Djibouti, a tiny African nation of less than 1 million people, sits on a strategic position on the Horn of Africa along key global shipping routes where the mouth of the Red Sea meets the vast Indian Ocean.

This new base, which China describes as naval “support facilities”, will be China’s first overseas military outpost, giving Beijing access to the Arabian Peninsula and positioning its forces near its investments in sub-Saharan Africa.

China had conducted anti-piracy operations in the region in recent years and is seeking to expand its capacity to respond to growing threats to its interests abroad, Reuters reports.

China’s new base will be used “primarily for military rest and resupply in carrying out naval escort, peacekeeping, and humanitarian duties,” Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said.

“Currently, initial construction on the relevant facilities has already started and China has already dispatched some personnel to launch relevant work,” Wu said.

Establishing resupply and logistics points abroad is a vital component of China’s push to expand its global reach, as Stratfor Global Intelligence explains. readmore

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Why China and Saudi Arabia Are Building Bases in Djibouti

China and Saudi Arabia are building military bases next door to US AFRICOM in Djibouti—and bringing the consequences of American withdrawal from the region into stark relief.

by Joseph Braude and Tyler Jiang

Djibouti, a resource-poor nation of 14,300 square miles and 875,000 people in the Horn of Africa, rarely makes international headlines. But between its relative stability and strategic location—20 miles across from war-consumed Yemen and in destroyer range of the pirate-infested western edge of the Indian Ocean—it is now one of the more important security beachheads in the develohttp://www.amazon.com/Joseph-Braude/e/B001KDV64Kping world. Its location also matters greatly to global commerce and energy, due to its vicinity to the Mandeb Strait and the Suez-Aden canal, which sees ten percent of the world’s oil exports and 20 percent of its commercial exports annually.[1] Since November 2002, the country has been home to Camp Lemonnier, a U.S. Expeditionary base—the only American base on the African continent—along with other bases belonging to its French, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese allies. (The United States maintains numerous small outposts and airfields in Africa, but officially regards Lemonnier as its only full-scale military base on the continent.)

But now there are two new kids on the block: On January 21st, the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry announced an agreement with Djibouti to host its first-ever base beyond the South China Sea, and construction commenced days later.[2] Though Beijing called the installation a “logistics and fast evacuation base,” the Asian power’s “near-abroad” rivals, such as Taiwan, opined that it is more likely the beginning of a new, aggressive military buildup to rival the United States. Six weeks later, Saudi Arabia declared that it too would construct a base in Djibouti,[3] apparently as part of its newly assertive policy of countering Iranian proxies politically and militarily throughout the region.[4] read more

China’s Africa Pivot: A Cause for Alarm?

In late November, China announced its first-ever overseas military outpost in the strategic African state of Djibouti. Its purpose, according to the Chinese leadership, is to assist Chinese Navy ships on United Nations antipiracy missions. This comes on the heels of a security and defense agreement signed between Chinese Minister of Defense Chang Wanquan and Djibouti’s Minister of Defense in February 2014, which included the use of Djibouti as a port for the Chinese Navy as well as assistance in building up the operational capabilities of Djibouti’s military.
For some, this is a cause for alarm. China has until now refrained from emulating the United States’ longstanding policy of maintaining military bases in key geographic locations, condemning what it considers to be gestures of American imperialism and hegemony. Instead, Chinese foreign policy has centered on economic development. In March 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road initiative (also known as “One Belt One Road”), a $140 billion economic plan to consolidate and strengthen China’s geopolitical power. Similarly, on December 4, at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation summit in South Africa, President Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion in development assistance to Africa, including $5 billion in grants and interest-free loans.
What Beijing is slowly coming to realize, however, is that their economic interests are best served when developed hand-in-hand with military capabilities. The American practice of building bases where it serves national interests has allowed for continued US leverage and influence worldwide. If China hopes to continue its ascension into the upper echelons of international power, building up their military is not only a logical step; it’s a necessary one. Earlier this year and for the first time ever, China dispatched a combat battalion to take part in a United Nations peacekeeping operation in South Sudan, where Beijing has major oil interests. China’s 2015 military budget of about $145 billion was the second-largest in the world following the US, but many foreign analysts say China’s real military spending is significantly higher.
For China, focusing on Africa and Djibouti in particular is of critical importance. Strategically, Djibouti’s location on the Horn of Africa is ideally situated to protect oil imports from the Middle East that traverse the Indian Ocean on their way to China. From Djibouti, China gains greater access to the Arabian Peninsula. The United States recognizes Djibouti’s geographic importance and maintains a base there, as do France, Germany and Japan.
Currently, Beijing is funding 14 mega projects in Djibouti worth $9.8 billion, six times more than Djibouti’s GDP. China has invested heavily in infrastructure, including hundreds of millions of dollars spent upgrading the country’s undersized port. It has additionally financed a railroad extending from Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, to the Port of Djibouti—a project that cost billions of dollars. Beijing also cultivates its relationship with Djibouti by treating government officials to lavish ceremonies and summits more appropriate for leaders of greater global significance. Such political gestures, designed to stoke personal egos, can have a great effect in states where government officials wield significant power and wealth in their countries, such as Djibouti’s President Ismail Guelph and his top aides.
Africa presents a perfect opportunity for China as it begins flexing its foreign policy muscles. The continent, still reeling from the scars of its colonial past, lags behind all other continents in every human development metric possible. That’s why China, with its economics-based foreign policy, offers an attractive package for developing countries: a lack of stigma associated with former colonial powers, easy loan deals and a willingness to invest in projects Western institutions deem too risky. China has economic, political and military deals with numerous African states including Algeria, Ethiopia and Nigeria (three countries rich in energy resources). At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation on December 4th, following Xi Jinping’s announcement of $6 billion in development assistance, Zimbabwe President and current Chairman of the African Union Robert Mugabe said: “[Xi Jinping] is doing to us what we expected those who colonized us yesterday to do.”
China’s attractive economic deals aren’t just limited to infrastructure projects. It has a burgeoning arms and defense trade, and Chinese Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) are already incredibly popular, especially in the Gulf. The price tag can be as little as $1 million for a Chinese Wing Loong I compared to $30 million for a US Reaper. Furthermore, the US has prohibitive policies on who can purchase their weapons and defense systems, while China does not. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq are all confirmed operators of Chinese drones. China’s military continues to expand; on New Year’s Eve, the Chinese Defense Ministry announced that it was building its first indigenous aircraft carrier—the second one ever for the People’s Liberation Army Navy.
These developments have not escaped the notice of Western military and intelligence officials. The US maintains Camp Lemonnier, its only base in Africa, in Djibouti. Lemonnier is home to 4,000 American troops who train and conduct counterterrorism operations, including fighter planes and Predator UAV drone operations in Yemen and Somalia. In 2013, Washington announced a $1.3 billion expansion plan for Lemonnier. In response to the February 2014 Chinese-Djiboutian security agreement, the US agreed to pay double its previous rent for Lemonnier in the hope of maintaining positive relations with President Guelleh. Overall, US investment in Djibouti amounts to $70 million annually.
A May 2015 Diplomat article likens the situation in Djibouti to a “zero-sum [game], where one power’s gain can only come at the other one’s loss.” Yet I would be cautious with this comparison.
For one, China’s base should be a welcome asset to counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf, which is a good opportunity for China to assume more responsibility on an important multilateral issue. Furthermore, China does have a legitimate stake in responding to domestic pressure to protect its citizens in the region. During the Libyan civil war in 2011, the Chinese government extracted nearly 36,000 workers. In 2012, militants captured 29 Chinese workers on a road project in Sudan. In November 2015, three Chinese executives were killed when Islamic militants stormed a hotel in Bamako, the capital of Mali. Just before, ISIS announced that it had killed a Chinese captive, Fan Jinghui. China’s interest in the Middle East is also fueled by the rise of the Islamic State, which has recruited hundreds of Uyghurs (a contentious Chinese Muslim ethnic group) into its foreign fighter ranks. In December 2015, ISIS released its first ever Chinese language recruiting video.

With the inevitability of Chinese military expansion looming on the horizon, the US and China must improve their bilateral relations and allow for Djibouti to serve as a productive analog in the future. Not only does the Sino international development plan have more financing available than Western ones, but is also more receptive in regions such as Africa and parts of the Middle East. Reports have leaked of Chinese plans to open at least a dozen new overseas military bases. China has also already sought to gain strategic military access through economic incentives in countries such as Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. readmore

The Chinese have struck a deal with the nation of Djibouti to build a military base in close proximity to a critical American military base on the Horn of Africa

According to PRI, “since 2014, this small chunk of the Horn of Africa, little bigger than the state of New Jersey, has been the only place in the world where the warships of the two countries’ navies are moored alongside each other.”
The Chinese are the second country to cut a deal with Djibouti this year to create a military presence, joining Saudi Arabia, which made a similar agreement early this year. China has invested heavily in the area by pumping billions into Djibouti and neighboring Ethiopia. The new base will both protect their investments and give them increased military presence in one of the world’s most important trading routes.
The Chinese government earlier this year began funding a natural gas pipeline to the main port in Djibouti that Beijing will then export. The major agreement has led some to caution that the government of Djibouti may depend too heavily on Chinese credit to function; estimates show a possible increase in the national debt of nearly 20 percent for the nation by 2017.
China has been increasing its investments worldwide, particularly focusing in Africa on Djibouti and neighboring Ethiopia. The new base will both protect its investments and give increased military presence in one of the world’s most important trading routes. Africa is uniquely situated at the opening of the major shipping lanes of the world. The Suez Canal and the Red Sea are among those major shipping routes, connecting Africa and Europe with Asia.
In an interview with Breitbart News, Captain Pete O’Brien, a military expert with the London Center, explained that China wants to be the dominate power in Asia. To achieve this goal, it must control passage through the South China Sea and the shipping lanes that lead to it.
Captain O’Brien went on to explain the Theory of Sea Power, written by A.T. Mahan in 1890. For China to become the dominate power in Asia and eventually the world, it would not necessarily have to control land, but control the approaches to the land. In the case of the South China Sea, this would mean Singapore in the east and the Suez Canal and the Red Sea in the west. If it can control the flow of trade on both sides, it will hold quite a dominant position in not only Asia, but the world. A base in Djibouti would be pivotal to monitoring traffic in the sea.
The Chinese government is currently embroiled in an extensive territorial dispute in the South China Sea far west of Djibouti. China has declared everything within a self-proclaimed “nine-dash line” its exclusive territory, spanning waters within the borders of Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines. It has developed military facilities in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, on artificial islands built on reefs largely considered to be international territory. The Philippines has filed a case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague requesting a verdict that plainly notes where the borders of China end. China has vowed to disregard any such verdict.
A robust presence in Djibouti, then, could help secure China’s control around waters far to the west of the South China Sea, while the militarization plan underway in the Spratly and Paracel Islands would help cement its presence in the east. The small island nation is situated between the south opening of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, which in recent years has become the epicenter of regional and international conflict.

Secretary of State John Kerry visited Djibouti in mid-2015, highlighting for the Associated Press that “the mainly Sunni nation has become a critical part of U.S. foreign policy. With U.S. ground forces out of Yemen amid a civil war, Djibouti is a launching pad for drone attacks on al-Qaida and other extremist groups as well as a key transit point for Americans trying to get home.” readmore

Djibouti: Dangerous Game

DJIBOUTI (HAN) February 13, 2016 – Public Diplomacy and Regional Stability Initiatives News. The importance of Djibouti in modern international affairs is entirely tied to its location on the Horn of Africa, a hotbed of chaos where stability is the most important currency. Currently, a flurry of countries either maintain military bases or use the country’s ports as a logistics hub for their military operations. The 23,000 km2 mini-state acts as a safe harbor for the Japanese, the French, the Americans, the Europeans and, increasingly, for the Chinese. In a sharp reversal of stance, Beijing acknowledged last week that they would in fact be building their first African military base in Djibouti, a stone’s throw away from Camp Lemonnier, the American installation. A 10 year contract has been signed, worth according to previous estimates at $100 million per year.
As China looks for ways to expand its economic and military presence in Africa, Djibouti has become its forward base. Before last week’s announcement, the Chinese already leased space at the country’s deep water port for warships that take part in the counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden readmore

"Will China's Naval Base Cause Friction with the US?

Djibouti's recent decision to host a Chinese naval facility caught many Western analysts flat-footed, showing how difficult it can be to predict the behaviour of wily autocratic regimes like that of President Ismail Omar Guelleh—or, for that matter, the government in Beijing.  China chose this small country on the Horn of Africa as the location of its first overseas military base since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, raising the question of whether the Sino-American dynamic in Africa might be moving to a new, more competitive—perhaps even militarized—phase.  For a region which has suffered from being the focus of outside power struggles before, the question is pressing.
China, which claims that non-interference in the affairs of other states is a central plank of its foreign policy, has long disclaimed any intention to build military bases abroad.  Beijing has even criticized the United States for what it regards as its "militarized" approach to Africa.  Yet the only permanent U.S. military base on the continent is Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, a country that also hosts French and Japanese facilities.  The new Chinese facility is a highly significant step away from the country's traditional approach to the continent, which has focused on diplomacy and trade much more than security.
In the early years of decolonization across Africa, China's relations with the newly-emergent states was based on their shared identity as developing countries who had been victimized by Western powers and China's desire for diplomatic recognition and support in bodies such as the UN General Assembly.  But since Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched Beijing's "Going Out" strategy of aggressive overseas commercial expansion in 1996, economic ties between China and many African countries have grown at an exponential pace and have come to define the relationship.
Protection of these commercial interests, and the many Chinese citizens who now live in Africa, is undoubtedly one reason for Chinese interest in a base in Djibouti.  Civil strife in Libya in 2011 and in Yemen last year stretched the capabilities of Chinese naval vessels dispatched to evacuate Chinese citizens.  Controversy over the Chinese presence in Africa is rising in many countries, and Djibouti represents an island of stability from which Beijing might be able to run future evacuation operations in a region undergoing many upheavals.  It is also conveniently located to provide logistical support for Chinese vessels involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.
But neither of these factors wholly explains Chinese interest in a Djiboutian base.  With incidents of piracy in 2015 having dwindled to just 1% of those recorded in 2011, the dimensions of the problem appear to be waning rather than growing.  This  begs the question of why China was interested in countering piracy in the Gulf of Aden to begin with despite its nominal policy of non-interference in regional affairs.  Trade doesn't appear to be the answer.  Africa as a whole accounts for only 5% of China's total overseas trade, and over half of that is with faraway Angola and South Africa.  China's commercial ties with countries in the Horn are a tiny part of its overall trade with Africa.
Instead, China's interest in a facility in Djibouti is much more about its global maritime strategy than it is specifically about the Horn of Africa.  It seems unlikely that China intends to use the new facility to project power across Africa and the Middle East, as the United States does from Camp Lemonnier.  Beijing's intentions are thoroughly aquatic: it is interested in power projection across water, not land.  The facility in Djibouti is likely to be the first such instalment around the Indian Ocean from which Beijing can in the future protect the maritime trade routes which are so crucial to its economy.  The fact that Djibouti is located at the crucial choke point through which vessels traversing the Suez Canal must pass only enhances its attractiveness as a base location.
China's goals for the new base means there is little reason to think it heralds the beginning of an era of Sino-American confrontation in the Horn of Africa—at least not yet.  During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in a zero-sum struggle in which the countries of the Horn of Africa were forced to take sides.  In the 1970s, warfare between Somalia and Ethiopia was fuelled by the superpower competition and the readiness of the superpowers to arm their client states.  The U.S. and China have both worked hard to avoid the appearance or reality of a Cold War–style competition in Africa, and Djibouti's ability to play both sides is a welcome sign that for now this dynamic continues.
But there is a risk that, as both China and the U.S. increase their involvement in a small and crowded country, tensions in the broader Sino-American relationship might eventually have negative implications for Djibouti.  At the moment, the two outside powers have different goals in the region, and there is little reason for them to come into conflict.  The U.S. uses Camp Lemonnier to prosecute the "war on terror" across Yemen and North Africa, an issue that interests China little because Al-Qaeda and related groups do not pose a threat to Beijing.  China's own interest in having a base from which it may be able to project maritime power across the Indian Ocean in the future need not conflict with America's goals either.  Although it remains to be seen how China will ultimately use its growing maritime influence, it would be unfortunate and disproportionate for Washington to react to developments such as this in a way that makes conflict more likely.
Yet President Guelleh needs to be careful.  It suits his purposes to develop a new strategic ally at a time when he is under pressure from Washington over democracy and human rights.  But he risks creating a situation in which, if Sino-American relations worsen or even break out into open warfare at some point in the future, Djibouti and the wider region could be forced to take sides or even become a theatre of hostilities.  Such a conflict would not be likely to have its origins in regional issues, but would affect the region nonetheless.  By being so promiscuous in his choice of international partners, Guelleh has hence made the future of his country dependent on decisions made in faraway places by much more powerful countries.  The great blessing that Djibouti has in its strategic location, which Guelleh has leveraged to garner many benefits from the country's partners, could then become a "location curse".  Wily as he may be, it is now no longer in Guelleh's power to ensure that such an eventuality doesn't come about. readmore

For more information about this publication please contact the Belfer Center Communications Office at 617-495-9858.

Full text of this publication is available at:
http://africatimes.com/2016/01/03/will-chinas-naval-base-cause-friction-with-the
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http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/geopolitics-insecurity-horn-africa-and-arabian-peninsula?print

The Geopolitics of Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Summer 2011, Volume XVIII, Number 2

Accelerating processes of globalization and cross-border flows of information, communication, militants, money and matériel are reconfiguring the geopolitics of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Domestic and external drivers of conflict are increasingly intermeshed as problems transcend national boundaries and can no longer be contained within states. Issues have become transnationalized as supra- and sub-state networks of exchange bypass state controls and erode what little remains of Cold War-era distinctions between the internal and external domains. Previously localized conflicts have developed regional and transregional dimensions, knitting together the zones of instability, while the growth of powerful and violent non-state actors poses a profound challenge to existing security arrangements and the international order. In turn, new mechanisms of collaborative and multilateral approaches have emerged to tackle these issues. However, they have largely failed to address the underlying problems generated by the erosion of local carrying capacities, governing capabilities and a crisis of political legitimacy and authority in the two regions.
These subregional conflicts constitute an unstable zone of cross-border insecurity and informal networks that link the two largely distinct security complexes in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. The growth of multibillion-dollar shadow business networks spanning the Gulf of Aden complicates conventional counterterrorism and counterpiracy strategies and defies attempts to contain the threat of the spread of radicalization at its source. This has profound implications for the future stability of the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and for the security of the commercial shipping lanes that transit the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab. International actors' attention has, however, focused more narrowly on the threat posed by the reconstitution of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen in 2009 (and, to a lesser degree, Al-Shabaab in Somalia), and a succession of high-profile attempted attacks that have attracted global attention.
Following years of comparative neglect, the focus of the international community needs to shift to the interconnected sociopolitical, economic and transnational challenges confronting Yemen, Somalia and their regional environs. Yemen and Somalia face parallel challenges from insurgency, terrorism, economic hardship and ineffective governments that are perceived to lack legitimacy. Viewed through a narrow terror-centric prism, the region has become a dangerous node of international terrorism, as evinced in MI5 director-general Jonathan Evans' very public warning in September 2010 of the terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from militants training in Yemen and Somalia. This, he said, "shows many of the characteristics that made Afghanistan so dangerous a seedbed for terrorism in the period before the fall of the Taliban."¹ Western engagement in each country has been based on a state-building framework involving diplomacy, development and defense; yet, the priority attached to secu rity-sector intervention has undermined the balance of political and economic action needed for this approach to succeed or be sustainable in the longer term.² Such an approach risks exacerbating a dangerous misalignment between the short-term security-centric priorities of the international community and the longer-term measures and comprehensive reforms necessary to recreate a base level of political legitimacy, social cohesion and economic sustainability.

The paper has five parts: (1) An exploration of the changing dynamics of regional security and the gradual convergence of the phenomenon of weak and failed states on each side of the Gulf of Aden. (2) An investigation of how the GCC states have responded to these new security problems astride a geostrategically critical trade route linking them to Western economies and markets. As the key regional stakeholder, the GCC states have a collective interest in addressing the root causes of human insecurity and minimizing their overspill to their own polities. Yet, Qatar apart, their record of engagement has hitherto been underwhelming, with a clear preference for a strategy of containment over serious consideration of the scale and complexity of the challenge posed by Yemen and Somalia. (3) A look at the recalibration of local and regional approaches to insecurity in the Horn of Africa that have achieved limited change in diplomatic mediation and conflict management. Much remains to be achieved, and at present the regional states remain divided; there is little prospect of an autonomous conflict-resolution capability developing. (4) An examination of the wider geopolitical implications for maritime and energy security and the internationalization of response measures. (5) A consideration of the extent to which security is being reconceptualized to encompass the emergence of increasingly non-military challenges to fragile polities in transition   readmore 

War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State

Tens of thousands of ethnic Somali civilians living in eastern Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State are experiencing serious abuses and a looming humanitarian crisis in the context of a little-known conflict between the Ethiopian government and an Ethiopian Somali rebel movement. The situation is critical. Since mid-2007, thousands of people have fled, seeking refuge in neighboring Somalia and Kenya from widespread Ethiopian military attacks on civilians and villages that amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. For those who remain in the war-affected area, continuing abuses by both rebels and Ethiopian troops pose a direct threat to their survival and create a pervasive culture of fear. The Ethiopian military campaign of forced relocations and destruction of villages reduced in early 2008 compared to its peak in mid-2007, but other abuses— including arbitrary detentions, torture, and mistreatment in detention—are continuing. These are combining with severe restrictions on movement and commercial trade, minimal access to independent relief assistance, a worsening drought, and rising food prices to create a highly vulnerable population at risk of humanitarian disaster. Although the conflict has been simmering for years with intermittent allegations of abuses, it took on dramatic new momentum after the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in Somali Region in April 2007, killing more than 70 Chinese and Ethiopian civilians. The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government, led by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, responded by launching a brutal counter-insurgency campaign in the five zones of Somali Region primarily affected by the conflict: Fiiq, Korahe, Gode, Wardheer, and Dhagahbur. In these zones the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) have deliberately and repeatedly attacked civilian populations in an effort to root out the insurgency. Read more