Plaut’s Commendable Input Towards Making Eritrea Better Understood

 Woldeyesus Ammar
Source: Harrnet
The year just ending also happened to be a period in which a good number of publications were released for the wider public with the yet unfulfilled aim of making Eritrea and the situation of its people better understood by others. Among them were  the official submission to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council the final conclusions of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Eritrea along its earlier 483-page comprehensive report, and follow up reports of the UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia. Another worthy addition to the long list of new research papers and recent publications on Eritrea was  Martin Plaut’s Understanding Eritrea, a paperback published in October 2016 under the aptly chosen subtitle: ‘Inside Africa’s Most Repressive State’.
Martin Plaut and his new book on Eritrea
Earlier this year, journalist/researcher Martin Plaut mentioned to me that he was writing a book on Eritrea, adding:  “it can prove to be difficult to  write on a subject with so many experts.”  For sure he was kidding.  Himself one of the veteran Eritrea observers from his BBC days in the 1980s and till now; producer of authoritative publications on African affairs and current Horn of Africa and Southern Africa researcher for the Commonwealth Institute, Plaut has  again come out with a valuable reading material for all those interested to better understand Eritrea and its unending woes. (And no wonder that he one of those in the watch-list of the repressive regime in Asmara,  whose paid agents vainly try to silence him and his likes through ‘threats’ and name calling.)
The book makes a sweeping coverage of history – not actually to tell the country’s history, but to give a sufficient picture as to why Eritrea’s problems linger and why they are what they are. Also through a careful screening, he narrates and assesses events of critical importance in Eritrea’s sad post-liberation decades. In addition to squeezing out every bit of indispensable facts from the voluminous UN Inquiry Commission and Monitoring Group reports – facts that might have been  overlooked even by our most avid readers in the opposition camp – Plaut also surprises many a reader by putting more light on information not fully known to the ‘experts’ on the subject. And all this in a small space of not more than 250 pages!
Nowadays, if one mentions the name Eritrea, one can hardly avoid thinking of :

• The thorny relations Eritrea has with its neighbours, especially with Ethiopia;
• Eritrea’s dangerous fall to the worst form of dictatorship in Africa;
• The hemorrhage of its population;
•  Their suffering in diaspora;
• The fragmentation of the supposed forces of change, and
• Prospects for the future.

The book does fairly adequately address these hot issues of importance to Eritrea and all concerned about the plight of its people. Plaut’s findings on the regime’s illicit economic activities and deals are also of particular importance. He does not mention  any production of unwanted items by the regime after liberation although, according to the book, the front that Isaias Afeworki led to victory is said to have cultivated marijuana in areas under its control.

Closed and Secretive
In its early pages, the book prepares the reader to expect Eritreans to be an outcome of a difficult history carrying traces of so many rulers, and a complex identity of diverse groups speaking nine languages, belonging to two major religions, living in different environments and with co-ethnics separated by artificial colonial boundaries.  It also asserts that peoples of the region were culturally inclined  “to be closed and secretive” and that the left-wing ideologies of the 20th century did contribute in  hardening further these traits in their elites. The author finds leaderships in the region to be  “veiled and obscure” –  culturally and partly intentionally. Therefore, even genuine differences could not be resolved through open discussions because of the “cult of confidentiality” that existed in the liberation movements.
The new Eritrean regime thus remained obscure by keeping everything secret. Even Eritrea’s population was wanted to remain an unknown figure. The last population census was made in 1931. According to Plaut, the population estimates for Eritrea today range from 3.2m to 6.5m, and the regime in Asmara can chose any figure when it wants to project fictitious percentiles on growth in education, health services, the economy etc.
Quarrels with Neighbours
The Eritrean regime’s numerous quarrels with neighbours, in particular the one with Ethiopia, are given sufficient space and insightful analysis. Regarding relations with Ethiopia, the author considers the question of the border to have been of critical importance although the Eritrean head of state, Isaias,  at first gave it little attention.
To his credit, Haile Mengerios, at that time regime representative in Addis Ababa, is said to have raised the border question early in 1992 but Isaias “rebuffed” him. The book also mentions that  even Yemane Ghebreab (monkey), then a novice in official diplomacy, blamed Haile Menkerios of being “obsessed with the border issue.”
One clear omission regarding the border issue is the book’s  failure to mention how much other Eritreans were very seriously concerned about that problem starting in the latter part of the 1970s when disagreements led to serious armed clashes between the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Tigrai People’s Liberation Front (TPLF).
The author observes serious absence of checks and balances and unwillingness to compromise both in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and as such, when relationship between two individuals break down, there remain “no official structures to fall back upon.”  He also hints at the ominous probability – that no one can be sure that “full-scale war will not resume” anytime in the future.
A Detrimental Email
There have been heated pro and con arguments about the failure of the concerned   states (especially Ethiopia) to accept the “final and binding” decision of the  arbitration Tribunal on the border problem with its epicenter at Badme. After reading this book, I am inclined to conclude that it was a misleading email by an OAU staff member and  observer at the Tribunal that hugely contributed in further complicating the possible acceptance of the arbitration decision.
The Tribunal gave only coordinates on the map without mentioning Badime and its location. When given the first copy of the decision, the OAU observer at the Tribunal wrongly interpreted the coordinates and emailed to his headquarters saying that Badime was given to Ethiopia.
The book informs that it was Martin Plaut of the BBC  himself who was the first to correctly read the map and to report that the OAU email was based on wrong interpretation. Plaut’s interpretation was backed by experts reached by BBC. At that time, Ethiopia was already celebrating victory and its foreign minister said all what “a victor” is expected to say. When the BBC report was broadcast, Ethiopia sent to London its minister of Information to ask the BBC to withdraw  its report,  but to no avail.
As we all know, it is now nearly 15 years since the boundary decision was passed  and the crucial matter left unaddressed by all concerned.
The ‘Clever, Manipulative’ Isaias
No present-day writer can spare Isaias the blame of being the topmost culprit in independent Eritrea’s disastrous failure from becoming what it was expected to be at the end of that long-stretched struggle. Martin Plaut could not be an exception. He describes Isaias not only as “clever and manipulative” but also as one whose style of rule is “arbitrary, personal and ruthlessly repressive”. This  “towering figure who led his people to independence” was not ashamed to become the  “dictator “who now holds them in servitude”. Yet, to Plaut’s judgment, “his colleagues in the EPLF leadership must [also] take their share for the responsibility for the country’s predicament.”

Flight and its Consequences
After discussing the build up towards dictatorship and the economic failures in most sectors that rendered the country inhabitable, the book thoughtfully narrates the risks faced by those Eritreans, mostly young,  who take the fatal decision to  say bye-bye to home. To be appreciated most is Plaut’s ability to select and provide most essential facts that can be kept at one’s finger-tips about what happened and in what numbers to Eritrean victims of human traffickers in the Sinai, the Sudan, the Libyan desert, the Mediterranean Sea and others parts of the globe. The human traffickers included Eritrean top officials working collaboration with Sudanese counterparts in the dirty business.
The Diaspora
Also given adequate coverage are diaspora Eritreans – both the old and new caseloads, and how much they contributed to the coffers of the regime as they did in liberation struggle days.  However, the book reassures that “the days of [Eritrean diaspora’s] unequivocal support for the regime are over”.  However, the long-arm’ of the regime is still reaching many of the diaspora communities, including those 200,000 Eritrean-Americans in today’s Trumpland, who, by the way, were ordered to vote for this supposed new buddy of the dictatorial clique in Asmara. (And it is good to remember that Eritrea’s population was estimated at little less than 200,000 – equal to those Eritreans presently in America – when it was named ‘Italian colony of Eritrea’ in January 1890).
Naturally, the book discusses the problems in the diaspora opposition and concludes that old rifts of the liberation struggle years are still “standing on the way” of the much needed wider unity.  In the concluding parts of the book, Martin Plaut opines a number of possible scenarios for change in Eritrea, the most optimistic of which is an internal take-over by the army.
(This piece of writing was  initially aimed to be a much shorter thank you note to the author for making the effort to make Eritrea and its current situation better understood by readers.)
Thank you, Martin Plaut. Shukren, Yekeniyelna!!
With warm greetings of the Holiday Season. source https://martinplaut.wordpress.com/2016/12/20/understanding-eritrea-a-review/

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External and Internal Opponents

The Eritreans

A variety of Eritrean secessionist groups have used conventional means and guerrilla tactics to defy the forces of both the imperial and the revolutionary governments (see The Eritrean Movement, ch. 4). The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), a nationalist organization committed to self-rule for Eritrea, commenced a small-scale insurgency in 1961 against imperial security forces. Throughout the 1960s, the level of hostilities accelerated steadily, leading to the 1971 imposition of martial law. Ethiopian army personnel deployed to Eritrea during this period numbered about 20,000, roughly half the force's total, but much of the burden of counterinsurgency operations fell on the paramilitary mobile police.
Ideological and ethnic differences split the ELF in 1970 and resulted in the formation of the Marxist-oriented Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). From 1972 to 1974, a civil war ensued between the two groups. Eventually, the EPLF, which advocated "revolution before unity," emerged victorious. Many ELF members, and sometimes entire units, then fled into eastern Sudan, further weakening the organization in Eritrea. After establishing its dominance, the EPLF used its increased popularity to expand its personnel strength. By 1977, when secessionists controlled the countryside and most population centers, the EPLF had approximately 15,000 troops in the field. The ELF, however, still had numerical superiority, with about 20,000 troops in its ranks. Therefore, to further discredit and isolate the ELF, the EPLF and a group of former ELF cadres who had reorganized themselves as the Eritrean Liberation Front- Revolutionary Council issued a joint statement indicating that they were "the sole representatives of the Eritrean people and the only legal spokesmen on all issues concerning the Eritrean people's struggle."
In May 1978, a 100,000-member Ethiopian force was deployed in a counteroffensive whose objective was the eradication of the Eritrean revolution. Even though the EPLF and ELF succeeded in making some preemptive attacks against government units and in defending Eritrea's southern border, the ferocity of the government counteroffensive forced the rebels to undertake a "strategic withdrawal" to their base area. As a result, the Ethiopian army reoccupied most towns and cities that had been taken by the rebels. Government troops also dealt a crippling blow to the ELF, causing many of its personnel to flee into eastern Sudan, where many of them remained.
The only government setback occurred at the EPLF-held town of Nakfa, which eventually became a symbol of Eritrean determination to resist government control. After retreating EPLF units had reached Nakfa, they built heavy fortifications, including a forty-kilometer-long defensive trench in the surrounding mountains. Despite repeated attempts, the Ethiopian army was unable to dislodge the EPLF from Nakfa. Between 1978 and 1981, the Derg unleashed five large-scale military campaigns against the EPLF, none of which resulted in a government victory.
In February 1982, the Mengistu regime embarked on its sixth counteroffensive against the EPLF. Dubbed Red Star, the campaign involved 120,000 government troops. The campaign failed to drive the EPLF from Nakfa and resulted in the deaths of more than 40,000 Ethiopian troops. Although Addis Ababa managed to consolidate its hold over the Eritrean highlands, it was unable to eliminate the EPLF, which still possessed the capacity to make hit-and-run strikes against government positions.
Once the 1982 Red Star offensive ended, the EPLF regrouped its forces to seize the military initiative. In January 1984, the EPLF captured the town of Teseney in southwestern Eritrea, and two months later the rebels overran the port of Mersa Teklay, thereby establishing an EPLF presence on the northeastern coast. During this battle, the rebels also captured a significant number of weapons, which they used to take the strategic hilltop town of Barentu in early July 1985. Once again, the rebels captured an array of military equipment, including fifteen T-54/55 tanks and dozens of trucks and artillery pieces. In May 1984, EPLF commandos attacked the Asmera air base and reportedly destroyed two Soviet Il-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
When news of the EPLF's victory at Barentu reached Addis Ababa, the Mengistu regime ordered the redeployment of two divisions (about 30,000 troops) from the Ogaden to northern Ethiopia and formed a new armored division to help retake the town. The Ethiopian army then made perhaps as many as thirteen attempts to recapture the town, losing 2,000 soldiers killed or wounded in the process. After the Ethiopian air force started bombing Barentu, the EPLF guerrillas withdrew from the town on August 24, 1985, taking with them at least thirteen T-55 tanks, twelve artillery pieces, and several APCs. According to the EPLF, their units killed or captured 11,250 Ethiopian soldiers during several battles fought before the withdrawal.
Within days of reoccupying Barentu, the Ethiopian army recaptured Teseney, thereby cutting off the EPLF's western territorial flank. Additional government victories forced the rebels to fall back to their Nakfa stronghold. Over the next several weeks, the Ethiopian armed forces used tanks and other armored vehicles, cluster bombs, napalm, and fighter-bombers to support the ground attack on Nakfa. By the summer of 1986, the government offensive had ended; Nakfa, however, was still in rebel hands, and the EPLF had extended its area of control southward along the Eritrean coast.
On October 10, 1985, the Derg launched another anti-EPLF offensive, whose objective was the capture of Nakfa "within five days." The operation involved sixty aircraft and thirty helicopter gunships. For the first time, the Ethiopian air force dropped airborne units behind rebel lines in northeast Sahel awraja (subregion). When Ethiopian forces failed to capture the city, the Mengistu regime ordered two more attacks on Nakfa, each of which ended in the government's defeat.
In 1986 the EPLF relied on more traditional guerrilla tactics in its operations against the Ethiopian armed forces. On January 14, 1986, for example, a rebel commando unit, armed with rocket launchers and hand grenades, again penetrated the Asmera air base, destroying more than forty aircraft and burning the installation's ammunition and fuel depots. Apart from the impact on the Ethiopian air force, this attack caused the Soviet Union to terminate its reconnaissance flights to and from Asmera. The following May, EPLF artillery units bombarded Ethiopian positions in and around Mitsiwa, destroying fuel tanks and tankers. Regular units also overran government garrisons located about thirty kilometers south of Asmera.
Concurrent with these military operations, the EPLF continued its political offensive against the Mengistu regime. On September 23, 1986, the rebels celebrated their twenty-fifth year of resistance by calling on the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (Arab League), the UN, and the Nonaligned Movement to recognize the legitimacy of their claim to nationhood. Then, on November 25, the EPLF announced that it had merged with an ELF faction that had severed ties with its parent group. The EPLF also continued efforts to reach an accommodation with another ELF faction, the Eritrean Liberation Front- Revolutionary Council, led by Ahmad Nasir.
The armed struggle in Eritrea entered 1987 with neither the EPLF nor the Ethiopian government willing to abandon the use of military force to achieve their political objectives. However, the Mengistu regime abandoned its costly strategy of launching annual major counteroffensives in Eritrea, preferring instead a policy of defensive containment while rebuilding its army, which still had not recovered from the October 1985 offensive.
The EPLF also kept its military activities to a minimum. Apart from various hit-and-run operations, one of the largest rebel engagements occurred on March 20, when the EPLF clashed with four Ethiopian army brigades in Eritrea's northern zone. In the two-day battle, the EPLF claimed government forces suffered 650 casualties.
The following year, the EPLF, which by then had approximately 30,000 full-time fighters plus an unknown number of part-time personnel, stepped up its military activities in Eritrea. On March 19, 1988, the rebels inflicted a defeat on Ethiopia's Second Revolutionary Army at the garrison town of Afabet. According to British historian and Africa specialist Basil Davidson, the Afabet victory was one of the biggest ever scored by any liberation movement anywhere since Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954. Rebel spokesmen indicated that the EPLF had destroyed an Ethiopian army corps, comprising three divisions totaling 18,000 to 20,000 personnel. The rebels also had captured several thousand Ethiopian soldiers, three Soviet military advisers, and an array of equipment.
The Ethiopian government, which launched an unsuccessful counteroffensive in June 1988 against the EPLF, eventually ordered the evacuation of all foreign personnel working for humanitarian and relief organizations in Eritrea. Additionally, Addis Ababa told these organizations to relinquish all food and nonfood assistance to the government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). Many Western governments, including that of the United States, objected to this decision because they feared Mengistu would resort to using food as a weapon against Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels and their sympathizers.
Another development associated with the Eritrean triumph at Afabet was the EPLF's and TPLF's acknowledgment of each other's military victories, something that had not happened since a disagreement between the two groups in 1985 (see The Tigray, this ch.). In addition, the two groups issued a reconciliation statement in Damascus, Syria, and promised to coordinate future military actions to bring an end to the Mengistu regime. However, the EPLF-TPLF relationship continued to experience difficulties, largely because of disagreement over strategy and tactics, over the next several years.
Apart from further demoralizing the Ethiopian army, the Afabet victory also gave impetus to the peace process. In early July 1989, Yuri Yukalov, director of the African department at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met with EPLF secretary general Issaias Afwerki. The meeting was significant because it was the first serious contact between the Soviet Union and the EPLF and because it demonstrated to Mengistu that Moscow was no longer willing to provide unlimited military assistance to support his military strategy in northern Ethiopia.
The EPLF sustained its military pressure on the Mengistu regime in 1989. On January 17, rebel units launched a preemptive attack against Ethiopian troops located northwest of the Asmera-Mitsiwa road. During the two-day battle, the EPLF claimed to have killed, wounded, or captured some 2,600 Ethiopian soldiers, in the process destroying twenty-one tanks and capturing eight others, together with a variety of small- and medium-caliber weapons. On February 19, EPLF units, operating in conjunction with the TPLF, struck and captured the town of Inda Silase in Tigray. Over the next few months, the EPLF defeated an Ethiopian contingent at Adi Kwala, a town ninety kilometers south of Asmera (March 15); repulsed an Ethiopian army attempt to cut off the EPLF fortifications around Keren (March 22-29); and killed or wounded approximately 1,000 Ethiopian soldiers at Adi Goroto (March 27-29).
In mid-1989, after Mengistu had succeeded in thwarting a coup attempt, the EPLF and the Ethiopian government agreed to enter into negotiations mediated by former United States president Jimmy Carter. After a round of preliminary negotiations, which opened on September 7, 1989, at the Carter Presidential Center at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, the two sides agreed to hold another round of peace talks in Nairobi, Kenya, beginning on November 20, 1989. These talks failed to produce a peace agreement. Subsequent meetings in Washington, chaired by United States assistant secretary of state for African affairs Herman Cohen, also accomplished little.
Meanwhile, government forces continued to suffer battlefield defeats. On February 10, 1990, the EPLF captured the port of Mitsiwa. The fall of this strategically important port isolated Ethiopia's Second Revolutionary Army and eventually resulted in the loss of Eritrea. Additionally, the EPLF used its small fleet of armed speed boats to sink or cripple most Ethiopian navy ships anchored in Mitsiwa harbor. Then, in August, the EPLF launched an offensive along the Dekemhare front, south of Asmera. During this operation, the rebels killed or wounded more than 11,000 government soldiers and captured two tanks, many vehicles, and more than 1,000 medium and light weapons. Although government forces enjoyed a few minor victories at the end of 1990, the EPLF remained in control of most of Eritrea.
In early 1991, the rebels started their final offensive against government forces by driving south along the Red Sea coast, a movement that by early April brought them to the gates of Aseb. At the same time, they formed an alliance with other rebel groups operating as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and contributed at least eight brigades to the EPRDF to aid in military operations in Gonder and Gojam. By the end of April, the EPLF controlled nearly all of Eritrea, the major exceptions being Keren, Asmera, and Aseb. In late May, the EPLF assumed control of these towns without heavy fighting and without Ethiopian government reprisals against civilians. The 120,000-member Second Revolutionary Army surrendered in Asmera on May 24, the same day that Keren capitulated, the garrison at Aseb following suit the next day. Having occupied all of Eritrea, the EPLF announced its intention to repatriate all Ethiopian soldiers, security personnel, WPE members, and ordinary citizens back to Ethiopia. Shortly thereafter, EPLF leader Issaias Afwerki indicated that as far as he was concerned, Eritrea was an independent state.  read more

Gender: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and Eritrean government initiatives

Focus is given here to a description of activities concerning women’s position and the gender initiatives undertaken between the mid 1970s and 1991, firstly by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (the EPLF) during its conflict with Ethiopia and secondly by the post-liberation governments (a transitional government between liberation in May 1991 and 1993, and the current government thereafter, once independence had been ratified.This document addresses events to early 2001).1In many cases there is little or no documentation available regarding people’s responses to such actions during the liberation struggle; such information as exists is set out here, and consideration given to emerging issues of gender equality in the light of previous and current action by those in power. The concluding comments point out certain topics remaining to be addressed by both government and the general population (with its many interest groups and varying

perceptions) if post liberation policy is successfully to be translated into practice.

read more

The article was written at the behest of the Department of Adult and Media Education, Ministry of Education, Government of Eritrea, to commemorate the celebrations of International Literacy Day on Sept 8, 2004. The article was published in Eritrea Profile - a State run news paper four days before on Sunday. It portrays the struggle of Eritrean leadership since its pre-independence era to the present to combat with the illiteracy problems dogging the Eritrean ethnic groups. READMORE 

The State of Eritrea’s Wome n’s Association Revisited: An Analysis of its Past and Pres ent Roles, and Future Challenges Tirhas T. Habtu

This research analyzes the role of the National Union

of Eritrean Women (NUEW) in pre and post-independent Eritrea by

focusing on national and international discourses on Eritrean women (ex)fighters. The NUEW was established in 1979 under the auspices of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), then fighting

for Eritrea’s liberation. Until Eritrea’s de facto independence in 1991 it was regarded as one of the most effective women’s movements in the African continent. In the aftermath of Eritrea’s independence, however, national and international narratives on the emancipation of Eritrean women—particularly

women (ex)fighters and their post-independence status—took divergent paths. This research, then, examines the contentious contemporary discourses on Eritrean women by revisiting the formation, strategies and objectives of the NUEW. Moreover, it scrutinizes the methodology and the data used to bring about

the current image of Eritrean women in the international arena.  READMORE

If you don’t do it our way, forget it! Contextualising Education in E ritrea: Reflections on a Research Experien ce

This paper is part of an unfinished journey into African education and reflects on

experienced cultural dilemm as involved in doing qualitative

research on the context of educational thinking in Eritrea. The thirty-year Independence War (1961-1991) – the two last decades under the leadership of Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), Eritrea’s short post-colonial history, the unexpected recent war with Ethiopia(1998-2000), and the fact thatcentral EPLF leaders are still in political power, are reasons why Eritrea attracts researchers from many continent read more

IN MEMORY OF PRISONERS EXECUTED BY THE EPLF ( 1970s & 1980s)

In the late 1960s Eritrea was among the main sources of students for the university in Ethiopia. This was the case despite the fact that the Ethiopian government introduced a calibration of the university entrance examination scores according to the province of origin, in order to restrict the entry of Eritrean students. Erlich (1983) who was lecturer at the University of Addis Ababa also observed that the proportion of Eritreans at University was higher than for Ethiopians in the early 1970s. 
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